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ABSTRACT
This study investigates a factor that observation suggests is an 
important causal factor in economic outcomes, namely governance. Because 
contemporary economic theory provides little explanation of the observed 
link between innovation, governance and growth, a new theory of 
microeconomic activity is proposed; one that brings together the efficient 
markets hypothesis of financial economics, and the role of property rights 
that is central to the new institutional economics of North and Williamson. In 
particular, a conceptual model is set out, suggesting that the existence of 
governance mechanisms, which enable credible commitments to be given 
regarding future economic performance, is a crucial enabling factor for 
economic growth; because, within a market economy with imperfect 
information, they provide the right incentives for the cooperation necessary 
for socially beneficial innovation. The central body of the thesis seeks to test 
this model by applying it to four separate but important historical epochs, 
using secondary historical sources. Ancient and medieval Europe provides the 
first two applications. Following this, detailed consideration is given to 
England around the eighteenth century, and then to the United States in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The development of commitment mechanisms, first in the form of 
legal contracting, and then in public accounting, is described, and, when this 
also enables the growth of financial markets, economic growth in the form 
envisaged by the theory can be observed. Furthermore, the thesis argues for 
the scientific value of this commitment-credit theory, because of the 
observability, and so testability, o f the concepts at its core. This suggests that, 
from the point o f view of managers and government policymakers, this is an 
improvement over many other economic theories, and the neoclassical theory 
in particular, which builds on introspectively derived axioms, and rushes to 
give policy recommendations, without first testing the validity of the theory.
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C h a p t e r  One
M OTIVATION, M O D EL AN D M ETH ODO LO GY
On 2 December 2001 Enron, once the seventh largest company in the United 
States, filed for bankruptcy protection. Then, on 2 January 2002 Argentina, 
once almost as wealthy as the United States, formally defaulted on its debt. It 
is unlikely that there was any direct connection, except perhaps a global 
economic downturn and the psychological significance o f the end o f the year; 
but the coincidence in timing helps in suggesting a similarity in the 
functioning o f both nation states and large corporations. Argentina and 
Enron both failed because they were unable to fulfil commitments they had 
previously given in return for financial credit.
The consequences for both were drastic. In the run up to formal default the 
government o f Argentina changed hands five times in two weeks, and GD P 
declined by the annual equivalent o f 16.3 percent over just three months 
(Cibils, Weisbrot et al. 2002). The impacts on many citizens’ lives cannot be 
easily described in a few words. Although many parts o f Enron survived 
under new parents, thousands of people lost their jobs; and many employees 
who had invested their pension savings in the company’s shares found their 
material prospects in retirement transformed overnight from comfortable to 
struggling. The Enron fallout even brought about the end o f its firm of 
auditors, Arthur Anderson, previously a leading global firm.
Although this study is not directly about Argentina or Enron, not least 
because it was well towards completion when these events occurred, it does 
go some way to explaining what happened to them. The commitment and 
credit mechanisms that failed for Argentina and Enron pervade our world, 
and to a large extent make our economic world what it is. The mechanisms 
have brought, and continue to bring, massive benefits to billions o f people on
7
our planet; but as these cases show they are not without their downsides. 
However, before being able to deal effectively with many of the problems that 
accompany the system, it is first necessary to understand the logic that 
underpins the normal functioning of the system. That is what this study aims 
to do.
1.1 Observations on Governance
The focus of this study is to investigate an important causal factor in 
economic outcomes, namely the role of governance mechanisms. These 
provide commitment mechanisms, both directly and indirecdy through 
financial markets. Without them the innovation that underlies economic 
growth is unable to be properly directed. This is obviously a big subject, but 
perhaps more importandy, one that will have been extensively studied already. 
Or at least one would assume that fundamental questions such as these would 
have received considerable attention, from the economics profession in 
particular over the hundred or so years of its existence. Yet if it has, it has not 
survived into the contemporary literature. Some consideration has been given 
to governance, and this will be reviewed, but with one exception, it is not 
linked with innovation. The exception is the work o f economic historians 
North and Thomas, whose analysis of the institutional changes leading to the 
industrial revolution in England has many similarities to this thesis, but also 
important differences. In many ways this thesis could be considered a work of 
economic history, but its motivation is to provide a new economic theory that 
offers to be more useful than many already in existence, at least from the 
point o f view of managers and government policymakers. So its contribution 
is assessed not in terms of economic history, or contemporary economic 
theory, but as a scientific theory, the confirming historical tests o f which 
justify its value to practitioners.
In many ways the objective o f the project of which this thesis is the final 
product has been to provide a bridge between management and economics,
8
although it has only been able to do this by suggesting that major changes are 
needed in the content and process of microeconomic research. However, this 
is not primarily a critical work, it is first of all constructive. Clearly, if this 
thesis does identify a fruitful new direction for economic research then much 
more work will be needed. What is sketched out here is a logical framework 
and its application, in short a model and a methodology, that together make 
up a new theoretical approach, albeit one that draws on extensive previous 
work across the social sciences.
1.1.1 Specific Thesis: Governance is Key
The specific thesis at the heart of this study is that particular laws and 
regulations governing economic interactions largely determine economic 
outcomes, in much the same way that chemical interactions are responsible 
for biological outcomes; and furthermore, that these economic phenomena 
can only be well understood once the logic that links the two levels has been 
worked out. These legal mechanisms commit economic actors to future 
actions in a way that is mutually beneficial to the actors involved, and 
ultimately to the society in which they live.
What is proposed here is that the ‘throwaway lines’ as to the importance o f 
property rights and a functioning legal environment of many economists, 
before they proceed to focus a great deal of attention on formalising agent 
decision rules, puts the cart before the horse. It is becoming a commonplace 
that governance and ‘the rule of law1 matters; particularly given the problems 
caused by placing too much reliance on the neoliberal ideologues who failed 
to take this into account in trying to manage post-communist reform in 
Eastern Europe and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa. This study 
goes one stage further. It argues that it is the governance mechanisms that are 
of first order importance and, given those constrains, agents then have a wide 
variety of decision strategies open to them, although their actual choices are 
not necessarily as important to the overall economic outcome as the attention 
given them by conventional methods o f economic analysis would suggest.
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Although economists who claim that economic analysis is marginal analysis 
would obviously disagree, the focus here on systemic outcomes o f 
interactions between large numbers of independent agents places this theory 
firmly in the domain o f economic enquiry. The second half o f this chapter 
specifies exactly what is proposed. It sets up a model that encapsulates this 
logic, and describes, in an abstract way, how governance connects economic 
interactions and economic outcomes.
This project also differs from conventional economic theory because it 
suggests that correspondence with observational evidence is more important 
than mathematical language in providing a scientific explanation of both 
economic success and economic failure. The greater part o f this study uses 
historical evidence as a ‘natural experiment’ to attempt, in a Popperian sense, 
to falsify the model. For Popper, and even more so for later intellectual 
historians, science is a communal activity, so falsification is best undertaken 
by people other than those who propose the theories. Nevertheless, although 
this falsification is done in a somewhat contrived way, it does provide a 
linking historical narrative through which the explanatory power o f the model 
can be demonstrated, and allows the basic elements of the model to be 
further elucidated.
Enron and Argentina provide recent examples o f devastating economic 
failure, and in doing so also highlight the danger that unscientific economic 
theorising is not just doomed to irrelevance, but can also damage the lives of 
huge numbers o f people. Before moving on to outline the new theory, it is 
worth clearing the ground a litde more by briefly considering some of the 
evidence that is already available on the role o f conventional economics and 
economists in those disasters.
1.1.2 Practical Consequences of Theoretical Failure
Enron and Argentina are both problematic economic experiences, and for 
two reasons above all, and the reasons are not as unrelated as they might
10
appear at first sight. First o f all, they are problematic because those who lost 
out most severely were those least able to take action themselves to recover, 
namely pensioners, because most of their more productive years were over. 
Secondly, they are problematic because, in both cases, until shortly before 
their abrupt failures, they were held up as paradigmatic poster children o f 
neoliberal economic policies.
In the case o f Enron, right from its inception, the funds set aside to pay the 
pensions of people employed by the firms that had merged to make up Enron 
were put at risk, essentially to protect the jobs of the senior management. 
Probably more serious was the holding o f very high proportions of Enron 
stock in many employees’ personal pension funds. While diversifying a 
portfolio is the first rule of rational investing, particularly given efficient 
capital markets, there were two reasons why many employees failed to adopt 
this approach. First of all, the company encouraged employees to spend their 
personal pension plan contributions on its own stock by matching purchases, 
and secondly, many people wanted to believe that they would benefit in the 
same way as employees at Microsoft, many of whom were millionaires as a 
result o f the Microsoft stock they had been given by the company. How were 
Enron’s employees to understand the difference between their company and 
one like Microsoft that created real value? But when Enron crashed, so did 
the pension funds that were largely made up o f its stock (Fusaro and Miller 
2002, 122).
In Argentina, one of the reforms undertaken in the public sector was to 
privatise pension contributions, by making these compulsory for new workers 
and providing incentives for existing contributors to switch. This clearly 
created a massive hole in the existing ‘pay as you go’ system, where the 
operative principle is that current workers pay the pensions o f retired workers 
through their taxes, because current workers were now only paying for their 
own pensions. The situation should not have been as serious as it might have 
seemed, because the private funds were required to hold substantial
11
proportions of their debt in, supposedly low-risk, government debt. The 
money raised from this would be used to fund existing pension obligations; 
just leaving current revenues to pay the interest and gradually contribute to 
what was essentially a one time capital charge (Lewis 2002, 163, 164). 
However, reality caught up when public sector pensions were one major area 
to be cut in the emergency reforms of July 2001. The private sector did not 
escape however, as pension funds were forced by the government to increase 
their holding o f government debt, the value o f which fell precipitously as 
default increasingly became a likelihood, and then a reality, so decimating the 
value o f these funds in turn (Lewis 2002,173,174).
Enron rode the crest of two popular waves before it crashed so spectacularly, 
that for energy deregulation and then the ‘new economy5 of internet based 
businesses. Its CEO for most o f its existence was Ken Lay, and Fusaro and 
Miller point out that he was well educated, but that unlike most chief 
executives who have at least some education in engineering or management, 
all L a /s  degrees were in economics. They argue that what drove Lay and 
Enron was not any fundamental innovation, which is what normally lies 
behind any firm that grows so quickly, but simply an idea, that of free markets 
(Fusaro and Miller 2002, 2). Ley5s successor as CEO, until his retirement 
under dubious circumstances and Lay5s return, was Jeffrey Skilling. 
Apparently, while CEO he replaced his vanity number plate, which read 
WLEC for world largest energy company, with one reading WMM, for we 
make markets. His message was that having become the leading gas and 
electricity trading company, Enron would use the internet to create markets in 
a whole host o f as yet unimagined commodities. O f course, for Skilling these 
markets were not to be public goods, but cash cows to service Enron5s ever­
growing debts (Fusaro and Miller 2002,70).
Lewis describes Argentina as the most assiduous disciple of the International 
Monetary Fund (Lewis 2002, 174). And, in retrospect, lending from the IMF 
was a major factor in preventing an earlier recognition of the deep structural
12
problems in the economy, as well as possibly making the consequences worse 
when the problems did finally surface. Much as with Enron, Argentina bet its 
future on the neoliberal consensus o f ‘free’ markets, hoping that the growth 
that would naturally follow over time would generate the wealth necessary to 
tackle the other issues. The problem was that the Argentine economy was not 
growing. And privatisation, starving the public sector of funds, and imposing 
strict monetary discipline, did not come close to tackling the underlying 
problems of insufficient public revenue and entrenched special interests.
It is the connections between pensions and free markets that highlight the 
need for an economic science that the neoclassical model fails to provide. In 
effect, neoliberalism is the policy framework that is the natural consequence 
of the neoclassical model. In the same way that equilibrium is a static concept 
and, particularly with neoclassical Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium models, 
all future states can apparently be translated into currendy tradable 
commodities, so neoliberalism prescribes markets now, to create the best 
possible future, with no need to build any institutional infrastructure. Yet this 
approach was demonstrably wrong for Enron’s and Argentina’s pensioners. 
While neoliberalism emphasises individual responsibility, and individual 
rewards, pensioners do not live in a static world. They have already made a 
large proportion o f their contribution to their society and economy, and have 
little left to bargain with when the shiny new market is introduced. While 
markets are necessary for sustainable economic growth, they are clearly not 
sufficient.
Moreover, it is not the role o f economic science to tell managers and 
policymakers what to do, although it can explain interdependencies and, as a 
successful paradigm develops, it will be better able to specify more completely 
and accurately the likely consequences o f change in one factor for others. 
Managers and policymakers will always have to take the responsibility 
themselves, for success and failure, particularly if they make decisions that the 
best current theories suggest will have problematic consequences.
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1.1.3 Initial Observations of Practical Failures
So much for justifying and motivating the work of this project from past 
failures, let us now turn to the positive task of setting up an alternative. Before 
setting out the model in the next section, some initial observations based on 
Enron and Argentina will provide several issues to consider in the interaction 
between innovation, governance and growth.
Enron was undoubtedly an innovative firm. It was selected by Fortune 
magazine as the most innovative firm in the United States every year from 
1996 to 2001. In 2000 its revenues made it the seventh largest firm in the 
Fortune 500 (Fusaro and Miller 2002, 75, 173). Unfortunately, much of that 
innovation was misdirected, and large parts of the firm subsequendy proved 
to be formidable financial shells, with litde underneath the surface.
Enron was created in 1985 from two natural gas companies, Houston Natural 
Gas and InterNorth (Fusaro and Miller 2002, 4). Right from the start much 
energy was directed at what were non value-adding activities. Shortly after the 
merger the company’s executives felt it necessary to secure their 
independence by buying back, at a considerable premium, a substantial 
shareholding from someone thought likely to attempt to take control o f the 
company, and to do this used ‘excess funds’ from the employee pension 
scheme, together with high interest debt (Fusaro and Miller 2002, 5). To both 
pay off these debts and create the appearance o f earnings growth a 
programme of asset sales commenced (Fusaro and Miller 2002, 12). Because 
these assets had appreciated in value since they were built or purchased, but 
were recorded in the accounts at their original cost, as conventional 
accounting principles dictate, the additional income they raised when they 
were sold was booked as profit. Although in itself legitimate, this was clearly 
not a sustainable process, never mind a genuine growth strategy. There were 
early signs o f problems regarding managerial accountability in the late 1980s, 
when a subsidiary based in New York, away from Enron’s Houston 
headquarters, was able to run up losses o f around $100 million, which was
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discovered not by Enron itself, but by regulators (Fusaro and Miller 2002, 21). 
Unfortunately, both practices continued, and indeed reinforced one another, 
as Enron reinvented itself from a company that supplied natural gas into one 
that traded it (Fusaro and Miller 2002, 37).
While energy deregulation and the technology of derivatives trading 
undoubtedly provided opportunities to create real value, the accountability 
necessary to create a sustainable business was not regarded as important, so it 
was not long before Enron’s credit ran out. In April 2001 Enron released its 
results for the first quarter o f 2001. At least it released a profit and loss 
account, which showed its revenue and expenditure. It did not release a 
balance sheet. When it did release the balance sheet in mid May, its cash 
reduction amounted to more than it had made in profits. While this was not 
necessarily a problem in itself, it was a warning signal, one that created 
uncertainty and was followed by declines in Enron’s share price. By the time it 
released its next quarterly results its earnings were forty percent up, but its 
revenues declined slightly, while its balance sheet showed its cash holding had 
gone down by over a billion dollars in three months, almost twice as much as 
earnings had increased. The Chairman and CEO resigned in what are still 
mysterious circumstances. Then with the release o f its third quarter results on 
October 16 it seemed that perhaps the previous Chairman, who had returned 
from retirement, was putting the record straight, by announcing a loss o f $618 
million. However, this threatened to reduce the risk rating of its bonds, which 
was critical because without a top rating Enron would no longer be able to 
trade the transactions it facilitated, which were all effectively guaranteed by 
the firm. It officially corrected its financial statements for the previous four 
and a half years, as a part o f negotiations with another firm to buy up Enron 
as a going concern. But when those negotiations broke down on November 
28, there was no choice but to sue for bankruptcy, on December 2 (Fusaro 
and Miller 2002,109,112,113,116,121,122).
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Argentina is a country rich in natural resources, particularly in its educated 
population and fertile agricultural land. In the 1880s its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita was almost at the level of the United States. 
Notwithstanding the Barings crisis of 1889/90, the subsequent century shows 
a mixed record of economic growth, although ultimately growth became not 
just relatively but absolutely negative in the 1980s and 90s (Lewis 2002, 88- 
89).
Bouts o f very high inflation in the 1980s were brought under control by a 
series o f measures designed to achieve monetary stability, and for a decade 
they achieved their aim. In January 1990 short-term high-interest deposits 
were temporarily frozen. Long-term deposits were converted into ten-year 
government bonds, denominated in US dollars. Fiscal policy was tightened 
through reducing the number o f people employed in the public sector, and 
also benefited from privatisations. Then in January 1992 a new currency, the 
Peso, was introduced at a conversion rate o f one to the US Dollar, guaranteed 
against reserves held by the central bank equal to the value o f Pesos in 
circulation (Lewis 2002, 161-163). From 1991 to 1994 the plan succeeded in 
its objectives. Output grew at just under eight percent per annum and 
consumer price index inflation fell from eighty four percent in 1991 to three 
point nine percent in 1994. Unemployment rose, but remained below double 
digits. The economy also absorbed the external shock of the 1994 Latin 
American ‘Tequila Crisis.’ 1995 saw negative growth, but in the subsequent 
three years it was positive. Average annual total factor productivity increases 
were positive from 1991 through to 2001, and by the end o f the decade 
export performance was positive (Lewis 2002,165).
Unfortunately, there were what turned out to be unsolvable problems in the 
public sector. The pension, education and health systems remained strongly in 
deficit, which previously had been largely disguised by high inflation. The tax 
system was problematic, being largely based on indirect taxes, so was also 
socially inequitable and pro-cyclical. But most serious, as a percentage of
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GDP, Argentina’s tax base was only half that o f countries such as Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and the US. Problems were compounded because, while the 
central government was largely responsible for collecting revenue, the 
provinces were responsible for spending it, and public services were further 
devolved as a part o f the reform process. As reform progressed, social 
problems became more serious. Capital replaced labour in the private sector, 
and the workers displaced, like those who lost out in the public sector, were 
often the unskilled and middle managers, who found themselves least able to 
provide what the reformed economy demanded from its workforce. Worst of 
all was the cancer of corruption that pervaded the political class, and had 
become the only way a party could maintain its cohesion in government 
(Lewis 2002, 164, 167, 168, 175). From an economic perspective, corruption 
means that the rewards of economic activity primarily derive not from 
creating economic value, but from retaining the support o f individual 
politicians and government officials, so making growth almost impossible.
The stresses in the economic system finally started to bring it to its knees in 
March 2001, when over $5 billion was withdrawn from the banking system. 
Then between April and mid July a further $10 billion was taken out o f the 
system. New taxes were introduced and public sector salaries were slashed, 
although parliamentarians exempted themselves and their immediate 
employees in congress from the wage cuts. A last desperate measure was the 
freezing of many bank accounts in December, but very soon afterwards the 
government effectively collapsed, swearing in five different presidents in two 
weeks spanning the start of 2002, followed by defaulting on its loan 
obligations, and the subsequent and continuing economic and political crisis 
(Lewis 2002,172,173,215).
This brief description of the underlying problems that led to the sudden 
collapse o f Enron and the Argentine economy shows that while in both cases 
there was innovation, or at least the potential for it, undue attention was 
placed on trying to manipulate the financial position, without focusing on
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building the underlying mechanisms to support the real innovation that 
creates economic value. The importance attached to keeping financial markets 
happy at Enron, and to the banking system in Argentina, suggests that these 
indeed play a critical role, but that they are not sufficient in themselves.
In many ways this approach taken by Enron’s managers and Argentina’s 
policymakers is not wholly surprising, for as this study will show, the 
underlying commitment mechanisms that enable economic growth have, until 
now, eluded detailed attention as a fundamental part of the wider economic 
system. In part this is because, as we will see, they have evolved largely 
incrementally, and in response to particular problems. But it is also probably 
because the issues involved intersect so many conventional academic 
disciplines that they have been central to the study o f none, no doubt for the 
very understandable desire to avoid unfamiliar but possibly already claimed 
territory.
1.1.4 Initial Observations of Practical Success
Although the fragmented nature of existing studies o f governance poses a 
problem, it also offers an opportunity, because considerable evidence should 
exist in the literature across a range o f disciplines. There is a risk that from the 
perspective of well-developed disciplinary traditions an attempt to synthesise 
the evidence may appear unsophisticated, but a start has to be made. So, what 
can be observed o f the role of governance in economic success? Broadly, the 
evidence divides into two categories, macro and micro.
The macro evidence takes the form of statistical evidence that governance 
mechanisms are a major contributor to growth at the scale o f national 
economies. One paper, part of the output o f a recent major World Bank 
study on social capital (Knack 1999, 2), contains a paragraph that is worth 
reproducing in full.
“A theme repeatedly emerging from cross-country empirical studies is that 
the difference between developmental successes and failures is largely a
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function o f incentives facing wealth-maximizing individuals. In some 
countries, the structure o f incentives steers people primarily toward 
producing new wealth, while in other countries it is easier to gain wealth 
by diverting it from others. Social capital determines the relative payoffs 
of production and predation, ‘making’ and ‘taking.’ Where social and legal 
mechanisms for the efficient resolution of prisoners’ dilemma and 
principal-agent games are weak or absent, the private returns to predation 
increase while the private returns to production fall.”
A major source o f micro evidence is the work o f Hernando de Soto, and his 
colleagues at the Institute of Liberty and Democracy, in Lima. His recent 
book, The Mystery of Capital (Soto 2000), sets out extensive evidence from a 
number o f countries, across several continents, that the assets held by people 
in less developed countries fail to provide the economic leverage that similar 
assets provide in the developed world. In particular, the officially recognised 
property owner faces an almost insurmountable wall o f bureaucracy, making 
transfer almost impossible. As well as inhibiting business growth in itself, this 
situation also effectively stifles the development of commercial banking, at 
the heart of which is the use of property as surety against loaning money, 
which can accelerate the pace at which a business is able to develop.
Taken together these studies clearly demonstrate the critical importance to 
economic activity, and to enabling economic growth, of the economic 
governance mechanisms in the social environment. An economic logic that 
enabled these issues to be addressed effectively would need to bring to centre 
stage issues o f governance and growth in a dynamic economy, in a clear and 
concise conceptual framework. The next section sets out in detail such a logic.
1.2 Commitment-Credit Theory
The following five paragraphs sketch out the model that sits at the core of the 
theory, which the rest o f this section expands on. It explains how funding for 
investment in innovation works, by providing a mechanism for overcoming 
the problem of potential investors evaluating opportunities with limited 
information.
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1. Innovation: resources are needed to implement an innovation that 
will create a profit opportunity. Bringing an innovation to market can 
be expensive, disruptive and have an uncertain outcome.
2. Investment: consumption needs to be forgone in expectation of 
greater future consumption. For most projects, the innovator does 
not have immediate consumption opportunities available in enough 
quantity to be forgone. However, others may be able to provide 
credit, given the right incentives.
3. Governance: so the innovator needs to be able to make a credible 
commitment, some form o f contract, to give up assets or future 
revenue, in other words capital, in return for others forgoing 
immediate consumption in the expectation o f future consumption 
opportunities, even if the innovation opportunity fails to produce its 
expected gains. The innovator is in the best position to evaluate the 
risk/return opportunity prior to committing to a contract, and is 
subsequently free to make decisions with the best available 
information at the time, given that the contract is ‘incomplete;’ in 
other words, makes no attempt to cover every possible eventuality.
4. Finance: investors cannot judge the likelihood of any particular 
project’s success, so their preference is to invest in a capital market 
that minimises arbitrage opportunities. That is, a market where no one 
is able to exploit information someone else does not have available. 
So, in effect, returns are evenly spread between investors, and are 
based on the aggregate of innovative profit opportunities realised.
5. Growth: general equilibrium and intertemporal preferences determine 
the overall level of consumption forgone, or saving, in response to 
investment opportunities. And, with sufficient information and 
incentives available to innovators, they will realise profit opportunities
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that improve the consumption available in the economy, in other 
words creating economic growth.
The implications of taking this perspective prove to be deep and profound, 
throwing light on such apparendy diverse phenomena as capital markets and 
economic development, as the remainder o f this section shows. The next sub­
section identifies modem finance as the logical starting point for this study. 
The elements o f the model are then filled out in more detail. Once this has 
been done some logical consequences are set out. The central claim of this 
thesis is that an economic model should be judged on its ability to explain 
economic experience, and the final two sections o f this chapter explain first in 
principle how this assessment will be done, and then how this relates to the 
overall structure o f the thesis.
1.2.1 Logic of Modem Finance as a Starting Point
Work in the last three or four decades in one area o f management research, 
namely finance, does go some way towards bridging the gap between business 
practice and economic theory, and in many ways provides a sounder logical 
platform on which to develop a new microeconomic theory than existing 
neoclassical microeconomic theory.
The development o f finance as a subject o f academic study separate from 
economics, and separate from a primary concern with financial management 
as a professional activity, can be largely traced back to the observation in the 
1930s that stock market prices move in ways that are indistinguishable from 
random, and random selection is as good a prediction o f portfolio 
performance over time as any other method. Bernstein emphasises that as 
1933 was the date that this result was first published, extraordinary 
computational resources for that time were required for the study; which 
incorporated over eleven thousand buy, hold or sell recommendations 
(Bernstein 1993, 33). This observation has stood the test o f time, and is now 
labelled the efficient market hypothesis. In this form it stipulates that, in an
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efficient market, all information is taken into account in the price o f a 
financial security. N ot surprisingly, numerous elaborations to try to make this 
observation more precise, and so more amenable to more sophisticated 
statistical testing, have been made; but the basic idea is easy to grasp, and 
firmly based on observational evidence.
Modem financial theory is now widely applied by people active in financial 
markets, far more than the deterministic price theory o f neoclassical 
economics is applied anywhere. The random nature of financial security 
prices, and their numerical nature, clearly leads to the expression of these 
ideas in a mathematical form. Ironically, the mathematics used is far more 
sophisticated than that used in neoclassical economics, and most people 
working in this area trained not as economists, but as physicists or applied 
mathematicians.
However, numerical data is only one form of data, and mathematics only one 
form of logic; and clearly there is a close relationship between the two. The 
past twenty years have made it clear that scientific knowledge with a high 
degree of predictability, within well-understood limits, does not have to be 
expressed mathematically. In particular, extraordinary developments in 
molecular biology rely on the logic of chemical reactions in determining 
biological outcomes.
One big question this thesis poses is: whether legal-regulatory logic is the 
appropriate language in which to model the microeconomic relationships that 
largely determine economic outcomes? Notwithstanding the numerical- 
mathematical nature of finance, and finance is an important component o f 
the model set out here, finance is only one factor that is taken into account. 
Financial theory itself generally builds on some underlying economic 
relationships that it treats as random, or at least independent. In many ways 
this study is an attempt to broaden financial logic, though in a way that breaks 
the constraint on only dealing with quantitative data. This is only a tentative
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first step, so the legal-regulatory logic is relatively unsophisticated, and will 
almost certainly benefit from more detailed subsequent work. It may also turn 
out that there is a more important role for mathematical models than the 
question of the incorporation of legal-regulatory logic into economic study 
may at first suggest. Nevertheless, no attempt has deliberately been made to 
express the ideas contained here in a mathematical form, at least in part to 
suggest that it is the logic that is more important than the language, although 
these are not completely separate things.
The relative extent and impact of the failures of Enron and Argentina, where 
Enron was dealt with in a relatively orderly way, with less serious broader 
consequences, suggests that the environment in which firms operate in the 
USA benefits from much greater systematic support compared to economic 
relations involving sovereign states. Indeed both official bodies, such as the 
IMF, and influential advocacy groups, such as Jubilee Research, are proposing 
major changes to the legal environment for sovereign financing (Krueger 
2002; Pettifor 2002). So although it is an important subject o f much current 
practical relevance, because o f the currency o f the subject and consequent 
difficulties in dealing with the limited evidence readily available, the 
environment in which Argentina contracted for its debt will not be 
investigated. Indeed, the point is that it is not this environment that should be 
of primary concern in understanding the economic outcome, but the 
institutional structures within the country itself. The focus o f this study is 
firmly in the business arena, focusing on the legal and regulatory environment 
in which firms of all sizes operate, in relatively well-developed economies for 
their time. Subsequent studies could make explicit comparisons with relatively 
less well-developed economic environments.
Hopefully these general remarks help the reader by setting the context in 
which the subsequent argument is set out. Now is the point to move on from 
motivational issues set out in a discursive way, to a more specific, and 
positive, mode of argument.
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1.2.2 Legal and Financial Logic
The following five elements combine to form a coherent logical framework, 
at the micro level, which shows how innovators are able to bring to market 
new products and services, despite the necessity for relatively large initial 
investments. The framework is set out starting with the profit opportunity, 
and shows how entrepreneurs are able to draw on resources across the 
economy to tackle them, given the availability o f specific legal and financial 
mechanisms. This suggests that once these mechanisms exist the whole 
economy is able to experience growth.
Innovation
The essence of business activity is the search for profit opportunities. In a 
competitive market no business can afford to stand still, or another business 
will find a way o f better serving its customers, and win them over. In addition, 
this dynamic activity is forever opening up opportunities for goods not 
previously produced. These improvements, or at least hoped improvements, 
whether in products or services, amount to innovation.
Innovation is on the whole a positive benefit because, broadly construed, it is 
the only way to develop the resources that help counter the detrimental side 
of the fluctuations that inevitably accompany human life. Accumulated 
successful innovation is characterised as economic growth; but that is getting 
a litde ahead o f ourselves in the story, more on this later.
Despite its apparent benefits, innovation is however expensive, disruptive and 
uncertain in its results. The extent to which it is able to generate a profit in the 
future is subject to a whole myriad of factors, and practically impossible to 
predict.
Investment
Innovation, in the broadest sense, including all the initial research, 
development and marketing, can absorb a lot o f people’s time and resources, 
with no immediate return. In other words, realising an innovation requires
24
forgone consumption, or saving, but this can be justified on the basis o f an 
expectation o f greater future consumption.
In most cases the innovator themselves, either an individual or a firm, does 
not have enough readily available consumption to be forgone. Time normally 
devoted to production will need to be devoted to the innovation, in addition 
to resources produced by others, to develop the service or manufacture the 
product, and introduce it to the market. So other people need to forgo 
immediate consumption, so that the resources they produce can be invested 
in the innovation.
Forgoing consumption will in many cases be seen as a positive benefit; if in 
doing so people are building up a claim on resources they are confident they 
will be able to call on in an uncertain future. The opportunity for greater 
consumption in the future than currently forgone will further improve the 
attractiveness o f the opportunity. The key word here is ‘confident’. The next 
two elements, governance and finance, provide the mechanisms necessary to 
provide confidence, and lie at the heart o f what could be characterised as 
capitalist society.
Before proceeding, one additional point to make is that the innovator will, or 
at least should, know their own market better than any investors, but is not in 
a position to compare opportunities in their market with other markets, 
because that information is not readily available. Their expertise, in the form 
of market specific information and further information that will become 
available in the course of development, is central to the success of the 
venture, and will require the continuing commitment of the innovator to 
bring the venture to a successful conclusion. In contrast, the investor need 
have no specific information, other than confidence in their future claim on 
resources, and could even exchange this, that is sell it, if someone else was 
happy to do this for a mutually agreed amount o f immediate consumption 
opportunities. It is this information and commitment asymmetry that
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constitutes the property rights approach, which is set out in (Hart 1995). 
However, in the model being described here, incomplete contracts are not 
just a reasonable or empirically justified assumption, as Hart suggests, but 
necessary for the innovator to take the best course o f action as new 
information becomes available. Furthermore, the systemic elements of 
governance and finance set out next have not until now been linked with the 
property rights approach.
Governance
So an investor sees an opportunity to forgo consumption in the short term, in 
return for consumption in the future. But how do they know, given an 
uncertain future, that their investment will come good? Two elements of 
social structure are needed to provide the confidence necessary to make this 
investment, namely institutions facilitating commitment and credit. The 
innovator needs to be able to make a credible commitment, in the terms of 
(Schelling 1980, 24), to give up assets or future revenue in return for the 
investors forgoing consumption, even if the innovation fails to produce gains. 
This puts the responsibility for judging the primary risks in the hands o f the 
innovator, who has the best information. O f course it also gives them all the 
upside o f the opportunity, after the agreed amount o f return to the investor is 
taken into account. The assets or future revenue that the innovator commits 
is their capital. Because modem finance theory recognises that the value o f an 
asset is its discounted future income, this amounts to the same thing. In 
practice, the asset will need to have a market value, or future income be 
secure, and it is the function of banks to assess this.
In a national economy this governance mechanism is provided through a legal 
regime that is able, in the case of dispute, to effectively determine and enforce 
a previously agreed contract. This also ensures that the innovator will have to 
return to the investor no more than they have committed to.
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But how does the investor know what level o f return they should expect, and 
how this relates to the risks they are bearing? This requires an efficient capital 
market, as the next section explains.
Arbitrage-free Finance
As previously noted, an investor cannot really judge the likelihood o f success 
of a project. What will give them confidence is a capital market that minimises 
information asymmetries, so that in effect no investment is better than any 
other, so long as the innovator has the capital to secure the investment. The 
responsibility again is with the innovator, in this case as to whether they 
believe they will make a sufficient return given the rate o f return the capital 
market requires.
It is to fulfil the requirement for shifting consumption opportunities from 
investors to innovators that this framework justifies the widely accepted, but 
not well justified, efficient-market hypothesis.
A brief caveat should probably be mentioned. Efficient markets do not 
happen *by accident,’ but depend on traders and market makers being able to 
make gains from arbitrage opportunities at the margins. Nevertheless, the 
basic logic still holds.
Growth
We now broaden our perspective, one step wider, to incorporate all 
innovation possibilities, as well as the capital market; in other words, the 
whole economy. Economic growth emerges as the aggregate of new 
consumption opportunities exercised less the opportunities forgone as 
savings. General equilibrium and intertemporal preferences work to match 
overall consumption available to be forgone with innovators wishing to 
commit to provide investment opportunities.
The connection between investments and returns is not straightforward 
however. One big factor is the ability of the economy to absorb new products
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and services, particularly as in most cases this will be in place o f existing ones. 
There are two elements to this. One is the extent to which vested interests 
have the power to intimidate innovators, or unreasonably obstruct them. One 
way to mitigate this is through the participation o f those with social and 
political power in the capital markets. This affects the innovative push. The 
corresponding effect is consumer pull, in the sense o f the willingness o f 
people to try consuming new products and services, and continue consuming 
those that provide greater benefits at a given price. Both of these effects are 
difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, they are probably fairly stable over the 
course of a few years.
The system becomes self-sustaining as successful innovators and investors 
continue to forgo immediate consumption opportunities for a claim on future 
consumption opportunities. Furthermore, stable growth occurs because the 
focus for change is on products and services with greater utility, not simply a 
shift o f market power from one economic group to another. In addition, the 
attraction o f forgoing consumption becomes not simply to give a degree of 
reassurance for the uncertain future faced by every individual, but the 
reasonable expectation that future consumption will be significantly greater 
than the current consumption forgone.
1.2.3 Economic Consequences
The previous sub-section set out to explain clearly and concisely the 
connection between the different elements that form a self-supporting logical 
model o f a whole dynamic growing economy. This sub-section shows how 
this framework accounts for four commonly observed economic phenomena, 
namely output growth, size of economic units, financial sophistication and 
cyclical fluctuations. While significant in their own right, together they also 
help provide a more sophisticated description o f economic growth than the 
simplistic measure of income growth used in contemporary macro models.
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Output Growth
While economic growth has a number o f aspects, the growth of goods and 
services available for consumption is the central one, and plays a central role 
in this model. There would clearly be some connection between people’s 
willingness to trade and the existence of market-supporting institutions, that 
would fit in with conventional microeconomics, and the partial-equilibrium 
approach in particular, but unlike here it is far from explicit.
Si%e of Economic Units
Another issue that partial-equilibrium microeconomics is widely noted as 
failing to address is the existence o f the firm. Logically, it even suggests that 
the most efficient, and therefore optimal, structure would be for individuals to 
simply purchase goods and services as they need them, at the market 
determined price.
Coase’s explanation for the existence of the firm, as being due to transaction 
costs, carries some weight, and was one o f the sources on which the property 
rights approach initially drew (Coase 1937). Nevertheless, this approach 
largely fails to recognise the dynamic nature of the activities pursued by firms.
The approach set out here brings the firm’s continuing search for new profit 
opportunities to centre stage, and provides a far more compelling explanation 
for the existence of the firm. In the approach presented here the firm is to a 
large extent a commitment device, in two ways. First, it binds more than one 
innovator, each o f whom brings complementary skills and resources to bear 
on the opportunity offered. Secondly, it demonstrates the mutual 
commitment to the enterprise as a whole of investors who are unable or 
unwilling to provide the whole of the initial resource requirement themselves.
This evidence all fits with the explanation that a market cannot operate if an 
initial investment is required and success depends on subsequent 
commitment, because it is impossible to price individual elements. This also 
suggests that as larger investments are needed to achieve more cosdy
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innovations, albeit with correspondingly large benefits, and credit markets 
develop that are able to facilitate these investments, then larger economic 
units will form.
Financial Structure
Although many smaller firms still have relatively simple capital structures, for 
most large firms this is no longer the case. Complications to the framework 
occur when share ownership has limited liability, and particularly when equity 
becomes tradable; because the owners are no longer owners in the sense that 
they are committed to the return o f loaned capital. Rather, they are 
committed to the extent of the capital they have invested in the firm’s equity, 
in the expectation that they will share in its future profit. Equity becomes a 
proxy for expected future income, and forms the capital on which debt is 
secured. This clearly gives equity holders an interest in the management o f the 
firm, but their limited commitment is also reflected in an increased role for 
other stakeholders, as is increasingly being recognised.
However, these growing complications do have the benefit that they enable a 
closer match between risk and return, and this benefit will outweigh the cost 
o f the additional complications involved as larger investments are undertaken. 
So another aspect of growth is an increase in the variety of financial forms.
Cyclical Fluctuations
Despite the difficulty quantifying the socio-cultural factors that affect the 
degree o f innovative push and consumer pull across the economy, as noted 
above, these are likely to be relatively stable factors. More noticeable medium- 
term variations in the capital markets will be due to changes in intertemporal 
preferences. These will be quickly communicated because o f the efficient 
nature o f the capital markets, and will be to some extent self-reinforcing. This 
corresponds with the commonly recognised role o f sentiment in capital 
market pricing. Fluctuations in financial markets will in turn be 
communicated to the real economy through shifts in investment patterns.
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This suggests that as credit markets develop there will be a tendency for 
output growth to cycle, simply due to these endogenous factors, rather than in 
response to non-market factors such as wars and epidemics.
In many ways, the framework set out here asks more questions than it 
provides answers. What it is trying to do, however, is to provide a better, 
more comprehensive and more coherent, way of looking at a wide range of 
questions.
The commitment-credit model sketched out here, while not set out in a 
formal mathematical language, creates a bridge between institutional and 
financial economics. This provides a framework for addressing many of the 
issues faced by managers and policymakers, to the extent that it may make the 
conventional partial-equilibrium approach to microeconomics as redundant to 
economic education as it is to economic practice.
1.2.4 Scientific Tests
The model just set out therefore claims to provide a better explanation o f 
microeconomic phenomena than the neoclassical model. The challenge in this 
thesis is to substantiate that claim. This sub-section sets out how this will be 
done. The central issue is in what way this should be done, and the approach 
here is to take a scientific perspective. So the first question is: what does this 
mean? Once this question has been answered the structure o f the thesis will 
fall into place.
The model posits that a credible contracting mechanism is necessary for 
channelling potential savings through a functioning financial market and that 
the three are necessary for channelling innovative capability into growth. This 
implies that a change in contracting mechanisms will precede a change in 
financial markets that will, in turn, given that human beings have an inherent 
innovative capacity, precede a change in growth. And growth breaks down 
into four specific factors, namely the rate of income growth, an increase in the 
size o f the unit o f economic production, an increase in the variety of
investment vehicles and that the rate of income growth will display cyclical 
variation. The question is how can this model be tested?
Given the fashion in social sciences at the moment, the first thing to spring to 
mind is to look for a statistical test. But this is problematic, for two reasons. 
First o f all it would be necessary to put together a big enough sample to give 
significant results. The second issue is that while a credible contracting 
environment should be observable, it is not readily apparent how it would be 
quantifiable. This however, is not as problematic as it may first appear. 
Popper’s analysis, considered in more detail when assessing the contribution 
of this work in the final chapter, shows that what is o f primary importance in 
assessing scientific theories is the existence o f falsifiable, empirically 
observable, basic statements. It is impossible to ever go from the specific to 
the general, so even if the validity of basic statements could be directly 
established in every observed case, never mind in a statistically significant 
sample o f them, these cases would never ‘prove’ the theory. So this study 
focuses on directly testing a small number o f hypotheses through direct 
observation, leaving wider statistical tests to later studies.
Given the causal mechanism the model describes, an obvious test is to find a 
change in credible contracting mechanisms and determine the extent to which 
that was followed by a corresponding change in growth. But it is far from 
obvious where to start looking for changes in credible contracting 
mechanisms, so this is a problematic approach. The opposite approach is to 
examine the extent to which changes in growth were preceded by changes in 
credible contracting environments, and that is what this project did. It would 
be possible to present situations found in this way as being selected on the 
basis o f changes in their contracting environments, and then looking for 
growth impacts, but this would be somewhat disingenuous.
Two specific shifts in the rate o f economic growth spring to mind, namely the 
industrial revolution in England and the growth of large corporations at the
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end of the nineteenth century in the United States, sometimes labelled the 
managerial revolution. Both of these are very problematic from the 
neoclassical perspective, because it suggests that economic activity is more 
efficient and therefore better socially when it is undertaken by as small an 
individual unit as possible, while both these cases at least on the face o f it saw 
the opposite trend, with new larger organisational forms competing more 
effectively than older smaller forms. The first case saw the rise of the factory 
system and the second saw the rise o f corporations employing tens o f 
thousands o f employees and capitalised at hundreds of millions o f dollars. 
Pardy because of the problematic nature of the neoclassical model, both these 
shifts in the nature of economic activity continue to excite controversy as to 
the underlying nature o f the change and its causes. So, if the model proposed 
here was able to provide an explanation o f both o f these shifts, it would also 
make a considerable contribution to these debates.
While these two large-scale historical developments define the consequences 
for which we hypothesise that the causes were developments in institutional 
commitment and credit mechanisms, it may not be obvious where we should 
look to observe these previous changes. It is perhaps more obvious in the 
first case, where the focus is a whole national economy. In this case the legal 
environment for settling contract disputes, and then the overall financial 
system, are the areas to focus on. In the latter case it is the managerial 
performance systems, followed by the private capital allocation mechanism, 
that are the areas o f concern. In the latter case accounting techniques provide 
the framework for setting and assessing managerial performance agreements, 
and will be the focus for investigation.
In large part because of the continuing controversy around these historical 
shifts, there is a considerable body of historical scholarship providing a 
substantial number of easily accessible secondary sources, based on thorough 
examinations of a wide variety o f primary sources. These secondary sources 
provide an excellent supply of empirical data on which to test the relationship
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between commitment environments, credit markets and growth. In particular, 
because a record o f the agreement is an important element o f an agreement, 
as it reduces the possibility for future disputes, many of these may still be 
extant, and should provide a considerable body of historical evidence. In fact, 
it quickly becomes apparent that there is a more than adequate supply o f 
historical evidence available to use in this project, particularly in the form of 
legal and accounting history based on extensive primary sources.
Using secondary sources clearly presents issues as to the bias introduced by 
their authors in the selections they make to present their arguments, but this 
should not be a significant problem. This is not primarily a historical work. It 
is focused on social scientific theory, and simply makes use o f historical 
evidence to test the theory it puts forward. Because the historical evidence is 
used in this way, and there is little direct engagement in the arguments made 
in the historical works, the evidence drawn from them can to a large extent be 
considered as a random sample of the extant evidence.
We therefore have hypotheses to test and readily available evidence to use to 
carry out the test. Our hypotheses are that shifts in the structure o f the 
economy leading to greater economic growth in the industrial and managerial 
revolutions were preceded by improvements in the mechanisms available for 
making credible commitments and in the markets for financial credit. And a 
variety o f secondary historical evidence exists that provide descriptions o f 
developments in legal and accounting environments, in financial markets, and 
economic growth.
A theory can be thought of as consisting of a central logical model and a well 
understood approach to applying the model. It is on this basis that this study 
asks to be judged in its contribution to improving the understanding o f the 
microeconomic aspect of the world. Although this project is largely motivated 
by theoretical concerns, and much o f the time was taken seeking to address 
them, once the model had been formulated it was relatively quick and easy to
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present. The bulk of this final report shows how this model can be 
interpreted in terms of observations. It may be unnecessary, given its limited 
conceptual elaboration, to point out that the model should not be judged on 
its technical sophistication, but on its explanatory value. It is in the nature of 
this explanation that the model claims its value, and the considerable amount 
o f observational evidence presented here gives considerable additional depth 
to the theoretical concepts. This is as it should be. For any successful science, 
its central concepts at first appear over-simplistic, and the observations it 
chooses to make concern only a seriously limited subset of those that appear 
to the untrained eye as potentially relevant. Where it gains its strength is in the 
interaction between well-defined concepts and a wide range o f actively 
pursued observations. However, a theory can also be assessed on the 
importance o f the phenomena it explains. In giving a clear explanation o f the 
major changes in economic activity in recent human history the theory further 
strengthens its claim to make an important contribution.
While this study now has its central focus, there are three additional issues 
that can be addressed, and will help to establish the scientific credentials o f 
the theory. First, the definitions o f growth given here are more than the 
simple income growth normally taken to be the primary measure o f economic 
development, so the extent to which this richer elaboration o f growth is in 
line with the historical evidence will also be examined. Secondly, a small 
number of specific examples o f particular businesses based on significant 
technical innovations will be examined, to see to what extent they were able 
to survive and grow given first the general environment in which they 
operated and secondly, and possibly more problematic given limited evidence, 
the extent to which where this was possible they were able to make use o f the 
commitment and credit mechanisms available. Finally, it will also be an 
interesting test to see if there is evidence for the lack effective mechanisms in 
eras prior to those in which sustainable economic growth occurred. This will 
also help establish the extent to which developments o f commitment and 
credit mechanisms were genuinely novel.
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1.2.5 Presentation of Results
The structure o f this thesis follows naturally from the hypotheses that test the 
commitment-credit theory. Over half of the text details the historical 
evidence, which turns out to confirm the theory. The subsequent chapters 
assess the implications.
Given the historical nature o f the evidence presented, it is natural to present 
this in a temporal narrative. So the next chapter examines the evidence for the 
lack of effective commitment and credit mechanisms in ancient and medieval 
Europe. This also provides the background to the subsequent chapter to 
understand what was different about England in the run up to the industrial 
revolution.
The first substantial positive test o f the theory is carried out in Chapter Three. 
The development o f the legal environment in England, particularly as it 
relates to contract law, and in the domestic credit market, up until the 
eighteenth century, is set out in some detail. Following this the evidence for 
income growth, the growth o f firms, increasing variety of financial 
instruments and the start of a business cycle in the eighteenth century is 
examined.
Despite becoming independent in 1776, the United States inherited much of 
its financial and legal systems from England. The end o f the nineteenth 
century however saw an unprecedented restructuring of industrial firms. 
Although perhaps not so much studied as a particular historical epoch as what 
is known as the industrial revolution, the managerial revolution is to some 
extent easier to pin down. Between 1895 and 1904 over 1,800 firms 
disappeared into ninety-three corporations. The fourth chapter examines the 
developments in managerial accountability and corporate finance that 
preceded this, and then examines the issues o f income growth, growth in 
internal organisational sophistication, internal capital allocation and output 
cycles for the large corporations.
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The following chapter moves towards assessing the implications o f this work. 
Neoclassical problems have not gone unnoticed and modifications and 
alternatives incorporating a central role for governance in some form, o f a 
largely un-mathematical nature, have been proposed. Although fairly widely 
known, they do not seem to have led to changes in the way the neoclassical 
framework is presented. Nevertheless, partly to help assess the contribution 
o f the work presented here, four significant alternatives to the standard 
neoclassical model will be discussed in the light of the outcome o f the tests. 
These are, first the property rights interpretation of Western European history 
o f North and Thomas. Next the transaction cost theory of Coase, followed by 
a further elaboration of this by Williamson. Fourthly, the later institutional 
theory o f North is set out.
The issues dealt with in the commitment-credit model at the micro level, at 
first sight, mirror those dealt with by macro models, and in some ways this 
theory could offer similar advances over the neoclassical model, at the micro 
level, as the Keynesian model did over the neoclassical model at the macro 
level. So some of these macro issues will also be introduced, to help 
understand the implications of the contribution made by this model.
The implications o f the commitment-credit theory are the subject o f the final 
chapter. The first part o f the chapter considers the conceptual nature o f 
scientific enquiry, and the implications o f this project for microeconomic 
research in particular. The second part of the final chapter discusses the social 
implications, first within the economics profession, then some broader 
practical implications. Some of these may feed through additional 
macroeconomic work to public policy, but there are some more immediate 
implications for microeconomics and management studies, in particular in 
terms of what should form the conceptual focus for studying the 
management o f large organisations.
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The framework provided here provides a much clearer link between 
management studies and microeconomics than currently exists. Links to other 
related subjects such as law and both accounting and finance also become 
apparent, in a far more transparent way than has been possible to construct 
with the neoclassical framework. What may seem to disappear is the 
framework as a foundation for macroeconomics, but the conventional focus 
of macroeconomics over the past few decades has itself come under 
considerable attack in recent years. Policy concerns have shifted away from 
attempts to manipulate aggregates such as money supply, employment and 
public spending, towards such ‘micro’ issues as competition regulation, 
banking supervision and public sector governance. The framework provided 
here provides a much more natural conceptual structure for dealing with 
these issues. So, as well as exploring possibilities for mathematical 
formalization, the natural follow up to this project appears to be a 
macroeconomic theory of governance that is able to bridge the gap.
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C h a p t e r  Two
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is apparent, from even a cursory knowledge o f history, that there was only 
ever very modest sustained economic growth prior to the eighteenth century. 
But it is not immediately clear why this was the case. So providing an 
explanation o f this can be construed as a test of the commitment-credit 
theory. This chapter examines two pre eighteenth-century historical epochs, 
to see to what extent commitment and credit mechanisms existed, and how 
this affected economic growth; namely ancient and medieval Europe. O f 
course, while providing a test of the theory, the details presented here also 
describe the historical background to the first appearance o f sustainable 
growth, and will help to emphasise the distinctiveness o f the social 
phenomena that enabled it, as well as showing that the governance 
mechanisms to enable commitment and credit did not just suddenly emerge 
into being.
The twin purposes of theory testing and subsequent comparison therefore 
provide the selecting and organising principles for this chapter. Authoritative 
secondary sources provide the evidence. Nevertheless, some caveats do apply. 
First o f all, for the ancient world in particular, primary sources are far from 
abundant. However, the focus is on areas relatively well attested by sources. 
While not conclusive, an evolutionary argument would suggest that those 
regimes that left the most substantial evidence were the most successful o f 
their contemporaries. Perhaps the most important caveat is that there is no 
reason to expect that the way people are brought up to categorise their world 
now is not substantially different from in the past, which makes 
understanding ancient societies that much more challenging. Indeed, this 
thesis contends that it is changes in the nature o f relationships between
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individuals that is at the heart o f the emergence o f growth-enabling 
governance.
2.1 Ancient Greece and Rome
Evidence of commitment and credit mechanisms require two things o f a 
society, first a sense of the individual as having a degree o f autonomy, and 
second a physical record. Without the first the concepts make no sense; 
without the second there is no evidence. On both counts we begin with the 
Greeks. To a greater or lesser extent all known human societies, almost by 
definition, could be fruitfully examined, but the Greeks are the first 
civilization to provide a wide range of written evidence that both directly, 
through actual documents involved, and indirectly, through their literary and 
historical sources, demonstrates a multifaceted but relatively consistent 
conception of the individual in their society, and the existence o f mechanisms 
used to invoke what we call contractual commitment and commercial credit.
2.1.1 Commitment
Most o f the elements for facilitating the creation of contractual commitment 
devices did emerge in some form in the ancient world. The Greek 
contribution was fundamental, and within their world Athens for our 
purposes was the most advanced, because they invented the concept of a 
democratic society. That is, a society where its members set the standards to 
which everyone must adhere, and the sanctions to be applied to those who do 
not. Despite the limited nature of Athenian democracy, which excluded 
women and slaves, it is in stark contrast to the hierarchical structure o f most 
human societies, where those higher up the tree make the decisions for those 
below. The Romans then advanced on the Greeks by abstracting this 
principle, and beginning the development o f social systems governed by the 
rule o f law. Necessity was largely the mother of this invention, because where 
Greek city-states never moved beyond a size where communal decisions
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could be taken by a significant proportion o f the community, Rome, even at 
the end o f the republic, ruled over a substantial empire.
Greek society did develop the concept of contract, but contract law never 
developed into a recognisably modem form of legal practice, largely because 
in practice the resolution o f disputes depended largely on the reputations o f 
the individuals involved. The Athenians tried to stand firmly by the principle 
that parties to a contract should expliddy agree and state in the contract the 
provisions to which they wished to be bound. Although in many ways a 
laudable aim, as later more sophisticated societies found, it presented a barrier 
to developing an effective system o f contract law. This depends on making 
the contracting process manageable, by developing widely understood 
principles for dealing with the inherent complexity and unpredictability o f 
human life, which are taken to hold, unless explicitly ruled out in any 
particular contract. Further factors o f Athenian legal practice acted as 
additional constraints. One individual could only take legal action against 
another. N ot only did this present a problem in forming any sort o f company, 
it also made partnerships difficult because action could only be taken by or 
against one partner at a time. It has been suggested that one effect o f this was 
that in a cooperative venture there would only be one named individual, who 
would be the least wealthy, even though their actual involvement in the 
venture may have been relatively small, if indeed they were involved at all 
other than as a proxy for contractual purposes (Cohen 1992,170).
By the fourth century BCE contracts were written, but up until this point 
courts demanded oral testimony, and written material was o f little value, so 
contracts were only made verbally (Cohen 1992, 178). This obviously limits 
the evidence we do have of specific contracts, although some direct evidence 
does exist from records of court activities, particularly speeches by well- 
known orators, that there were relatively sophisticated financing contracts for 
maritime trade.
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All things considered, while effective practices could be developed by 
individuals, and diffused through personal instruction or copying others’ 
observed behaviour, there were no institutional mechanisms for accelerating 
this learning. Even if one accepts the most positive interpretation o f the 
evidence we have available regarding its sophistication, institutional limitations 
severely constrained effective development.
The Romans, although they acknowledged their debt to the Greeks, 
developed the basis of a system that up to this day forms the foundation of 
one o f two widespread legal traditions, one which remains particularly strong 
in continental western Europe. The foundation o f their legal system and 
subsequent developments was the Twelve Tablets, produced by a commission 
set up in response to popular calls for a codification o f the traditional laws, 
similar to that o f Solon produced in Athens in the early sixth century. A 
popular assembly in 450 BCE approved them. These dealt with a wide range 
of issues, focusing on potential areas of contention. In particular, they dealt 
with details o f legal procedure (Stein 1999, 4).
Roman law gained much of its effectiveness from its procedure, which had 
two elements. The first was the application o f legal principles by an elected 
magistrate, the second the establishment o f facts by an independent juryman. 
A litigant first had to appear before the magistrate with his opponent. The 
opponent would presumably go along with this, as there were relatively 
straightforward ways to compel him if he was reluctant. The magistrate would 
decide whether there was a case to answer in legal terms, and if there was, 
what the factual question was that would determine the outcome. A mutually 
agreed juror was then selected, if necessary using a procedure that was 
demonstrably fair, where each party eliminated one person from a list o f 
eligible citizens until only one remained. The magistrate would then make a 
proclamation appointing the juror with his terms of reference, setting out the 
appropriate legal ‘formula’. The juror would then take whatever steps he felt 
were necessary to determine the relevant facts, and then deliver his verdict.
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When this procedure was first instituted, the magistrates were the two consuls 
responsible for every aspect of governing the city. However, in 367 BCE a 
new office was established, that of praetor, and someone was elected to the 
post annually to deal exclusively with the administration of justice (Stein 1999, 
8). It was not expected that the individual elected would have any particular 
expertise in the law. The tradition developed that at the beginning o f the year 
o f office a praetor would publish an edict setting out the formulae he would 
grant, and it was then for individuals to apply for a formula in regard to a 
particular situation. In theory the praetor never made the law, but simply set 
out what the law was. However, the edict could and did change from year to 
year, so the effect was that the law developed in response to the types of cases 
that arose.
As Rome’s sphere o f influence expanded and the formal legal framework 
grew in sophistication, the system developed. A second praetor was elected 
annually from 242 BCE, and soon afterwards a class of legal experts, jurists, 
emerged. Neither the magistrates, nor the jurymen, nor for that matter the 
litigants or defendants, had any particular expertise. Although not having any 
formal role, jurists were available to advise any o f the parties, and at first they 
were not paid because they regarded their work as a form of public service. 
They effectively became the custodians o f the law (Stein 1999,13).
This situation was largely maintained in the early years o f the Empire. 
Augustus in particular was anxious to preserve the fa$ade o f a republican 
constitution. But not surprisingly the praetorian edict had reached the point 
where it hardly changed from one year to the next. And in the early years o f 
the second century the Emperor Hadrian ordered it put into a permanent 
form. The two centuries leading up to this are regarded as the high point of 
Roman law, known as the classical period. During this period expert jurists 
debated problematic cases that arose, either in reality or hypothetically, and 
these debates shaped a remarkably rational and consistent legal framework.
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Alongside the maturing o f the central principles was a move towards 
systematisation. At least at first, this was as an aid to legal education rather 
than legal practice. But by the beginning of the second century two leading 
jurists, Paul and Ulpian, wrote great commentaries, synthesising the work of 
their predecessors. Ulpian made for the first time a clear distinction between 
public and private law. Public law addressed matters to do with the state, and 
private law addressed relations between private individuals (Stein 1999,21).
It is perhaps not surprising that as the system became increasingly complex it 
also became increasingly bureaucratic. One significant change was the 
introduction of professional judges, often trained jurists, who took on the 
roles of both magistrate and juryman. This was a gradual occurrence, with the 
two types o f court existing through most of the Empire until the formulary 
procedure ceased to be used, officially in the fourth century, but probably in 
practice the previous century (Johnston 1999, 122). Alongside this, the orality 
that had remained an important element of the process gave way to 
exchanges conducted in writing. One generally positive innovation was the 
introduction of an appeals process. All this placed far heavier demands on the 
time of legal experts, and the pendulum of development swung away from 
elaboration towards systematisation and simplification (Stein 1999,24).
Roman contracts took two forms, formal and informal (Johnston 1999, 77). 
The formal one, stipulate, was made orally. The promisee would ask a 
question, and the promisor would reply with an exacdy corresponding 
answer. Its terms were interpreted stricdy and everything needed to be stated 
explicidy for it to be a part of the contract. Informal contracts covered a 
variety of specific situations, and each type of situation required its own type 
o f contract. The emergence of the consensual contract of sale, empio venditio, 
by the end of the second century BCE, overcame some of the disadvantages 
o f the stipulate. It required a defined object and price, which clearly covers 
many situations, but excludes those where the price may be subject to change 
for any reason, by reference to a future event for example, or because the
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object is not specifically identified, as with a generic product such as com 
before the specific measure has been metered out. Given the required 
elements, several legal consequences followed automatically, such as the seller 
warranting tide to the goods and the quality of the goods, and once agreed the 
risk of accidental loss or damage passed to the buyer. In more general terms, 
the concept o f good faith developed, and was applied, by the early second 
century CE. The effect of this was that the law automatically kept pace with 
customs of trade and commerce (Johnston 1999, 81).
Given the important role of banking in the economy, described in the next 
subsection, the law evolved to deal with significant issues that would arise 
from time to time. By late classical law it had become accepted that, as a 
consequence o f good faith, if a banker made use of money placed on deposit, 
he was obliged to pay interest (Johnston 1999, 87). Security against borrowing 
generated a considerable juristic output, suggesting it was a very real issue. 
Much of this related to personal guarantees, suggesting that this was creditors’ 
preferred source o f security, but real security was also significant, although the 
scope for confusion over prior charges means that it was less useful and 
versatile than it might have been (Johnston 1999, 94).
Moving from contracts related to specific actions, what of the legal basis for 
principal-agent relationships? As a precursor to this it is necessary to set out, 
briefly, significant differences between Roman society and our own regarding 
interpersonal relationships. The primary difference was that in Rome the 
family rather than the individual was seen as the basic unit of society. In legal 
terms this meant that the senior male ascendant, the paterfamilias, owned all 
the family property, and everything acquired by his dependants automatically 
vested in him. As well as descendents the family also included slaves. One 
possibly surprising difference was that marriage did not alter this family 
relationship, so at least in property terms divorce was fairly straightforward. 
N ot surprisingly perhaps, there was a mechanism that made this property 
situation a little less restrictive than it otherwise would have been. This was
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the peculium, where some amount of property was made available to a 
dependent descendent or slave. This remained the property of the 
paterfamilias and could be withdrawn at any time, but until that happened the 
person to whom it was granted had full powers of disposal over it (Johnston 
1999, 31). There were legal avenues available for releasing descendants or 
slaves from the control of the paterfamilias, but certainly in the case of 
children this does not appear to have been the regular occurrence. It was 
largely on the elaboration of the peculium concept that principal-agent 
relationships developed.
What follows is based less on evidence of actual practice than on the extent to 
which the issues are addressed by the jurists, because of the lack of direct 
evidence o f the former, while the latter does not seem unreasonably 
disconnected from practical application. The effect o f the peculium was that 
the paterfamilias would still be called as the defendant in any legal proceeding, 
but would be bound by the actions of a dependent, to the limit o f their 
peculium. This actually had a benefit o f course, that the limit o f the action was 
the extent o f the peculium, so introducing a form of limited liability. There 
were cases where a principal could be sued for the actions of an agent, one of 
these related specifically to owners being responsible for the actions o f their 
ship captains. In these cases there was no limit to liability. For a dependant in 
receipt of a peculium, the extent o f the liability rested on the knowledge o f the 
paterfamilias. Clearly, there could be benefits from not having direct 
knowledge, and one way of helping establish this was by having a dependent 
with a peculium appointing the agent, a possibility explicidy acknowledged by 
the jurists (Johnston 1999, 104). Employing agents who were not dependents 
did bring additional complications, although these were reduced during the 
second century CE. There is evidence of partnerships, societas, although it is 
more evident as an arrangement under which co-heirs would continue to 
operate an inherited business as a single entity, than for more specific business 
opportunities, although these were not ruled out. One document sets out a 
partnership arrangement, but in the form of a stipulate (Johnston 1999, 107).
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Part of the reason for this may be that the partnership was only relevant for 
the partners. Any action by another party had to be in relation to one specific 
partner.
One other relevant issue addressed by Roman law was bankruptcy. A creditor 
could take action in two ways, against a person, or against their property. 
Action against a person appears to have become less common. A creditor 
could imprison a person until he had worked off his debt, but although there 
are provisions in the Twelve Tables for this, its application is unclear. More 
clarity prevails for action against property. Detailed consideration by the 
jurists and continuing development through the Empire suggest that this was 
a regular occurrence, for example elaborations were introduced to treat all 
creditors on an equal footing (Johnston 1999, 109). With no concept o f 
separating the individual from their business, the individual was wholly liable, 
as well as being subject to subsequent civil disabilities, and social stigma. As 
this was in general the only remedy open to an unpaid creditor, it could create 
difficulties for both sides, but perhaps in practice this would have encouraged 
mutual agreement without court involvement.
From this brief summary it is apparent that Roman law had at least begun to 
address the central issues o f contracts as commitment devices for commercial 
activity. The next section describes the further elaborations developed during 
the middle ages, but Roman law continued to be the foundation on which 
subsequent developments were built. The next question to be addressed is to 
what extent did this foundation allow financial markets to develop.
2.1.2 Credit
To some extent our story ends before it really gets started, because neither the 
Greeks nor the Romans, according to one of their most generous analysts 
(Andreu 1999,147), distinguished between loans for investment and loans for 
consumption. Much debate has gone on as to the extent to which ancient 
economies functioned in similar ways to modem ones. While Finley, on
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whose authority we will also draw, has made the case for a significant 
difference, Cohen and Andreu tend to the other point o f view. However, in 
all cases, what will be drawn on here is the specific nature of the mechanisms 
the evidence shows were available, rather than any assessment as to their 
modernity.
The lack o f any evidence directly or indirecdy o f a distinction between loans 
for investment and loans for consumption suggests that the role o f credit 
markets in allowing innovators to create wealth was not appreciated either 
explicidy or implicidy. So they failed to function effectively as a governance 
mechanism harnessing innovation to growth, and in itself provides an 
explanation o f the ancient world’s failure to achieve sustainable significant 
growth. Nevertheless, well-documented credit mechanisms did exist, and 
these will be set out. Direct connections between Greek, Roman and 
subsequent European practices will become apparent, and the issues dealt 
with by the ancients do shed light on the nature o f effective governance 
mechanisms, particularly in regard to problems that can arise.
Money, the precursor to any effective financial credit mechanism, was a 
Greek invention. The use of standardised pieces of precious metals goes back 
much further, but coins were invented around 640 BCE in Lydia, in what is 
now Turkey, but was a city state in the Greek tradition (Davies 1994, 63). 
Archaeological evidence clearly shows developments leading to the coin 
around Lydia, where other areas o f the Greek world only reveal fully 
developed coins. Nevertheless, the take up o f the idea was very rapid. Around 
half a century later they were widely in use across the Greek world. Although 
no doubt initially understood as nothing more than a way of identifying a 
recognisably unadulterated standard amount o f precious metal, the concept o f 
a unit o f currency as a measure of value in itself, rather than simply another 
commodity, albeit a portable, easily transported and traded one, opened a new 
world o f abstraction.
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There is some evidence that Athenian banking became relatively 
sophisticated, and dealt with a variety of clients including both wealthy 
aristocrats and businesses, particularly the maritime traders who among other 
things kept the Athenian population fed; although the extent o f their activities 
is disputed (Cohen 1992, 8). At least in part, the dispute is a result o f the 
somewhat confusing evidence. So even if credit mechanisms were relatively 
sophisticated, it has been suggested that the legal framework available for 
mediating disputes, just described, and the mechanisms for collecting taxes 
described next, at the least provided incentives for limiting the amount of 
information put into accessible forms. Clearly, information that was not easily 
available to contemporaries is even less available to us from our distance in 
time.
Athenian taxes were effectively levied on visible wealth, and worked on the 
basis o f specific needs for public expenditure being made the responsibility o f 
a particular citizen. Common examples were a ship for the navy, or funding 
for a communal festival. A process existed for the community to select 
specific individuals. But if the individual selected could prove in the law court 
that another individual was wealthier and had not performed as many public 
duties, the burden shifted to them. While this system makes a lot of sense, 
given that there was no government machinery, there was clearly an incentive 
to conceal the extent o f ones wealth, which one only had to do from other 
citizens, rather than the state. This not only provided an incentive to keep 
bank activity confidential, but because confidentiality was so important to a 
banker’s success, it is possible that this increased the demand for bank- 
mediated investments. This may have become particularly acute in the fourth 
century, when Athens had lost her empire, its silver mines were less 
productive, and while it still remained independent, the tax burden became 
rather substantial (Cohen 1992, 194). But the source of funds, particularly 
given the incentives mentioned, is open to a variety o f interpretations, so it is 
not clear how credit arrangements fitted into the wider economy.
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In contrast to the Athenian picture, there is considerable evidence that 
Roman banking did became relatively well developed. The industry existed in 
two forms, although, as with most social classifications, these are not 
completely clear-cut. Many aristocrats both loaned and borrowed money 
from each other, for a variety of purposes. In addition, there was a profession 
o f banker. This was at the level of what would now be called retail banking, 
formed from those who plied their trade in shops as any other trader. The 
trade was regulated to some extent, and the law recognised a number of 
distinct types of transaction, as well as standard practices to which those 
functioning as bankers were expected to follow. Needless to say, perhaps, 
these regulations did not apply to aristocratic lending.
Before saying a little more about these two categories, a couple o f general 
points are worth noting. First, while historical evidence suggests that these 
two types o f lending were very common, there were other forms, less 
common, but still relatively well established. One was lending for sea-borne 
trade, which also acted as a form of insurance, as interest rates were high, but 
the lender bore more risks. Another was the large-scale merchant who would 
often use credit in the course of their arrangements, and would sometimes be 
found with this as their primary activity. It is also likely that there would have 
been those who lent to the poor at extortionate rates, though partly because 
this was technically illegal, and partly because o f the illiteracy o f the people 
who participated, not surprisingly, there are no extant written records, so 
nothing is known about it. The second general point is that lending meant 
lending coin. There is no evidence that there was ever any other form of 
money, and this o f course placed enormous strains on the financial system 
from time to time. Nevertheless, the fungibility o f money was expliddy 
recognised in Roman law, so that unlike other cases where subsequent 
disputes could arise, in the case of coin, title always passed with possession 
(Johnston 1999, 55).
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In Rome, like most societies, heredity played a crucial role in the social 
structure. A few wealthy families passed control over large areas o f land from 
one generation to the next. On the whole these individuals devoted little time 
or effort to agriculture, but used the income from it to carry out what they 
regarded as their social and political duties. Making a political career was 
expensive. One had to develop supporters among particular influential 
individuals and the population as a whole, and for this significant expenditure 
was necessary (Finley 1985, 153-154). Often this meant borrowing money 
from other families. The return came later, particularly under the Empire for 
those who became provincial governors, when one was rewarded by a 
significant proportion o f the tax revenue (Finley 1985, 53). Individual civic 
donations made up a good deal o f public expenditure undertaken, and in 
particular it was the primary source of non-military capital expenditure, 
because there was no concept o f public debt. O f course, the individuals 
involved creamed off a significant proportion o f tax revenue for their own 
consumption, and lived in considerable luxury.
Roman bankers carried out a number of commonly recognised functions, 
including assaying coins, foreign exchange, advancing credit at auctions, 
receipt o f deposits and subsequent payments, and the advancing o f loans. In 
many cases they were awarded a monopoly, and had a tax levied. For 
example, in some cities changing money from large to small denominations 
was restricted to the recognised monopolies, which charged about five 
percent in commission, some of which went in tax. A banker was expected to 
keep a register o f accounts, which was required by law to be produced 
whenever a client was involved a lawsuit. It was not considered to provide 
absolute proof, but was deemed to be reliable evidence. This at least suggests 
that bank accounts were relatively common, if not de rigour. Interest rates were 
a subject o f public concern, although the evidence seems a litde confused as 
to what was thought reasonable (Andreu 1999, 91). The maximum rate fixed 
by the state, generally agreed to be around twelve percent, was not the basic 
rate, and there is considerable evidence of loans below it, often around five to
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six percent. There is also evidence, not surprisingly less common, that rates 
over the theoretical maximum were charged from time to time. There was 
also an expectation that this would be simple interest, compound interest was 
sometimes allowed, but frequently forbidden (Andreu 1999, 92), betraying the 
underlying lack of appreciation o f financial logic.
In regard to payment mechanisms, there is some evidence o f the use o f 
cheques, but they are always direct, so never becoming negotiable and 
constituting an extension of the concept o f money (Andreu 1999, 42). As one 
would expect, from time to time there were shortages of coin, and particularly 
when it was in demand for special taxes for example, the price o f land could 
fall, that is the value o f the coin increase, as demand for coin increased. As 
always, this inflexibility in the money supply would severely and unnecessarily 
magnify the problems of individuals who were unfortunate enough to be 
experiencing temporary cash-flow problems, as well as accelerating the 
consequences for those in fundamentally unsustainable economic positions.
So, while the invention of money helped the notion o f credit to develop, the 
limitation to precious metals also limited development. Nevertheless, the next 
question is to assess the extent to which the commitment and credit 
mechanisms that were available in the ancient world could have enabled 
sustainable economic growth.
2.1.3 Consequences
The fate o f Athenian and Roman civilization clearly demonstrates that there 
was no such thing as sustainable economic growth in the ancient world. 
Athens remained an important city well into Roman times, and Roman 
civilisation could trace a continuous existence through to the final fall of 
Constantinople in 1453 CE. In many respects, and certainly in its transfer to 
the East, it was far from a static civilization. Developments were taking place 
all the time. Even in the few details sketched out above, a huge creative 
potential can be seen. And the areas described by no means stand out as
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unusual. In architecture and civil engineering the Greek and Roman 
achievement stands to this day. Roman roads and aqueducts would be 
significant achievements for modem engineers. Roman and particularly 
Athenian literature and philosophy is still admired and studied. Their 
influence pervades western civilization. But they have no direct descendants. 
They are dead civilizations.
Greek and Roman civilisation grew, reached a peak, or a series of peaks, 
declined and died. And the fundamental reason for this unsustainability lies in 
the answer to the question: who benefited from the achievements o f the 
civilization? The answer: the social elite. For the vast majority o f people who 
made up Greek or Roman civilization nothing changed. Agriculture 
dominated the lives of the vast majority, and despite all the creativity 
unleashed on what could be called high culture, innovation that would affect, 
never mind improve, the lives o f the vast majority were singularly, and to our 
eyes startlingly, non-existent. Trade undoubtedly increased, but archaeological 
evidence shows that trade is a pervasive human characteristic, not limited to 
common cultural or political areas. But most people would see little benefit. 
There were more city dwellers, but the vast majority of the inhabitants of 
Athens and Rome themselves existed at subsistence levels. The water supplied 
by aqueduct, or bread freely distributed from time to time by rich Romans, 
was a necessity to life, not in any sense a beneficial luxury.
One benefit under the Roman Empire was a lack o f war for those in the 
empire’s interior. But although this could be a benefit, it was probably 
difficult to recognise at the time. While most pre-modem societies could only 
support any large-scale military mobilization when imminent hostilities 
threatened, Rome maintained a substantial standing army. This was a 
considerable expense, and the government would have appropriated most o f 
any production surplus to basic subsistence. As well as supplying the army, 
this was used for the massive construction projects and luxurious lifestyles of
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a few, that while clearly providing marvels for future generations, meant 
nothing to the vast majority.
Rome’s eventual failure has been ascribed to its failure to ever improve on its 
productive capacity (Finley 1985, 149). Is it possible to be more specific than 
this? The lack o f governance mechanisms facilitating commitment and credit 
offers a potential explanation, particularly because, as has been shown, they 
existed to some extent. To what extent can this be posited as a specific 
explanation? Does it genuinely improve on explanations in terms o f less 
specific but more pervasive cultural factors?
The unbreakable glass story goes some way to explaining Roman attitudes 
towards innovation, particularly among the literary elements of society. A 
number o f ancient authors, including the elder Pliny, Petronius and Dio 
Cassius cite an event in the reign o f Tiberius. A man has invented 
unbreakable glass, and demonstrated it to the Emperor expecting a great 
reward. After satisfying himself that the man had shared his secret with no 
one else, his head was promptly ordered removed lest, explains Tiberius, the 
value o f gold be reduced to that o f mud (Finley 1985, 147). But what 
opportunity would the man have had for profiting from his invention? 
Leaving aside not unimportant issues o f intellectual property, could he have 
secured the necessary capital to develop and market the product, either 
himself, or in partnership with someone else? The quick answer is yes. He 
could have approached a banker, and offered whatever property he had 
available, perhaps his workshop, as security. Failing the adequacy o f this he 
could have entered into a partnership with someone who had sufficient 
personal or material standing to act as security, on whatever profit sharing 
arrangement was agreed.
However, while in principle the mechanisms were available, the practical 
difficulties would have been considerable, if not overwhelming. The scant 
evidence from actual commercial practice, as opposed to legal possibilities,
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suggests twQ particular difficulties. What little evidence there is suggests that 
security outside the aristocracy always took the form o f moveable goods, such 
as slaves, precious objects and traded commodities (Andreu 1999, 75). And 
among the few things known about some loans is that they were relatively 
short term, for a few months or at most a year (Andreu 1999, 44). This goes 
to suggest that commercial lending addressed the need for working capital, 
rather than investment capital. Without any substitute for cash, such as 
endorsable bills, the seasonable nature of the agricultural products that made 
up most trade, and the significant times goods were in transit, meant that 
there would be a considerable need for working capital. The lower risk 
associated with this type of lending, together with the limited supply of 
money, would largely preclude the availability o f investment capital.
In terms o f the partnership contract, further problems would arise. One could 
speculate that this would have been a particularly unusual arrangement, but 
then so would the invention o f unbreakable glass! More seriously, the 
difficulty would have been in finding a partner. Relationships were, as we 
have seen, despite the recognition o f some individual autonomy, perceived 
very hierarchically. So although there could be partnership, this in general is 
seen in similar roles, rather than complementary ones. A wealthy partner 
clearly would be unwilling to become the junior partner, but would the 
inventor want to join the capital supplying partner’s establishment, indeed, 
would it be possible if he did? It is not clear that, between becoming a slave or 
being adopted as an heir, there was any practical mechanism.
In recognising these practical details we start to move towards the impact of 
cultural factors. While physical property could be used as collateral for a loan, 
it was far less problematic, and therefore presumably greatly to be preferred, 
to use personal standing. But of course one had to have the personal standing, 
meaning family wealth. To a large extent this is a consequence o f the failure to 
distinguish between lending for consumption against lending for investment. 
For commercial lending, it would almost inevitably be for working capital.
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For lending among the aristocracy, in a sense lending to further a political 
career was lending for investment, but not in a systematic sense. On the 
whole, in both cases lending was to overcome a short-term shortage of cash, 
simply in the expectation that in the fullness of time income would return to 
its previous level, and the loan could be repaid. Underlying all this was an 
essentially static view of society. One was bom into a certain station in life, 
and that was where one should remain. Given the lack o f sustainable 
economic growth this was not an unreasonable view to hold, but in this way 
the failure to grow reflected a failure of expectation as much as anything else.
This essentially fixed view of society would prevent another problem to an 
innovator, which perhaps reflects Tiberius’ concern. To whom would the 
inventor sell his new products? And if he did sell them, would that not imply 
that someone else would lose out? Innovation would threaten the whole 
existing basis of society. And of course that was the big threat to those who 
felt themselves to be at the top o f the pile. So innovation was best actively 
discouraged. With this pervasive attitude, it would be far from clear where the 
revenue to repay the capital investment would come from, so difficulties with 
the culture and the business logic went hand in hand.
In methodological terms, this difficulty in distinguishing, and indeed a 
genuine interdependency, between specific commitment and credit 
institutions and more general cultural factors is the continuing problem this 
study faces. What can perhaps be said, is that cultural and formal practices 
went together, and both played their part. The formal elements functioned as 
they did largely because o f their cultural background. But, in some ways more 
importantly, because they can be more clearly perceived, the formal legal- 
financial mechanisms available had very real consequences, in the extent they 
either prevented or enabled sustainable economic growth.
The broader point is already established however, that once one knows what 
one is looking for, in terms o f formal commitment and credit mechanisms,
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even in distant, scantily attested, civilizations, it is relatively straightforward to 
identify key elements and the extent to which they performed the function 
that the commitment-credit model suggests they need to. It is also readily 
apparent that although the model deals with the concepts in a clear and easily 
understood way, their actual embodiment in a society is far from 
straightforward. The ancient world made considerable steps in their 
development, but still left significant issues to be resolved.
It probably adds little worthwhile to say that the failure of Roman civilisation 
to sustainably increase productivity caused its fall, because it was a failure of 
all civilisations until that originating in what we now call modem western 
Europe. The fall o f Roman civilization clearly had a whole range o f 
interconnected causes. One was increasing monetary problems largely a result 
of the dependence on coin for economic exchange, though the first steps 
towards managing the money supply were taken, with the manipulation of the 
coinage from the third century. In the short term, this appears to have 
contributed significandy to the demise of banking as a profession. Another 
enduring innovation was the introduction o f the national budget by 
Diocletion. Nevertheless, the last western emperor died in 476 AD, although 
Roman traditions were continued, and in the legal field at least continued to 
develop, in the East under Byzantine rule. In the west, political rule 
fragmented, and social institutions took on a wide variety of less sophisticated 
forms. Nevertheless, once political stability started to return, cumulative 
developments started to take place again, combining elements o f the ancient 
heritage with a whole range o f novelties. It is to this potent mix that we now 
turn.
2.2 Medieval Europe
Post-Roman Western Europe became, more than anything else, fragmented. 
So it is not possible to be as specific about institutional arrangements as it was 
with the ancient world, where Athens to a large extent, and then Rome totally,
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dominated the region, at least as far as institutional sophistication is 
concerned. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some general statements, as 
well as identify some key developments.
While the barbarian conquerors o f the western empire, not surprisingly, 
appear to have liked the idea of taking up the lifestyle o f the wealthy Romans, 
they were oblivious to the means necessary to sustain it. So the government 
institutions, and the services they provided, quickly fell into disrepair. 
Interconnections were lost, and communities turned in on themselves to 
sustain themselves. Gaps opened up physically between communities. The 
reasons for this are not completely clear, but some evidence suggests that the 
last centuries of antiquity and the first o f the middle ages were particularly 
cold and wet, and alongside this plague was intermittently common from 180 
CE to the mid sixth century (Lopez 1976, 12). Taken together with the 
breakdown of the pax romana and the return o f warfare to common 
experience, sometimes associated with the movements o f people such as the 
Anglo-Saxon invasion o f the Britain, all this suggests that, although there is no 
direct written evidence, there was probably a considerable decline in 
population.
The paucity o f evidence makes identifying the point at which the decline was 
reversed impossible, even if there were to be one such time. Nevertheless, by 
the tenth century the demographic tide had turned and population was 
starting to grow again, although it took until the fourteenth century to occupy 
many of the wide uninhabited stretches in a way that made communication 
and organisation practicable, as well as increasing the food supply (Lopez 
1976, 29). One indication of a general improvement, albeit far from signifying 
much in the way of day-to-day improvements, is that evidence o f large-scale 
famines become rare by the early thirteenth century (Lopez 1976, 37).
An indication that social structures had changed, and that changes made a 
difference, is evidence of the widespread diffusion o f water mills. Lopez
58
identifies two factors to explain why, although known about in the ancient 
world, widespread utilisation had to wait. First, that there were no longer 
slaves available to do the work, but landlords still had sufficient power to 
compel their tenants to send their grist to the mill. Then, for estates lacking a 
usable water source, the windmill became available. N ot documented at all in 
antiquity, by the early twelfth century its use was widespread. Even by the late 
eleventh century, England is recorded in the Doomsday Book as having five 
thousand mills. Another improvement in productivity came through the 
introduction o f the heavy plough. Again its origins are mysterious, and it 
could have been known in Roman times, but its use only became widespread 
during the middle ages (Lopez 1976, 43-44).
The problematic nature of generalisation comes to the fore again when 
considering medieval trade. On the day-to-day level for most people there was 
little trade. This is perhaps exemplified by the fact that archaeological 
evidence suggests that money disappeared from use in England for two 
centuries, from shortly after the Romans left at the beginning o f the fifth 
century, until the seventh century. Even though coins were available on the 
European continent, there is only evidence that they started to be imported 
shortly before local production recommenced (Davies 1994, 117).
Nevertheless, Mediterranean trade was sustained, to a large extent by 
easterners such as Jews, Arabs and Greeks (Lopez 1976, 60). By the tenth 
century it is apparent that the Italian cities of Venice and Amalfi had become 
important hubs. Interestingly, neither city had any Roman past. An additional 
novelty was that master craftsmen appeared in the upper classes (Lopez 1976, 
62). So a new type o f polity had started to appear, one that focused on making 
a living from craftsmanship and particularly from trading. It began to prove 
increasingly successful. By the early fourteenth century Venice, Milan, 
Florence and Genoa all had populations in excess of 100,000, twice the size 
of any dty in any other part of Europe (Lopez 1976, 93).
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Societies were clearly more flexible than in ancient times, though sustainable 
economic growth remained elusive. Significant innovations were introduced, 
and one in particular, the printing press, will be considered in some detail. 
Despite the astonishing variety that characterised the middle ages in Europe, 
by concentrating on the most commercially successful regions o f their time it 
is possible to sketch out the further development of embryonic institutional 
commitment and credit mechanisms.
2.2.1 Commitment
Post-Roman Europe’s fragmentation encompassed the legal arena. The 
northern Germanic tribes had their own, albeit unsophisticated, legal 
principles, which they wished to maintain, and southern Europe maintained a 
good deal o f continuity with Roman law, at least an unsophisticated 
derivation o f it. In practice there was a large area o f overlap, and together with 
fragmentation and conflict between communities, the result was that legal 
practices evolved on divergent paths.
Variety in contractual forms was as marked as in every other aspect o f 
medieval life, although there were to some extent moves towards 
standardisation. Central to this was the growth o f the legal profession, which 
was very much a pan-European phenomena. Nevertheless, by the end of the 
period two distinct traditions had become established, the common law 
tradition in England, and the Roman law tradition, which later evolved into 
the civil law tradition, in the rest o f Europe. However, divergence very much 
preceded convergence, and the interplay of the increasing demand for greater 
sophistication of the wide variety o f local laws rooted in tribal customs, and 
the rediscovery, and sometimes reinvention, of Roman law provided a heady 
brew.
As in so many ways, Italy with its direct Roman heritage led the way. The 
tenth century saw the introduction o f the contratto di commenda, also known in 
Venice as the collegantia. It was used in trading, and had characteristics o f both
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loans and partnerships. It incorporated a distinct division o f labour between 
the provider of capital and the travelling merchant. Any losses were borne 
fully by the capital provider, but profits would be shared: one quarter by the 
traveller and three quarters by the capital provider. The capital provider could 
not be held direcdy accountable for the activities o f the traveller, and both 
partners were able to enter into other contracts as they wished. Capital 
providers could invest relatively small amounts along with others, with the 
rewards being shared in proportion to their investment (Cipolla 1994,161).
In time practices changed, and the commenda became outdated. Beginning in 
the latter part o f the thirteenth century, and accelerating during the second 
half o f the fourteenth, businessmen operating through agents superseded 
itinerant merchants. In its place emerged the compagnia. By the early twelfth 
century Venice already had several such companies, but they became more 
common in the inland cities that combined production with trade (Cipolla 
1994,162).
Italian jurists in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries ‘found’ the concept of 
partnership in Roman law, with partners sharing risk and profits, and insisted 
that a commercial society was a ‘brotherhood’ of equals. Most were short 
lived and small, but some could be ongoing with a membership reaching well 
into double figures. By the early fourteenth century greater sophistication was 
needed. One example is the Buonsignori of Sienna, whose junior partners 
petitioned their republic to intercede with the papal court in establishing the 
principle that no partner be liable beyond his share in the company. Rejected 
initially, by 1310 it was accepted. Meanwhile, in 1301 the Calimala, the 
Florentine wool guild, had provided that the creditor of a bankrupt partner 
could only take their shares, not pursue the firm itself (Mundy 1991, 100-2). 
Recognisably modem forms of legal association were slowly beginning to 
emerge.
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From the 1160s, the monies created by governments, and shares sold in such 
revenue streams as harbour duties and state salt monopolies, can be 
considered as public private partnerships. Essentially, these investments were 
limited liability vehicles, as investors in public concerns risked no more than 
they had invested. Sometimes governments intervened more aggressively. In 
1283 the Venetian government ordered its merchants in Alexandria to 
combine to comer the pepper and cotton trades (Mundy 1991,103).
While many developments were shared, polities jealously guarded their legal 
autonomy, but the growth o f international trade created a demand for a 
common system. From the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries a customary 
commercial law developed, known as the lex mercatoria, or law merchant. Its 
source was the practical needs o f merchants, and covered a whole range o f 
issues from corporation to credit, through trade fairs, banking operations and 
insurance. Merchants had their own courts, and were judged by their peers 
(Caenegem 1992, 83-84).
Given the medieval conception of law, as something having an independent 
existence, and being essentially unchanging, and not subject to human 
manipulation, the distinction was primarily one o f procedure over substance 
(Baker 1979). A modem translation of the earliest extant treatise on lex 
mercatoria, from The Little Red Book of Bristol' circa 1280, identifies three 
differences from the English common law. First in being faster in making a 
determination, second in a broader interpretation o f pledging that included 
responsibility for resulting damages and expenses in addition to the specific 
debt, and thirdly a difference in evidence and proof that placed the burden o f 
proof for informal debts on the plaintiff, but required the defendant to 
address this directly (Teetor 1962).
While, in general, courts were local in their jurisdiction, lex mercatoria, was 
regarded as universal. In the treatise already dted, although found in a 
collection o f documents in Bristol, no mention is made o f Bristol, while it
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does mention London, Boston, York and Paris. Whether or not it was 
particularly relevant to Bristol, the author clearly expected the principles to be 
commonly accepted in major cities across national boundaries. In the fullness 
of time, as part o f the process of nation building, lex mercatoria was 
incorporated into national legal systems, and in effect ceased to constitute a 
common international commercial legal framework. Nevertheless, in its time 
it provided an effective institutional foundation for the development of 
commerce, and because used and administered by merchants, was able to 
evolve in step with other developments in commercial practice.
England’s distinctive economic trajectory began to emerge in the thirteenth 
century, because rather than fall back on Roman tradition as a framework for 
providing a consistent legal framework, the common law tradition continued 
to evolve. At least one significant cause o f this was the creation o f a single 
national customary law by Henry II (1154-89) (Caenegem 1992, 35). 
Influenced by the developing Roman scholarly tradition, this also included the 
recognition of the importance of written records, and a complete set of ‘rolls’ 
o f the royal courts exists from the twelfth century onwards (Caenegem 1992, 
96). The medieval recovery of Roman law was not sufficiently well developed 
by this stage to provide a comprehensive written source, so the precedents 
recorded by the royal courts became the primary source of law in England, 
while elsewhere in Europe, where written sources o f customary law did not 
exist to the same extent, there was nothing to compete with the written 
authority of recovered Roman law once it became available.
Through the thirteenth century the shift began from a feudal notion of 
property, to what could be labelled a modem one centred on individual 
ownership. With a rising population, the demand for land made it more 
valuable, and two English statutes, Merton in 1235 and Westminster in 1285, 
permitted a manorial lord to enclose wasteland, but only so long as sufficient 
land was left for tenants. Most significant was the ability to transfer the 
ownership of land. The feudal perspective was that several people had
63
jurisdiction over any piece of land, namely the hierarchy of peasants, lords and 
kings into which everyone fitted, and everyone had their own rights. Transfer 
of land could only happen to the extent that one tenant could return his rights 
to his lord, who could pass them on to another, or a tenant could create 
another feudal layer by granting part o f his rights to another, an action known 
as sub-infeudation. However, the statute Quia emptores in 1290 forbade sub­
infeudation, as well as recognising what had become common practice 
recognised by the king’s court by then, namely transfer o f land between free 
men without the lord’s permission. By the end o f the thirteenth century the 
concept o f the freeman, as one whose obligations were strictly defined, who 
could transfer his land holding and was answerable only to the king’s court, 
had been established. This is not to say that most men were regarded as 
freemen, only that the concept had become accepted. North and Thomas 
suggest that the significance even o f that is difficult to overestimate. In taking 
this step, England set out on a trajectory differentiating itself from the rest of 
Europe, and ultimately the world (North and Thomas 1973, 63-64). The next 
chapter sets out in detail the medieval origins and subsequent development of 
contract law in England. But first, developments in medieval finance will be 
set out.
2.2.2 Credit
Without a central government to direct commerce, as had been the case to a 
greater or lesser degree in the ancient world, in the medieval maelstrom a 
decentralised mechanism was necessary to organise the flow of goods. While 
by no means a new phenomenon, what was in many ways new was the 
relationship between the ruler and the merchant. Central to these 
developments was perhaps the ultimate physical embodiment o f the idea of 
the free market, the medieval fair. Rather than simply emerging spontaneously 
at a convenient location, however, a fair was established by a charter. And 
charters described the public goods that would be provided to market 
participants. These included safe conduct for merchants, security for their 
property, and special courts to resolve disputes. Moreover, there is also
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empirical evidence that earlier more local economic activity supports a 
principle o f ‘no mint, no market’ (Hunt and Murray 1999, 26). So currency is 
also a public good necessary for a functioning market. The rise o f the fair was 
rapid, even by modem standards. In England, the first 75 years o f the 
thirteenth century saw the granting of 2200 separate charters for fairs and 
markets (North and Thomas 1973, 50), where the doomsday survey of 1086 
had identified around 3000 communities (North and Thomas 1973, 44). 
Localised famines, which had been widespread before 1200, became less 
common during the thirteenth century (North and Thomas 1973, 53). Only in 
the decade 1307-17 did famine spread again throughout Europe, and recurred 
intermittently, being followed thirty years later by the start of the Black Death.
During the thirteenth century, the first genuinely international fairs developed 
in the Champagne region of north central France. This lay across the trade 
routes connecting the northern markets in England and Flanders with the 
Italian and Mediterranean markets in the south. Between January and October 
there were six fairs. These were originally religious festivals, but the Counts o f 
Champagne courted merchants by offering safe conducts and special 
privileges. Northern merchants brought primarily cloth, but also specie, and 
exchanged it for luxury goods made in the Mediterranean region, or imported 
from further east.
In conjunction with the growth o f the international exchange o f goods, there 
developed payment systems, and in particular credit instruments known as 
‘fair letters’ to facilitate the trade in goods. To a large extent these obviated 
the need for large shipments o f specie. They were not negotiable in the 
modem sense, but could be transferred from one person to another (Hunt 
and Murray 1999, 29). Nevertheless, they offered a flexible way of committing 
to make payments in a specific currency and time agreed between two parties.
While overland trade, including river transport, never went away, sea bome 
trade became increasingly important. Alongside this, merchants, and
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particularly Italian merchants, started to establish branch offices in major 
trading centres outside their own cities, particularly in the northern ports such 
as Bruges and London. So by the end o f the thirteenth century, the 
champagne fairs were becoming less significant
A more general instrument than the fair letter also developed, the bill o f 
exchange. One early version dates from late twelfth century Genoa. The 
transaction involved four parties, the lender and borrower in the town of 
issue, and their representative and correspondent respectively, who would 
actually exchange the cash, in the town of repayment. Payment was scheduled 
for a future date, and normally was in a different currency to that in use where 
the transaction was agreed, because this allowed the lender to include a 
margin, which the usury laws of the time allowed, as the currency fluctuations 
meant that they bore an element o f risk. In general, the payment due date 
reflected the time normally expected for a cargo to travel to the place where 
payment would take place, and was known as ‘usance’.
A phenomenon recently dubbed the ‘super company’ flourished briefly 
towards the end of the thirteenth century, then disappeared in the 1340s. 
They were trading organisations that covered the whole range o f goods traded 
between northern and southern Europe. Their demise was probably due to 
their inability to cope with fluctuations in the grain supply following a 
concentration of extreme weather conditions. N ot long afterwards the Black 
Death swept across Western Europe, with devastating human consequences, 
but leaving behind an environment ripe for organisational innovation.
Two shifts started to become apparent in subsequent decades. One was the 
end of Italian dominance in international business, with the rise for example 
of the Fuggers in southern Germany. The second was the increasing 
involvement o f large-scale merchants, including the Fuggers as well as Italians 
such as the Medici, in production as well as trade, albeit not on such a
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concentrated scale as had occurred with the super-companies (Hunt and 
Murray 1999,169).
The growth in trade, and associated moves towards specialisation, suggests 
and explains a growing productive capacity. Some of this growth was in 
luxury goods, but much of it was consumed in military activity. Either way, 
the major beneficiaries were the rich and powerful. But the other beneficiaries 
were town dwellers who produced and traded the growth products. Where 
faced with relatively weak feudal rulers, in areas such as Germany and the 
Low Countries, they were often able to organise themselves and manage their 
own affairs to a considerable extent. Feudalism never really took off in 
northern Italy, where the landowners tended to move into the towns at a 
relatively early period. One effect of this was that Italian city-states often had 
ruling elites who, because of their heritage as large landowners, were 
geographically acquisitive, leading to a continuing series o f wars. Pardy 
because they lacked a large agricultural population able to provide men for 
military service, and pardy because of the wealth created through their 
production and trade, warfare became increasingly capital intensive. Rather 
than conscripting feudal underlings, foreign mercenaries were engaged. And 
the combination of competition and availability o f capital from commerce led 
to rapid developments in military technology, spurred considerably by the 
growing use o f gunpowder.
While at first the funds necessary to fight increasingly expensive wars were 
extracted by taxation and loans,’ on an irregular basis, the continuing and 
increasing need led to a more systematic process. Although many lenders 
never expected to be repaid, loans were often only provided in return for 
concessions such as trade monopolies. Particularly given the international 
nature o f much commerce, merchants could rarely be compelled to supply 
funds, so a degree of mutual benefit was often present, unlike the zero sum 
outcomes likely in monolithic autocratic polities. Nevertheless, as early as the 
mid thirteenth century Venice and Genoa, followed within a century by
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Florence and other Italian cities, had regularized their public debt. Known as 
the monte, because o f its mountain-like size, this was accumulated by the cities, 
but paid lenders a regular low rate o f interest. For example, at the turn of the 
fifteenth century Venice paid four percent. The debt was transferable, and 
traded at rates that varied with commercial rates and the relative financial 
strength o f the dty (Hunt and Murray 1999, 207). Further north, to meet their 
own needs, and the demands o f the relevant feudal ruler, cities tended to 
prefer to issue annuities, where they agreed to pay a fixed sum to particular 
individual, and possibly their next generation, in return for a lump sum 
payment (Hunt and Murray 1999, 208). While most o f these public funds 
went direcdy or indirectly into sustaining the lifestyles of the elites and in 
unproductive military activity, some went into capital projects, such as river 
widening and voyages o f exploration.
While these to some extent mutually beneficial approaches developed in the 
politically fractured Italian and German regions, in more autocratic regions, 
particularly France, another alternative developed: ‘reforming’ the coinage. 
Rulers benefited from this in two ways, first through seigniorage, the charge 
levied for the actual exchange o f coins, but also from the precious metal 
retained when the newly minted coins were exchanged for those with a higher 
content o f precious metal, though nominally retaining the same value. While 
within the state’s boundaries this could be maintained, and there could be 
some benefit to trade from an increase in the money supply, exchange rates 
would adjust correspondingly, making people poorer by international 
comparison (Cipolla 1994,172).
During the sixteenth century the role o f Italians declined, and the Low 
Countries became the commercial heart of Europe. Commercial banking 
developed in both volume and expertise as the middle ages drew to a close, to 
the extent that rates o f interest dropped from twenty to thirty percent in 1500, 
through nine to twelve percent in 1550, to three percent or less during the 
seventeenth century (North and Thomas 1973,142).
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2.2.3 Consequences
Medieval Europe was in some ways more hierarchical than Greek or Roman 
society, though most of those were in theory rather than in practice. The great 
difference was in the variety o f the medieval world compared with the 
homogeneity of the classical world, certainly under the Roman Empire. And 
this variety was constantly interacting, increasingly so as the age progressed. 
In this environment opportunities for novelty became commonplace. 
Alongside the majority of innovations that were borrowed from elsewhere, 
there were some that were genuinely new.
A relatively well-documented series o f technical developments can be set out. 
From the sixth century use o f the water mill spread, then from the seventh, 
particularly in the North, the heavy plough. The eighth century saw the spread 
o f the crop rotation system, and the ninth the horseshoe and new methods of 
harnessing draft animals (Cipolla 1994, 138). Windmills spread through the 
twelfth century, and the compass developed from a primitive needle in a bowl 
to a self-contained instrument from the end of that century right through the 
next. At the beginning of the fourteenth century came the spinning wheel, 
spectacles, clocks, firearms and canal locks. A realisation was dawning that 
technological change was possible (Cipolla 1994,143-5).
In transport, significant improvements occurred, particularly in the fifteenth 
century with the development o f the full rigged ship. Within a century, ships 
were developed to a sfre at which they largely remained until the nineteenth 
century. This made possible significant improvements in trade, but also 
provided the technical foundation on which the European voyages o f 
discovery were made (Cipolla 1994,145-8).
One innovation more than any other contributed to the end o f the medieval 
world, and for the first time in history, though disputed from time to time in 
the past, we know the name o f its inventor. This is no coincidence, for the 
invention changed the very nature o f human knowledge. Around 1400, in
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Mainz, Johann Gutenberg was bom  into a rich merchant family. Family 
names were not as fixed as they are now, often being taken from the name of 
the family property, and the name by which we know him was taken from the 
property he was bom in and later occupied. His father was bom  around fifty 
years earlier, just after the Black Death. His mother was the daughter o f a 
shopkeeper, albeit one whose grandfather had been governor o f the fortress 
o f Mainz, until 1332 when a dispute between the city and emperor erupted. 
The city lost; with lasting social consequences, if not so much economic ones, 
for the families of those city patricians on whom primary blame fell. 
Apparently, this somewhat mixed social pedigree would have limited 
Gutenberg’s prospects in his hometown, at least compared with his father 
(Kapr 1996,30-31).
One particular formal association held by Gutenberg senior, but denied to the 
son, was being a companion o f the mint. There is evidence that other holders 
o f this office resided for some time at the same dwelling as the young 
Gutenberg. So although denied the opportunity o f exercising the office, he 
could well have perfected many o f the skills needed in coin production (Kapr 
1996, 49). A Combination o f family connections and greater opportunities 
offered by a larger town were probably behind Gutenberg’s move to 
Strasbourg sometime before 1434 (Kapr 1996, 67). Here we find the first 
direct evidence of his entrepreneurial spirit. Around 1438 he entered into a 
partnership with three other men to manufacture ornate convex mirrors 
prized by pilgrims for catching the power o f religious relics shown once every 
seven years at Achen (Kapr 1996, 72). Gutenberg clearly had the ideas and the 
know-how, but needed the capital and labour of his partners to realize the 
opportunity. All expected to become significantly wealthier.
Fortunately for us, the partners’ plans went awry. The pilgrimage expected in 
1439 was in fact only to take place in 1440, and in the meantime one o f the 
partners succumbed to the plague. The deceased partner’s brother proposed 
that he and an older brother take his place in the partnership. Wishing to
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maintain secrecy Gutenberg refused, and was taken to court, and well-attested 
copies o f the records still exist (Kapr 1996, 75).
What is in many ways more interesting, is that the court records say that when 
the miscalculation of dates was realised, the men entered into a further 
partnership to pursue activities already being developed by Gutenberg, but are 
only described in the most general terms as, for example, ‘art and adventure’, 
or ‘art and invention’. Nevertheless, the evidence from the legal records can 
be interpreted to suggest that the three key stages of print production, namely 
typefounding, typesetting and pressing, were undertaken at the three partners’ 
own residences. Although more complicated, Gutenberg may have preferred 
the secrecy this provided, as well as cutting down on the costs necessary for a 
dedicated workshop (Kapr 1996, 86).
The last record of Gutenberg’s presence in Strasbourg is for 1444, the year his 
five-year partnership was due to end. The next reliable document has him 
back in Mainz, albeit only in 1448. Part o f the reason for Gutenberg’s 
departure may be the appearance around Strasbourg at that time of a band o f 
unemployed mercenaries known as the Armagnacs, recendy put out of work 
by a truce between the French and English.
It is likely that Gutenberg did produce his earliest books as Strasbourg, but 
the technology was still rapidly developing, and there is no indisputable 
evidence that this was the case (Kapr 1996, 99). Gutenberg had returned to 
Mainz by 1448, and began printing in the building where he had largely grown 
up, now owned by his widowed brother-in-law. Nevertheless, to produce a 
substantial book, in 1450 he entered into another partnership, with Johann 
Fust, a merchant and goldsmith. Fust’s capital allowed the renting and 
equipping o f a workshop with initially four and later six presses, with the first 
tranch o f funding being secured against the equipment being assembled. 
Subsequently, Fust supplied additional capital, as around 20 workmen would 
need to be recruited, trained, and paid. Supplies o f ink and paper needed to be
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purchased. Also thousands of types cast, a task estimated as taking six 
months. All this before production could actually begin. Production would 
probably have taken two years, and none o f the estimated 180 finished copies 
of Gutenberg’s now famous 42 line Bible could be sold until then (Kapr 1996, 
158-67). Nevertheless, the evidence o f a Bishop’s letter dated 12 March 1455 
suggests that the project had proved a success, and buyers were quickly 
found. People as far apart as Vienna and Rome were aware o f this new 
invention within no more than a few weeks.
However, while the project was a success, the partnership was not. Again, we 
benefit from Gutenberg’s misfortune, because court records are still in 
existence, albeit not in relation to the original action, but from one several 
months later in November 1455. Quite what the underlying motivation 
behind the dispute was is probably impossible to know, but Fust sued 
Gutenberg for improperly using funds from their partnership, and for interest 
on money he had needed to borrow to invest in the project. Despite the 
completion o f the Bibles, which rough calculations based on reliable evidence 
suggest should have been profitable, Gutenberg cannot have yet received 
payment and, admitting the charge to some extent, was unable to repay the 
money. So Fust took sole possession of the major book-printing workshop 
(Kapr 1996, 184). Kapr suggests that, on the evidence o f separately set but 
identical in content indulgence documents, which the Church used to raise 
money in return for remitting sins, Gutenberg was still using his original 
workshop to print these. Given the likelihood that he was able to price them 
at the same level as a hand-produced version, but more accurately and more 
rapidly produced in large quantities, these would have been very lucrative. 
Gutenberg may have needed the funds for continuing with his Bible printing, 
in addition to those supplied by Fust, which though profitable required 
considerable capital, some from the profits o f indulgences. The identical, 
except in setting, indulgence forms suggest that Fust switched to the more 
immediately profitable activity of producing these, once he gained control of 
the workshop (Kapr 1996, 196). While Gutenberg never left his name on his
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work, Fust and his adopted son, and later son-in-law, Schoffer, applied their 
imprint to editions produced after the dissolution of the original partnership.
While the end o f the partnership with Fust was clearly a blow, it would not 
have left Gutenberg in any immediate financial difficulty. Nevertheless, he 
continued with his work, and by 1457 he had defaulted on the interest 
payment for a loan he had taken out in Strasbourg (Kapr 1996, 221). Between 
1458 and 1460 another edition o f the Bible was produced at Bamberg. The 
likelihood is that this was a commission by the Pnnce-Bishop, who paid for 
the entire costs of the 80 or so copies for distribution around the diocese. It is 
likely that Gutenberg was involved in this project, but that it was primarily 
managed by one o f his former assistants (Kapr 1996, 224-5). N ot long after 
the Bible was finished, the type, workshop and presses were sold to the 
secretary to the Prince Bishop, who continued to produce small popular 
works, many in German. The quality o f these suggests that the most skilled 
craftsmen returned to Mainz after the sale (Kapr 1996,225-6).
As early as 1458, books also started to be produced in Strasbourg, under the 
management o f another of Gutenberg’s assistants. Then in 1462, in a dispute 
between two claimants to the Archbishopric o f Mainz, one who supported 
local autonomy from Rome, and another appointed by Rome on the 
excommunication of the first, resulted in an attack on the city, and the 
expulsion o f many of the inhabitants, almost certainly including Gutenberg 
and his associates. Likely exiled to Eltville, where he had relatives, there is 
evidence Gutenberg was involved with a printing works there. While 
Gutenberg was subsequently allowed to return, with some honour, to Mainz 
for his last few years, in the vicinity o f which he died in 1468, his associates 
dispersed together with their skills across Europe. By 1500, less than fifty 
years after Gutenberg’s first major production, it is estimated that at some 255 
locations more than 30,000 publications had been produced, in a total of over 
20 million copies (Kapr 1996,285).
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The details sketched of Gutenberg’s innovation demonstrate two things. First, 
and perhaps o f less importance, is the role of legal records in providing data 
on which much of the description o f developments is based. Secondly, is the 
nature o f the innovative process, and the fundamental role of institutional 
commitment and credit mechanisms in enabling it to function.
By modem business standards production o f the first printed books was not a 
large project, but it was clearly too big for one person to undertake 
themselves. Formal contracts were clearly important in motivating both the 
active and investing partners to supply their time and resources. Fust’s claim 
to have borrowed the money he invested may have been simply a legal fiction 
necessary to counter the defence that he was a usurer (Kapr 1996,175). But it 
is quite possible that as an active merchant he did not have the money to 
hand. Either way, loaning money was clearly not an unusual practice, even if it 
was normally for working capital rather than capital investment as in this case, 
and interest charges were recognised as facts of life, if not as morally or legally 
acceptable. Fledgling credit markets existed. Cipolla points out the 
significance, even though existing on a relatively small scale during the middle 
ages, o f the institutional mechanisms for transferring funds, temporarily, from 
savers to innovators and producers (Cipolla 1994,164).
The limitations in the institutional environment supporting contractual 
commitment were also apparent. The Guttenberg case demonstrates how on 
two occasions, what should from a contemporary perspective be relatively 
straightforward arrangements became the subject o f expensive litigation and 
in the second case a damaging outcome. It is possible that effective 
intellectual property legislation may have helped Gutenberg but this was only 
just starting to be developed. Venice granted specific patents from 1416, and 
promulgated a formal patent law in 1474 (Hunt and Murray 1999,154). While 
the evidence suggests that Gutenberg was not motivated by material gain for 
its own sake, he recognised the need for commercial success to enable his 
work to proceed. The dispute with Fust may have arisen because while
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Gutenberg saw this as simply an enabler, he realised that for Fust it was the 
only objective, and if indulgences were so profitable he would see no point in 
producing books. The idea that continuing innovation was the only way to 
sustain profitability in the long term was clearly not yet apparent to 
businessmen.
Further south, Italy’s preeminance in medieval commerce was about to 
decline. Between 1494 and 1538 it became the battleground for international 
conflicts between the increasingly centralised nations o f Spain and France, as 
well as trade-enriched, though remaining decentralised, Germany. With the 
war and its disruption came famine and disease, creating a downward spiral. 
The second half of the sixteenth century saw something of a recovery. But the 
next century saw Italian products increasingly losing out to English, Dutch 
and French ones. Italian quality remained pre-eminent, but not enough to 
bridge the price gap that developed. The Italian insistence on traditional 
methods and maintaining quality, enforced by the guilds, proved misguided. 
Its great cities lost their vitality, and its most important exports became 
agricultural and semi-finished goods (Cipolla 1994,241-7).
While many of the legal foundations had been developed in Italy, they applied 
almost exclusively to trade, rather than to production. And while the guilds 
were very successful in maintaining the quality of production, they also 
prevented innovation in production. And it is innovation in production that is 
the locomotive for sustainable economic growth. The Hanseatic League in 
Germany and the northern Netherlands republics also had many of the 
building blocks in place, but partly because of the disruptions caused from 
time to time by military action, and partly because the individual economic 
entities were relatively small, and relied on ongoing personal relationships 
which significant innovation could disrupt, the right sort of innovation failed 
to take place here either. Enduring commercial relationships needed to move 
from the personal to the impersonal.
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The Dutch did rise to commercial primacy, and have been cited as the first 
nation to experience sustained growth (North and Thomas 1973, 132). But 
this was the ‘fluke’ o f being the last to start on the well-established path o f a 
commercial upswing. Inevitably, this was followed by a downturn, but 
whereas before genuine sustainable growth was kindled this would have been 
an absolute decline, Holland in fact benefited from the effect o f sustained 
English growth, to the extent that it only experienced a relative rather than an 
absolute downturn after its ascendancy. They were caught in the slipstream. 
This is not to take too much away from the Dutch achievement; before 
England attained their ascendancy just before the start o f the eighteenth 
century the English were very aware that they had a great deal to learn from 
the more advanced Dutch (Cipolla 1994,259).
By 1700 in England however, the pieces were in place. While in most cases 
the pieces were embryonic, a symbiotic dialogue developed between the needs 
o f business and the formal legal foundation necessary to enable effective 
organisational and credit relationships. Over the next century and a half, by 
the end o f the 1850s, the structures we recognise now as necessary for 
modem business were firmly in place. It is now time to turn to describing the 
nature o f the relationships made possible for the first time at that time, and 
sketch the processes by which they developed.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN EN GLA ND 1700 - 1850
In some ways more precise historical dates could have been used for the tide 
of this chapter, namely 1689-1856, because that is time from the ‘Glorious 
Revolution’ until the introduction o f the Limited Liability Act. And those 
were in many ways the defining events of their age, at least for the issues 
described here. However, the level o f precision suggested would be spurious, 
because these events were simply steps on the ladder. Neither was wholly 
unexpected, although neither was a forgone conclusion either.
By setting the boundaries as 1700 and 1850, within the symbolic defining 
events, the focus is on the business environment as it existed and evolved, 
rather than the major changes at the beginning or the end. The economic, 
legal and political structures that, since the time of the fall o f the Berlin Wall 
in 1989, define large-scale social relationships around the world were already 
in place in England by 1700, and by the end o f the 1850s a recognisably 
modem framework o f corporate governance had developed there too.
One economic historian has said that there is a case for arguing that the 
division between ancient and modem occurred in 1709, when in England one 
Abraham Darby first successfully smelted iron with coke, and introduced the 
concept of self-sustaining growth to the world (Earl quoted in (Landes 1993, 
132)). While smelting iron with coke was a considerable technological 
advance, in itself it is clearly difficult to even to begin to justify the claim from 
the perspective of technical innovation. What does make the claim plausible is 
that Darby founded a business that, albeit as an indistinguishable element, is 
still in existence to the current day. And in the course of its almost three 
hundred year independent history, the company also produced the first iron 
wheel, the first iron rail, the first iron bridge and the first steam powered
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railway locomotive. Clearly it benefited from its access to the materials 
necessary for iron making, but as a self-sustaining organisation the firm took a 
form and existed in an environment never experienced before in human 
history.
To help understand the distinctiveness of the organisations and environment 
existing in England around 1700 it is instructive to compare Darby’s 
experience with that of a contemporary bom  four years later than him, but in 
Germany. He was also what would today be called the developer of an 
innovative material; Johann Bottger was the first European to make porcelain.
Bottger, of course, although working independently, was not the first to make 
porcelain. The Chinese developed it in a gradual process around the sixth 
century (Gleeson 1998, 40). But Darby’s distinctive originality was not so 
much in the material, novel though it was, but in his market. In part the value 
o f smelting iron with coke was that it was as an alternative to charcoal, and in 
England the coal used as the raw material for coke was available in substantial 
amounts, whereas the wood used as the raw material for charcoal was in 
increasingly short supply. Even so, the iron smelted using coke was different 
from that smelted using charcoal. The latter was less brittle, to the extent that 
the former was difficult to forge, and not in demand by the forge-masters 
who constituted the primary market for raw iron. However, while less suited 
to forging, coke-smelted iron was better for casting.
Darby had his insight no doubt partly because as a youth he was apprenticed 
to a malt-mill maker, someone who produced small brass machines used to 
process malt for use in brewing, and he subsequently set up his own brass 
company, so would have understood the markets for brass (Thomas 1999, 4). 
It was also probably because he was bom close to the home of T)ud’ Dudley, 
a landowner who had claimed to be able to smelt iron with coke towards the 
end o f the seventeenth century, though not in commercial quantities (Thomas 
1999, 12). The properties o f cast iron meant that it would be an effective
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substitute for brass. However, whereas porcelain pots, and even Gutenberg’s 
printed books, were clearly aimed at the wealthy, the primary benefit o f cast 
iron over brass, as it would clearly be less aesthetically pleasing, was its cost.
Coke-smelted iron was, for the first time, an innovation aimed purely and 
simply at the mass market of working people. The founding o f Darby’s 
company at Coalbrookdale signalled the start o f what would now be called 
the democratisation that enabled the industrial revolution, and what we now 
call sustainable economic growth.
Darby’s and Bottger’s genius extended far beyond their technical ingenuity. It 
encompassed a significant skill in building relationships and managing what 
were, for their time, complex long-term capital-intensive development 
projects, as we have already seen for Gutenberg. The environments and 
markets, and the specific approaches these required, were however worlds 
apart, worlds we will briefly compare, because they exemplify the distinction 
between the modem and pre-modem worlds.
Bottger’s father, a mint-worker, died soon after his birth, but his mother 
remarried a well-educated widower who was an architect and engineer. This 
enabled Bottger to benefit from an education, and develop his early interest in 
chemistry, becoming apprenticed to a leading apothecary in Berlin (Gleeson 
1998,13). His curiosity brought him into contact with several individuals who 
claimed to either have or be looking for the ‘philosopher’s stone’ o f alchemic 
legend, which transmuted other metals to gold. The benefit o f such a 
discovery was not lost on the rulers of the day, and several German princes 
supported some of these people (Gleeson 1998, 14). It is impossible to know 
precisely what his motivation was, but Bottger contrived a display in which he 
appeared to be able to transmute silver into gold. Although requesting secrecy 
from the few people to whom he made the demonstration, news quickly 
spread. He was summoned to appear before the King of Prussia, but deciding 
his luck was about to run out, he absconded. Unfortunately his perceived
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value was such that he was pursued, although because he had fled to the 
neighbouring kingdom of Saxony his apprehension by the Prussians required 
the acquiescence of the Saxon authorities.
Curious to the reason why the King of Prussia was so interested in a common 
subject, the Saxon authorities made their own enquiries and, when they found 
out, informed their own king. He decided to keep Bottger for himself 
(Gleeson 1998, 18-22). Despite, not surprisingly, failing to demonstrate the 
production o f gold, promise of its imminence was enough for the credulous 
king to appoint him master of his mint. In the intervening time, however, 
Bottger had met one of the King’s councillors, Ehrenfried von Tschimhaus, 
who among other things was responsible for locating promising mineral 
deposits in the kingdom. One o f his interests was porcelain, at the time 
imported in considerable amounts and at huge cost from the orient. 
Tschimhaus became a frequent visitor to what was effectively Bottger’s 
prison.
After three years, by the spring of 1705, it was becoming clear to the king that 
Bottger’s claims were spurious. However, he was concerned that he would 
lose considerable face if he executed Bottger, because he had invested so 
much in him. At Tschimhaus’s suggestion, his remit was widened to include 
the production of porcelain (Gleeson 1998, 44). He was moved to larger 
premises and supplied with samples of all the clays produced in the kingdom. 
Bottger started to attack the problem systematically, and realised from his 
previous experiments that far higher temperatures than those used in 
conventional pottery or glass production were required. Political events soon 
intervened, however. An unsuccessful war with Sweden was leaving Saxony 
exposed to attack, and Bottger was moved along with the King’s most 
valuable possessions to a remote castle prison. After a year, events calmed 
down, and Bottger was able to resume work, in another location with a bigger 
and more powerful furnace built for him. By 1708 he had produced samples
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of porcelain, and on 28 March 1709 wrote to the king declaring himself ready 
to go into full-scale production.
Darby’s path to his 1709 success in England was somewhat more mundane. 
After completing his apprenteship in Birmingham he moved to Bristol, in 
1698. Like his parents and his apprentice-master he was a member o f the 
Society o f Friends, more commonly known as Quakers. The year after his 
move to Bristol, Darby married another Quaker. He founded his first 
company, the Bristol Brass Company, around 1702 to make malt mills, with 
three partners. He seems to have foreshadowed his later work by using coal 
rather than charcoal for the brass making furnaces. Not long afterwards he 
established another enterprise, initially alone but then with two other partners, 
to cast iron pots. He had used techniques developed in Holland to cast brass 
in sand, rather than clay or loam, and wanted to utilise the same technique for 
casting iron, but it was proving problematic for the Dutch brass-founders he 
employed to make headway. Working on the problem himself with a talented 
assistant he was soon successful, and in 1707 successfully petitioned for a 
Patent giving him legal protection for fourteen years exclusive use (Thomas 
1999, 9). While in Bristol he also came to know Thomas Goldney II, also a 
Quaker, who was a prosperous merchant.
By 1708 Darby had become aware o f a disused furnace, which had been out 
o f action since being partly destroyed in an explosion and then its operators 
subsequent move to Russia several years before, presumably as part o f Peter 
the Great’s Europeanisation project. It was in Coalbrookdale, further up the 
River Severn, which reaches the sea in Bristol; and it offered a considerable 
number o f advantages, being close to sources o f iron ore and coal, as well as 
easily accessible by river to Bristol and the sea. In September 1708 he took 
over a lease previously established until 1717. Initially restarting the furnace 
using the tried and tested charcoal fuel, he started to experiment with coal and 
coke, and although exact dates are uncertain, it is likely that he was successful
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fairly quickly, in 1709, but needed another few years to hone the technique to 
his own satisfaction.
Bottger too was still some distance away from a reliable production process, 
but his captor still insisted he would not be free until he started producing 
gold, as he had originally promised to do. Bottger’s spirits cannot have been 
improved by the news that another alchemist, employed by the King of 
Prussia following Bottger’s escape, had been publicly hanged as a fraudster, 
accompanied with much golden decoration. Nevertheless, the King o f Saxony 
cautiously provided more backing to Bottger’s porcelain making endeavours. 
One major concern was secrecy, and for this reason the key stages o f the 
production process, namely mixing, modelling, firing and decorating, would 
be carried out at separate locations.
The King was still reluctant to invest directly, pardy because he was involved 
in another war, and had the opportunity to invest advertised throughout the 
kingdom, but to no avail. Undaunted, the King proceeded, albeit cautiously. 
Key managers were appointed, and recruitment o f craftsmen started. The 
recruiting of managers proved straightforward, presumably there were no 
shortage of courtiers keen to please the court and seeking opportunities for 
enrichment; but finding craftsmen proved more difficult. Despite the novelty 
and interest o f the project, presumably a regular wage could be problematic, 
given the people responsible for the enterprise. When limited sales did 
commence, the number o f purchases proved very disappointing.
A move to larger premises was made, and production started to gain pace. 
Finance however continued to be a continual worry. Funding promised by the 
King was erratic, and was not improved by fact that the director he appointed 
was redirecting considerable amounts to his own pocket, as were many 
others. Perhaps less dishonest, but at least as damaging, was the King’s 
appropriation of a considerable portion o f output for his own use, either 
directly or as gifts, without regarding it as necessary to pay anything for them.
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In 1711 a commission was established to investigate the obvious problems, 
and Bottger was able to successfully make the case for proper investment and 
a reorganisation of the management. Meanwhile, numerous technical 
problems were still being addressed, and a skilled workforce recruited and 
trained.
By 1713 white porcelain was being produced in commercial quantities. 
Bottger’s achievement can be grasped to some extent from the fact that no 
one was able to improve on his basic furnace design for another hundred 
years, although the environment may not have been altogether conducive for 
further innovation. Problems persisted however. Corruption undermined the 
financial integrity o f the business, and success attracted the attention of other 
rulers wanting the secrets to build their own factories, and unscrupulous 
individuals who saw the opportunity to gain for themselves at others expense. 
The stress, the toxicity of some o f the chemicals used in his experiments, and 
the effects o f prolonged exposure to heat and bright lights from furnaces 
took their toll. Bottger died on 13 March 1719. He was found to be deeply in 
debt through borrowing money on his own account to sustain the factory, but 
had no descendants and no significant assets (Gleeson 1998,117).
Darby also needed to juggle his activities, albeit in a somewhat different 
environment. He too needed until 1713 to achieve commercial viability. 
Along the way some of his partners sought to withdraw their capital, and 
extant indentures show that a sum of £1282 was raised from a Bristol 
financier and paid back between 21 September 1711 and 28 February 1712. In 
1714 he was able to renegotiate the lease on the works, for another 21 years 
from 1717. Two new partners replaced his former ones.
Darby started to expand his operations. Two new operations were 
established, though probably in partnership with existing furnace operators, in 
Wales and Cheshire. A new furnace was built on the Coalbrookdale site, and 
he also recruited three clerks, one to manage each site (Thomas 1999, 17).
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Thomas Goldney of Bristol met the capital requirement this entailed through 
a loan, against a mortgage on the works.
Unfortunately, Darby died in 1717. Coming relatively unexpectedly, and 
followed by the death of his wife the following year, it did create problems for 
his family. Nevertheless, the business was divided into sixteen shares, and 
after some financial manoeuvrings, Thomas Goldney ended up with ten 
shares and his son one, because of their heavy financial involvement. Three 
shares were held for the Darby children, and two by the clerk of the 
Coalbrookdale works, Richard Ford, who later married Darby’s oldest 
daughter. Darby’s son regained control in the fullness o f time, but in the 
meantime Ford and Goldney managed the works. In the following decades a 
very successful business developed.
It must be one o f the great ironies of human history that had Bottger found 
out how to smelt iron with coke, and cast it into pots cost effectively, the 
King o f Saxony would almost certainly have dismissed the idea. For him 
porcelain was a substitute for gold, and offered a way to further his political 
ambitions through ostentatious display and military conquest, with the latter 
being just one avenue for the former. Yet Darby’s focus on serving everyday 
needs, much as with Arkwright and the cotton producers later in the century, 
and the agricultural improvers contemporaneously bringing about what has 
been termed the agricultural revolution, underlay the sustainable economic 
growth that is first observed at this time, and gave the country where it 
occurred unprecedented political power, until it was overtaken by another 
that made itself even more adept at catering to people’s everyday needs.
The historical evidence of the progress of these two parallel innovative 
economic developments, demonstrates clearly the impact o f the different 
governance environments. Although major innovations were produced in 
both environments, both the innovation itself and its long-term economic 
consequences were shaped by the governance mechanisms available. In both
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cases access to investment capital was important, as were commitment 
mechanisms. Effective legal contracting mechanisms and access to capital 
played a key part in Darby’s innovative activity, while Bottger could only call 
on patronage and Royal favour. Commitment in Bottger’s case was o f rather a 
different nature to that between Darby and his partners and investors. And 
ultimately it was Darby’s incentive to produce for a mass market in a self- 
sustaining way, over Bottger’s incentive to produce for an elite market in a 
dependant way, which explains why the industrial revolution happened in 
England, not in Germany. So a hypothesis from our model has survived 
another test.
The next logical step is to ask whether contracting and finance had changed 
significantly shortly before Darby founded his company, as if this was not the 
case there would likely be some other factor recendy come into play at that 
time. It turns out that contracting and finance had both changed, and the next 
two sections will describe those changes.
3.1 Commitment
The prediction is that there was in England around 1700 a change in the legal 
institutions supporting contracting. N o revolution has previously been 
identified here, yet when the pieces are put together and looked at in terms of 
their economic effects, rather than from the perspective o f the development 
of specific legal practices that legal historians take, a remarkable shift did 
occur at the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, to appreciate what 
this was it is necessary to trace previous developments from several centuries 
before.
3.1.1 Legal Environment
By the end o f the medieval period England had a complex legal system that 
incorporated a number of courts, which were to some extent complementary, 
but also competed with one another. This competition was a considerable 
spur to innovation, as the different courts competed with one another to
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provide legal adjudication, particularly of lucrative commercial disputes, in a 
way both parties to a dispute could feel was fair and efficient.
English jurisprudence has evolved continuously with no significant 
dislocations since the beginning o f recorded time. Its earliest manifestation 
was as an integral element of the hierarchical system of administration that 
became the feudal system. Often labelled the common law system, technically 
the common law was only one element o f the system, albeit the foundational 
one, that became a fundamental and in many ways a distinguishing element o f 
the English state.
The introduction by Henry II of a common ‘traditional’ law in the second half 
of the twelfth century provided a legal environment that was available to all, 
to some extent. Not surprisingly, the resulting workload was far more than 
the king could deal with personally, as had previously been the case with 
disputes that came within his jurisdiction. Given the fees legal action required, 
this may have been a deliberate revenue raising measure.
Centralisation was not as inconvenient as may at first be imagined, at least 
from a geographical perspective. This was because the King and his court 
were by no means a fixed location, but would be continuously travelling 
around the country. The multiplication o f court business, which included 
local administration, alongside the more limited conception o f modem 
judicial business, was met with the appointment o f justices to tour the whole 
of England, in place of the King. Two were appointed in 1166, but then in 
1176 six circuits were established, and by the 1180s twenty or thirty justices 
were assigned to these circuits. Alongside this, however, there were 
complaints o f the difficulties inherent in searching out travelling courts. So 
there is evidence that in the late 1170s Henry II ordered five judges to remain 
at Westminster, where an embryonic Exchequer, controlling the King’s 
treasure and revenue service, had started to put down roots since earlier in the 
century (Baker 1990,19,21).
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Alongside the Exchequer, the other great department of state was the 
Chancery. This had its origins in the Anglo-Saxon scriptorium, where royal 
charters and writs were drawn up and sealed. The Lord Chancellor was always 
a senior political appointment, yet most have been lawyers, and in medieval 
times most were bishops or archbishops who had graduated in civil or 
cannon law (Baker 1990, 114). However, the bedrock of the common law 
system was not the chancellors’ learning but the documents through which 
the state was governed, which were made authoritative through the 
application o f the Great Seal o f England, possession o f which gave the Lord 
Chancellor his power.
Royal justice was at first seen as a privilege, and one that plaintiffs were 
expected to pay for. Access to the system was gained through purchasing a 
writ from the Chancery. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, there 
were many common forms of writ, and a standard fee for their purchase. Well 
into the thirteenth century a new form of writ could be drafted whenever the 
need arose, and registers containing substantial numbers of precedents were 
put together. By the middle o f the century the uninhibited creation o f new 
writs was seen as a burden, and new forms of writs ceased to be invented 
without the consent o f the king’s council (Baker 1990, 66).
King John encouraged judicial proceedings before himself, and in 1209 the 
Bench at Westminster was discontinued. Plaintiffs had to resort to following 
the King around the country again. This was one of the grievances addressed 
by Magna Carta in 1215, which in clause 17 set out that ‘common pleas 
should not follow the king but should be held in some certain place’ (Baker 
1990, 22). The effect of this was that writs had to name the place where the 
court would be held, and in general this became Westminster, though from 
time to time it was set for other places. Common pleas were defined as those 
that did not involve the king. But many issues did involve a royal interest, so 
in the reign of Henry III, in 1234, the coram rege or Kings Bench was revived,
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and from this time there were two distinct common law courts, each with 
their own judges and administrative support.
It is the law developed from the precedents set through decisions in these two 
courts, Common Pleas and Kings Bench, which technically form the 
common law. They remained nominally within the purview of the Lord 
Chancellor however, and it remained possible to appeal to him on issues 
where no common law remedy existed, or if the available remedies were 
believed to be inappropriate. To deal with this a court o f Chancery developed, 
and the law applied here became known as Equity. Although initially this 
spumed the precedent system, and every case was supposed to be decided on 
its merits, in time the principles it applied became standardised, though never 
to the extent o f the common law. The downside was that proceedings were 
far more time consuming, and by the end of the eighteenth century a backlog 
of thousands o f cases had built up, and cases could take decades to resolve.
The earliest justices were as much administrators as they were lawyers. Many 
were clergymen, but some were knights. By the beginning o f the thirteenth 
century the beginnings of a profession was emerging, with new justices being 
appointed from among those who had previously served as clerks to justices. 
As the century progressed, standard writs were proliferating, and a body of 
professionals developed. Oral proceedings were conducted in court French, 
and formal written documents were in Latin. So, as well as a good 
understanding of the writs available, effectiveness in pursuing or defending 
causes effectively in court required considerable linguistic skill.
By the end o f the thirteenth century it is not surprising that judges in the two 
common law courts were appointed from among the professional advocates. 
During the fourteenth century the system became institutionalised and a guild 
of serjeants at law was formed, who were recognised as masters o f their 
profession. They came to acquire privileges such as a monopoly on right of
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audience at the Common Pleas court, and membership a necessary 
prerequisite for selection as a judge (Baker 1990,180).
The rise of a legal profession skilled in the complex reasoning necessary for 
dealing with the procedural aspects of the law, not surprisingly, came to 
approach the substantial aspects of the law in the same way. The distinction 
between procedure and substance was far from clear for many centuries. It 
was in the course of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that the 
common law was formed from the daily interaction in court between logical 
reasoning and the real world of plaintiffs and defendants wishing to settle 
practical disputes. The means by which this was carried out was the 
interaction between advocates and judges known as pleading. The writ 
provided the basis on which the case commenced. However, while it set out 
the basis for the complaint, it provided little which would allow the case to be 
settled
A distinction developed between law and facts. This became particularly 
important because o f another development starting at this time, namely the 
rise o f the jury. Early medieval justice depended on proof through 
supernatural ordeals or oath ceremonies. The end of this process was 
hastened when in 1215 the church declined to participate in ordeal by fire or 
water, and their integral role in the ritual ordeal process effectively finished off 
these forms o f proof. The jury system that came to replace this form of proof 
had its origins in ascertaining the facts in administrative matters, such as the 
basis on which tax assessments were made. At the end of the twelfth century 
the practice was still for the judge to examine the jury o f local men under oath 
as to the facts o f the case, and on this basis would make his decision.
The rise of the legal profession introduced the practice o f extensive debate 
between the issuing of the writ and the ascertaining o f the facts through the 
jury. The question that the advocates addressed was what exacdy the question 
was that should be put to the jury. It was in doing this that the common law
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evolved. A sophisticated process developed whereby the plaintiff put his case, 
and the defendant then had four choices. He could deny all the facts in a 
‘general traverse’ resulting in the ‘general issue.’ He could deny one material 
fact in a ‘special traverse’ and put a single fact at issue. He could admit the fact 
but deny that this amounted in law to a case against him, this being a 
‘demurrer’. Finally, he could admit the facts but explain them through other 
facts, a ‘confession and avoidance.’ The first two choices would lead to a jury 
being called to decide either the general or single fact. The third produced an 
issue at law, on which the judge could rule. The fourth would effectively 
reverse the roles o f plaintiff and defendant, and the plaintiff had the same 
four choices in responding to the new factual claims made by the defendant. 
This switching of roles sometimes occurred a number of times until the issue 
was decided, which would either be put to a jury or decided in law. In the 
process, the jury evolved from being local men who would know the facts 
through their membership o f the local community, to an independent body 
charged with reaching a common conclusion as to the facts of a matter (Baker 
1990, 92).
While this was the formal process, the evidence suggests that in practice it was 
slighdy different. Judges were clearly aware that because o f the precedent 
system any formal decisions they made would become law, and they were 
reluctant to do this, particularly where there was a divided opinion on the 
bench. Pleas only became binding when the clerks recorded them formally in 
Latin. The practice developed o f making tentative pleas for discussion 
between the advocates and the judges. So in practice few formal pleas of 
demurrer were made. Therefore, a plea would be made tentatively, and if the 
defendant advanced a demurrer that seemed effective, the plea would be 
withdrawn and another advanced. If  no effective demurrer could be found 
the issue would return to facts, either denied, so initiating the move to the jury 
stage, or in avoidance, in which case the same process would occur, until 
either the case was dropped or an issue was reached for a jury to decide.
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Given the central role o f tentative pleading, the formal records made by the 
clerks o f the court were of little interest, though they were referred to from 
time to time. It was the actual debate around the tentative pleas that the 
advocates, particularly when they were still in training, wanted to know about. 
This need was met through the development o f what are now known as 
yearbooks. Some records survive from the thirteenth century, but it is from 
1300 that a continuous stream of reports o f arguments in Common Pleas 
exists in a common form (Baker 1990, 205). They continued in this form until 
the advent o f printing. Clearly, until this time copying was by hand and many 
lawyers would assemble their own collections. Individual authors only 
become known at all in the fifteenth century, presumably also a consequence 
of the introduction o f printing. The yearbook collections finish in 1535, but 
law reports continued, with known authors whose names became their 
principal identifier.
As well as the change in style o f reporting, the sixteenth century also saw a 
major change in the trial format. Quite why this change took place is not 
clear, one possibility is that it occurred as an unexpected consequence o f an 
Act o f Parliament o f 1540. The most significant change was that tentative 
pleas were no longer allowed, and definitive pleas had to be submitted in 
writing. The practical effect of this was to reverse the order in which issues of 
law and issues o f fact were decided. Two specific changes occurred to enable 
this reverse to take place. First, judges needed to be willing to be authoritative 
and to rule definitively in the case o f demurrers. The second was for a formal 
appeals process to develop. In the late fifteenth century it became possible to 
raise motions regarding substantive questions o f law after the verdict, and 
over the next two centuries this process went through further elaboration. 
This format has remained in existence ever since.
Given this rather extensive explanation of developments in the common law 
legal process in general, albeit one necessary to understand the succeeding,
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specific developments in what would become known as contract law will now 
be considered.
3.1.2 Rise of Assumpsit
The genesis o f modem English contract law is in the action of assumpsit, or 
undertaking, which was treated as an action with its own identity from the 
sixteenth century. It differed from the ancient actions of debt, detinue and 
covenant because the plaintiff claimed damages, rather than recovery o f the 
debt, chattel or charter (Simpson 1975, 199, 210). Because the appreciation 
grew that it did not require the existence o f a previous act, it became possible 
to take action on a promise, that is, an agreement between two parties, while 
the ancient actions could only require the agreed reciprocation or reversal of 
an already completed act.
The history o f assumpsit can be traced back to the fourteenth century. It was 
just one way of pleading a trespass action for damages because of a wrong, or 
in modem legal terminology a tort. Writs of trespass were designed to 
compensate for actions that could no longer be put right, so were irreversible 
(Simpson 1975, 200). Around 1370 lawyers began to draw the distinction 
between general trespass and ‘writs of the case.’ The former came to relate to 
a breach o f the peace, the second had two elements, the first ‘the case’ that 
specified a duty the defendant was expected to perform, and the second 
element then alleged the way in which they had failed to discharge the duty 
(Simpson 1975, 202). Prior to this time it had been standard practice to allege 
breach o f the peace regardless of the actual circumstances, because this was 
what qualified the action to be heard at the royal courts, rather than the local 
ones, because the king had a specific interest in keeping the peace. However, 
towards the end of the fourteenth century the courts came to regard frivolous 
allegations o f breach of the peace as objectionable (Simpson 1975,203).
The duties that defendants of trespass actions were alleged to have failed to 
perform at this time arose from local tradition, such as maintaining a sea wall,
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or from an individual’s status as a member of a particular trade, such as a 
doctor or a blacksmith. For example, before the latter part o f the fourteenth 
century a plaintiff who alleged that a blacksmith who incompetently put a nail 
into a horse’s hoof, the wound becoming infected and the horse dying, would 
simply claim that the blacksmith killed the horse. However, after this time the 
court would expect an acknowledgment that the plaintiff had agreed with the 
blacksmith for his horse to be re-shod. This though opened up the 
opportunity for the defence to claim that this should not be brought as a 
trespass, but as a breach o f covenant, which would not allow damages to be 
claimed, and only recognise that the agreement had not been carried out 
properly, the remedies for which were that it be unwound or completed, the 
monetary value of either o f which would be negligible. So plaintiffs started to 
play down the element o f prior agreement. The courts however also started to 
accept that the issue should be the wrong committed, not whether there was a 
prior covenant or not. However, to avoid using the term covenant, the term 
assumpsit was first recorded as being used in 1373, and came to be common 
practice soon afterwards (Simpson 1975,215).
Through the fifteenth century, assumpsit was used in the context o f 
agreements, but the distinction was made between simple failure to carry out 
an agreement, which still required action on a covenant, and causing loss to 
the plaintiff through negligence. This was known as the nonfeasance rule, 
which first appeared in 1400 and was still quoted in 1533, albeit in a dissent 
from the majority opinion (Simpson 1975, 225). In many cases the initial 
agreement was o f a relatively minor nature, so the formalised action o f sealing 
a document that was required for creating a covenant would not be gone 
through. The fact that work had at least begun to be undertaken was however 
evidence that the agreement existed (Simpson 1975,224).
The nonfeasance rule did not disappear overnight. According to Simpson 
(1975, 264) the first half o f the sixteenth century is very poorly covered by law 
reports, so a definitive assessment of when this happened is impossible.
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Nevertheless he is able to show that there was a relatively gradual move away 
from the rule.
As the sixteenth century progressed, two new problems came to concern 
lawyers. The first was to bring the action of debt within the purview of 
assumpsit despite an, until then, well-established distinction between the two. 
Secondly, in some ways a more genuine problem, was establishing the basis 
on which the informal agreements that had not previously been a concern of 
the royal courts should be recognised (Simpson 1975, 271). The records of 
three cases, from 1527, 1543 and 1544, show that the second issue was 
becoming recognised, but found no effective way of dealing with it. 
Nevertheless, assumpsit was becoming an action for breach o f promise 
(Simpson 1975,274).
The availability of assumpsit as an action for breach o f promise was in part 
due to the lack o f available remedy in other parts o f the common law. In 
particular, for specific types o f contract, particularly in cases o f sale o f land or 
for performance of a service, where one party could sue for debt, but the 
other had no remedy. It was also becoming more widely used as a 
consequence o f forms o f pleading. Debt’s roots in traditional society meant 
that the way of rebutting a plaintiff was through Svager o f law,’ and juries 
were still not utilised in these cases. This meant that to deny the charge the 
defendant simply assembled twelve men each prepared to swear that the 
allegation was unfounded. If  each one took the oath, with no slips o f the 
tongue, then the defendant was absolved. In assumpsit a jury took the 
decision as to facts. Again change did not occur overnight, but by 1602, with 
Slade’s Case, assumpsit had won out.
The shift from debt to assumpsit was further complicated because o f the two 
common law courts where plaintiffs could choose to pursue their case, the 
Kings Bench and the Common Pleas. In theory Common Pleas had a 
monopoly on personal actions, while the Kings Bench required some royal
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interest, although for these types of cases this could be achieved when the 
defendant was in the court’s Marshalsea Prison, or if the case involved one of 
its officers. However, it became standard practice simply to allege that the 
defendant was in the custody o f the marshal, from which point Kings Bench 
would hear the case. This became significant because it was generally regarded 
that the procedure in Kings Bench was better, where parties could be 
represented by utter-barristers, while in Common Pleas expensive and often 
elderly serjeants-at-law held the monopoly of right o f audience. This trend is 
confirmed by evidence that towards the end o f the sixteenth century 
Common Pleas business was depressed (Simpson 1975, 292). Two cases in 
Kings Bench show the evolution from debt to assumpsit in progress. In 1533 
a plaintiff claimed that he had suffered greater damages than simply the value 
of goods not delivered, because in order to stay in business he had needed to 
pay more at short notice to another supplier. The jury found against the 
plaintiff on the facts, but the plaintiff raised the issue o f law that he should be 
using debt. The Kings Bench, in upholding the jury’s decision, denied that 
liability for debt excluded the possibility o f liability for assumpsit. Then, in 
1542 a judgement was given that a judgement in debt bars assumpsit, and vice 
versa, so recognising that they were alternative cases on the same cause 
(Simpson 1975,290-1).
One o f the reforms that helped bring oral pleading to an end, a Statute of 
1585, established a judicial appeals mechanism from the Kings Bench, to 
replace appeal to Parliament. The way the appeals tribunal was constituted 
meant that in effect judges from the Court of Common Pleas dominated it. 
The Kings Bench however did not recognise the appellate body as 
authoritative. This created the situation that for a number o f years at the end 
o f the sixteenth century Kings Bench would routinely allow actions of 
assumpsit on informal contracts, which the appeals tribunal would then 
disallow (Simpson 1975, 293). The traditional remedy of a conference of all 
senior judges was invoked to address this situation. Slade’s case, originally 
from 1597, was the specific case on which the issue was debated. The
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resolution, although never stated formally, was that subsequently judges 
accepted assumpsit in debt actions, as an alternative to defending a debt 
action through wager of law. Chief Justice Holt was still upholding this basis 
for the distinction in 1689 (Simpson 1975, 310). Slade’s Case thus effectively 
abolished wager of law as an institution, although it was not until 1833 that a 
statute formally abolished it (Simpson 1975,298).
So alongside the issue o f moving from debt to assumpsit for action against 
breaches of informal contracts, the other issue was the basis on which the 
agreement should be recognised. What should replace wager o f law? The 
answer was consideration. The basis of an enforceable promise became that 
the promisor had received some benefit that prompted them to make the 
promise. The desire for a simple dictum was satisfied by this apparently 
simple test. O f course, the varied and complicated reasoning that may be 
behind a promise ensured that the test was never as simple as it at first 
appears.
N ot surprisingly, the doctrine of consideration appeared at the time assumpsit 
became available as an alternative to the action o f debt, around the mid 
sixteenth century. In the fifteen fifties consideration started to be averred, 
1549 actually being the very first, but at this stage it was by no means 
inevitable. Then in a series o f cases in 1566,1567 and 1568 the actionability of 
agreements was reported as being clearly related to the presence or absence of 
consideration. Subsequent reports show the development of an intricate 
doctrine and by 1586 a Solicitor General identified the three key issues as 
consideration, promise and breach of promise. Simpson (1975, 319) believes 
that by the end o f the sixteenth century the major problems relevant to the 
issue o f consideration down to modem contract law had been raised and 
settled, one way or the other. Nevertheless, on his own analysis, while the 
central importance o f consideration had been established by that time, issues 
such as precisely who was able to sue, and that one promise was sufficient 
consideration for another, had to wait until well into the seventeenth century
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to be settled, the latter using rules set out in a case o f 1669, the former using 
reasoning from a 1677 case (Simpson 1975, 482, 465).
Also in 1677 occurred what Simpson considers to be the most significant 
development in the common law of contract until at least the mid nineteenth 
century, if not today, namely the Statute o f Frauds (Simpson 1975, 620). In 
some ways this was a revisionist piece of legislation, because it reintroduced 
the need for formalities in a number o f areas that the development of 
assumpsit doctrine had allowed to be pleaded with fewer restrictions. 
However, the effect was to shift the balance from the plaintiff back to the 
defendant. Contemporary rules o f evidence meant that often one side simply 
pleaded against another, sometimes with the evidence o f witnesses who were 
not cross-examined. It was generally agreed to be common for people to sue 
for breach of promise on the least pretext, with success often coming down 
simply to a matter o f luck. The Statute was not unduly onerous; it simply 
required that for promises in a number o f cases the evidence be in writing, 
including contacts with a value o f over £10 in value or one year in length.
The nature o f the common law meant that the medieval actions did not go 
away. Parts were superseded, but other parts assimilated, and some left 
untouched. Despite assumpsit’s rise to prominence in the sixteenth century 
and its status as the regular common law remedy for broken agreements, it 
was not until the middle o f the eighteenth century that the extant evidence of 
legal practice ceases to be made up primarily o f material on the medieval law 
(Simpson 1975, 3). The following quarter century saw the contract law 
developed up until that time firmly entrenched, through the work o f Chief 
Justice Lord Mansfield, who brought what had been issues o f fact to be issues 
of law, so that rather than rely on the somewhat unpredictable nature o f juries 
many issues became clear and predictable, as he believed was wanted by the 
business community (Simpson 1975, 618).
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So by the middle of the seventeenth century, through a process o f gradual 
evolution, a sophisticated system of rational contract law had developed. A 
clear distinction was established between issues of law and issues of fact. 
Issues o f law could be expected to be well known to businessmen and 
provide a high level of predictability in the system, and while formality was 
encouraged, it was still possible to provide remedies in the event that the 
agreement had not seemed to warrant the cost o f formality, or the issue 
causing the problem had not been foreseen. The downside was that the rate 
of evolution was, in practice, painfully slow. The next two sections describe 
areas where this became a particular problem, before describing how the 
solution came about.
What is apparent from this and the previous section is that the procedural and 
contractual logic described here is in most cases far from obvious. Some 
medieval innovations such as wager of law are obviously problematic from 
the modem standpoint. Others such as the doctrine o f consideration remain 
largely because they work. Even issues such as the separation between law 
and fact, while clear in principle, are not always so clear in practice. It is the 
economic consequences of many of these practices that are their ultimate 
justification, yet this is not a well-researched area, for either lawyers or 
economists. However, before considering the financial and economic 
consequences of these developments, it is worthwhile to consider further legal 
developments.
3.1.3 Legal Organisation
The legal form of business organisation had two sources. At the end of the 
medieval period, partnerships were the only ongoing contractual arrangement 
that could be formed independendy o f the state, and they owed their origins 
to classical developments, largely described above. Other forms of 
organisation had medieval origins, but not as businesses, rather as 
ecclesiastical bodies or guilds. The latter, although created to support 
craftsmen in business, acted in regulatory, welfare and social roles rather than
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businesses in their own right. The beginning o f the sixteenth century saw the 
creation o f the regulated company which was in some ways similar to the 
guilds in being an organisation within which merchants traded on their own 
account, but they were limited to providing business support services such as 
foreign bases, as an aid to moneymaking, and had no significant welfare or 
ritualistic elements like the guilds (Harris 2000, 32).
The first joint-stock company, the Muscovy or Russia Company, was founded 
in 1553, and chartered in 1555. Soon afterwards other companies formed for 
long distance trade with other specific destinations. Although first organised 
with permanent capital, the Russia Company did not reach profitability, and 
further calls were made on shareholders, to the extent that in 1568 it was 
reorganised using one to three year short-term accounts rather than perpetual 
capital. Then in 1622-3 separate term accounts were replaced by individual 
accounts, and it became a regulated company. The time was clearly not yet 
right for the joint-stock company (Harris 2000, 45).
The first companies were created with a symbiotic relationship between 
themselves and the monarchs who endorsed their charters, which involved 
the exchange o f expected company revenues for monopoly rights (Harris 
2000, 50). Although from a modem perspective monopoly rights could be 
seen as a mechanism to ensure that initial investments in establishing 
relationships and facilities in foreign locations would be protected from 
competition from subsequent free-riders, they were seen then simply as a way 
of protecting profits, and were possible because the royal prerogative would 
provide effective protection from competition. The monarch was happy to 
intervene in this way to generate revenues for himself, particularly during the 
accelerating conflict between king and parliament during the first half of the 
seventeenth century. This relationship between state and company survived 
the 1688 revolution and, as the next section describes, the joint-stock 
companies became major players in the management o f public finances.
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The post revolutionary period saw a burst o f company formation, something 
like 150 in 1695, for a whole range o f purposes, including manufacturing, 
mining, banking and finance, fishing and water supply. However, although 
total capitalisation continued to increase, actual numbers decreased to around 
46 in 1693, and only twelve in 1717, with only four new companies formed 
between 1700 and 1717 (Harris 2000, 57). O f an estimated £20.6m in share 
capital in English companies in 1717, £18.7m was in the Bank of England, 
the East India Company and the South Sea Company. It is clear that for the 
three, government debt finance was their primary business, so it is likely the 
same held for the remaining capital. So, while the market in company shares 
looked attractive, and there was considerable activity, it was directed at public 
rather than private investment. So it appears from this that company forming 
was not a key to growth. But growth did lead to a desire to be able to create 
appropriate legal structures, which led to much experiment later in the 
eighteenth century, described below in the context of implications rather than 
causes o f sustainable economic growth.
3.1.4 Bills and Notes
Bills o f exchange and promissory notes were o f fundamental importance in 
the eighteenth century English economy, as the next section demonstrates. It 
is instructive to build on the descriptions above o f the common law legal 
environment and the rise of the action of assumpsit, and observe the 
development o f the legal framework that facilitated this use o f bills and notes. 
The precise pleas submitted to the courts plot out in great detail the path 
developments followed.
From the end o f the sixteenth century, payees o f bills were succeeding in 
assumpsit actions against the drawees with an explicit allegation that a sum of 
money had been delivered as part of the exchange transaction of which the 
bill was a part (Rogers 1995, 135). Soon afterwards pleas start to cite the 
custom of merchants, which is not straightforward to explain, because lawyers 
would not advise their clients to claim more than necessary, as the more that
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is claimed, the more there is for the defence to challenge. Rogers (1995, 133) 
speculates that this may be because it is not clear which party is the agent and 
which the principal, so if in earlier cases the agent had contracted on behalf o f 
the principal, the principal was bound to pay. However, the principal could 
not bind his agent in the same way, but it could be that by asserting that it was 
the custom of merchants to act on earlier promises, particularly a promise to 
accept the bill for later payment, the principal’s promise could be binding on 
the agent.
Developments in the seventeenth century can be seen in both official records 
of pleadings and reports of exchanges in court. A report o f 1612, although 
brief, sets out the custom of merchants, but does not mention any underlying 
exchange. Then in 1636 there is a record of a formal plea that takes this 
approach. The 1690s have several records o f pleading where the practice is 
simply asserted as being according to the custom of merchants, with no 
detailed description of what this is (Rogers 1995, 129-131). Rogers notes that 
this continuing reference to the custom of merchants has been taken to mean 
that this was alleged as a statement o f fact. From time to time defendants 
demurred on the basis that they were not merchants, but the courts rejected 
these pleadings as a matter o f course. The explanation Rogers proposes is that 
it was a typical common law device that allowed the law to develop to meet 
the needs o f the economy. Technically, the promise to pay would require 
either a sealed document or a consideration, but neither o f these existed. The 
assertion o f custom of merchants provided a way to enforce what clearly had 
become the general expectation in this particular type o f economic transaction 
(Rogers 1995, 149). The common law was continuing to respond, albeit in a 
slow and often convoluted way.
3.1.5 Parliamentary Innovations
From a modem perspective it seems curious that in all this discussion of the 
legal environment, and of the law as it relates to contracts in general, and 
financial instruments in particular, there has been so litde reference to
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Parliament and statute law. O f references so far, two sixteenth century 
Statutes merited mention as a result of apparendy unexpected changes they 
brought about, and the 1677 Statute of Frauds was on the face o f it a 
retrogressive Act. So even where mention has been made it is not in a 
particularly constructive role. Nevertheless, it will be useful to consider briefly 
the background and role o f parliament at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century.
The courts and parliament both had their origins in the same royal council 
that advised the king. In medieval times it was settled that the canon of 
statutes began with Magna Carta on its confirmation in 1225. For the next 
century a variety o f formulas are used to introduce statutes. Before the reign 
o f Edward III (1327-1377) parliament and council are interchangeable terms. 
Reference to lords and commons had been made since 1275, but during the 
reign o f Edward III the commons began to meet as a separate house, and in 
1340 the king conceded the principle that without their consent no taxation 
could be imposed. From 1348 it was said that the king with the assent o f the 
lords and commons made laws, and from 1407 until today it has been 
accepted that English parliamentary legislation requires the separate consent 
of the monarch, lords and commons. Official records of legislation only date 
from the 1290s, and until the fifteenth century officials sometimes carried out 
the detailed drafting after assent had been given. It was only at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century that the text o f the statute became the 
overwhelming issue when disputes came to court (Baker 1990, 235).
For subsequent developments to be understood, what has become the third 
element o f modem government, namely the executive, needs to be 
considered. Again from a modem perspective, at least as important as the role 
o f the law in resolving disputes between individuals, is its role in mediating 
between the individual and the state in the form of the executive. However, 
the early medieval origins o f both the judges who developed the common 
law, and o f parliament, were in the king’s council, and the king was in no
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sense bound by his council. It took a civil war and a bloodless revolution 
during the seventeenth century to establish the rule of law over the king. Until 
the Bill o f Rights o f 1689 established the limitations on the prerogatives o f 
the king, many seventeenth century developments took place through the 
interaction between royal prerogatives and parliamentary powers.
The most obvious area of royal prerogative relative to the issues considered 
here is that o f monopoly. The common law drew from the right in medieval 
custom of everyone to ply their trade, that no one could claim a legal 
monopoly to prevent others from setting up in competition. However, royal 
charters for markets and fairs, as well as for guilds and trade associations, 
effectively created monopolies for their holders, but the purpose of these was 
to set standards and provide an environment in which any qualified individual 
could ply their trade. However, in the sixteenth century the practice was 
adopted from the continent o f granting monopolies to individuals who 
introduced new inventions into the realm, the argument being that this 
infringed no existing trades. This was extended to grants o f monopoly on 
trade in foreign parts, by virtue o f the royal prerogative to license foreign 
trade, so again infringing no existing trades. It was this that allowed the 
trading companies to be chartered.
Grants o f monopoly became a lucrative source of revenue for the crown, and 
the boundary was continually extended. The issue came to a head in 1602 
with the grant o f a monopoly on supplying playing cards, the crown arguing 
that it was an undesirable activity requiring control. The courts dismissed this 
defence however. Nevertheless, the practice continued and action was taken 
in Parliament leading to an Act o f 1624 declaring any monopolies within the 
realm void, with a number of exceptions. Most long lasting were rights of 
inventors, who could claim, as Darby did, a monopoly for fourteen years. 
Charters to companies were also excluded for the time being, so giving an 
extension to the monopoly rights o f the trading companies (Baker 1990, 513).
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The interregnum following the execution of Charles I saw a vast range o f 
sweeping legislative changes, but these were all rolled back on the return o f 
Charles II in 1660. However, one change that was seen to have benefits was 
the end o f feudal tenure, so this was enacted in a Military Tenures Abolition 
Act of 1660 (Baker 1990, 294). The Statute o f Frauds o f 1677 has already 
been considered, but was another intervention at this time. Following the 
revolution o f 1688-9, mineral rights, with the exception of gold and silver, no 
longer belonged to the crown, to the undoubted benefit of the landed classes, 
but also removing administrative barriers to the exploitation o f these 
resources about to become a central feature o f the industrial revolution 
(Atiyah 1979, 87). Parliament was beginning to take the legislative initiative, 
albeit in relatively unproblematic areas from an economic point o f view.
The start o f the eighteenth century sees a change o f gear. In 1702 Chief 
Justice Holt ruled that a promissory note payable on order was not a bill o f 
exchange, and hence not negotiable. His view was that it would in effect take 
the place o f the sealed covenant, and any written agreement would then 
become binding in itself, with no dispute possible on the agreement o f which 
it was a part (Baker 1990, 418). Three subsequent cases upheld this ruling. 
Rather than wait for the common law to take its course, and find a way over 
decades to deal with what from an economic point of view was a useful new 
tool, as had happened previously, in 1704 the Promissory Notes Act made all 
notes payable to “X”, or to “X  or order,” or to “X  or bearer” negotiable 
(Carruthers 1996,130).
3.1.6 Legal Revolution
While not perhaps as direct a consequence o f the Glorious Revolution as was 
the financial revolution, to be considered shortly, the final acceptance of 
Parliament, or technically the King in Parliament, as the sovereign body of the 
nation in many ways brought about the end of the common law tradition of 
the law adjusting internally, albeit to the changing demands o f the society it 
served. From the beginning o f the eighteenth century, a body that had seen
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itself finally put an end to unrestricted royal prerogative had the confidence to 
legislate when conditions warranted it. Clearly, the common law system had 
not been so expliddy problematic as the previous executive system and its 
financial manipulations. But nor did it have continental examples from which 
it could easily copy. For these reasons the effects were not as apparent as in 
the financial arena, but they were non the less significant.
Through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a necessary shift in people’s, 
and particularly the law’s, understanding o f contract had taken place. The 
established idea was that the reason for the contract was critical, whether 
based on an existing relationship or transaction, and the law made the 
contract. The new concept was that a contract was an act of will and was 
created by the individuals involved. By the mid eighteenth century the 
realisation grew that there was a distinction between morality and the law of 
the land, that the two were not necessarily the same (Atiyah 1979, 163). As 
people came to rely more on one another as individuals in their own right, 
rather than as holders o f a place in society, they came to expect that they 
should be able to make commitments to which they would be subsequently 
held liable, and the law developed to make this possible (Atiyah 1979,188).
3.2 Credit
The fiscal effects o f the political changes o f 1689 have already been labelled as 
a financial revolution (Dickson 1967), referring principally to the getting and 
spending o f money by the state. Here this is labelled ‘public finance’, although 
clearly taxes were collected or money borrowed from individual people, and 
given to individual people in return for goods and services. But, in addition to 
this, I want to argue that this revolution was larger in scope than 
conventionally envisaged, and also took place on the level o f private finance. 
The level labelled here ‘private finance’ concerns the transfer o f purchasing 
power between individuals, although again changes here also involved 
changes in national policy regarding legislation and judicial practice.
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Furthermore, as in the commitment-credit model used to derive the 
hypothesis being tested here, contracting mechanisms and financial markets 
are self-reinforcing, and most o f their economic effects come from their 
interactions. So the distinctions made here, dividing credit and commitment 
into separate sections, are to ease the process o f exposition, more than any 
desire to claim that separate but parallel developments occurred.
3.2.1 Public Finances
Although public finance did not become truly self-sustaining until the 
twentieth century, when it shifted away from mainly paying for unproductive 
national defence to mainly investing in human capital through education, 
health and social security, seventeenth century developments, first in the 
Netherlands and then particularly in England, did enable it to become 
effectively self-sustaining. Governments have always needed to borrow to 
finance calls on expenditure that cannot be met immediately by taxation and 
other forms o f revenue generation. What was new at the start o f the 
eighteenth century was the expectation that the debt would be funded, that is 
repaid, so leading to a low risk premium and low interest rates, which made it 
affordable by governments. This created a self-reinforcing system, because 
reliable repayments kept interest rates low, and low rates meant governments 
could afford to pay, and had the incentive to do so to keep rates low.
However, what really allowed the system to be sustainable, though not 
recognised at the time, was that the public debt markets that developed 
provided liquidity and a ‘risk free rate o f return.’ This provided a pool of 
funds and a standard by which to compare other lending opportunities, and 
allowed businesses to borrow. Clearly, this would be at a risk-adjusted rate but 
one not much higher than the rate for government debt, at least for well- 
collateralised businesses. This created a very conducive climate for 
commercial investment, and brought about economic growth. This growth in 
turn increased the economic surplus available to the government, and even
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with constant tax rates this meant increasing revenue, thus funding the 
previously incurred debt in a sustainable way.
Central to this revolution in public finances was the constitutional settlement 
following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which invented the idea of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Public finance was no longer the battle, at times 
literal, that it had been over the previous century between a royal sovereign 
demanding spending and a parliament trying to resist the increase in taxation 
this implied. In this struggle, royal borrowing was continually filling the 
resulting fiscal gap. But the frequent defaults that followed made government 
borrowers one of the most risky. Normally this was compensated for through 
the granting o f a monopoly, or similar wealth destroying profit opportunity, 
further damaging the sustainability of the system. 1672 saw the last major 
sovereign default in England, when Charles II’s pursuit o f wars with the 
Dutch proved economically unsustainable.
Following the 1689 settlement, the new joint sovereigns, the Dutch William 
and his English wife Mary, daughter o f Charles’ brother and successor, the 
now exiled James, still led the executive; although in the decades and 
generations that followed this became an increasingly symbolic status. The 
executive itself came to be made up o f members o f the party that had the 
majority position in the House o f Commons. Spending had to be initiated by 
the executive, but approved by Parliament, which also carried out 
retrospective audits (North and Weingast 1989, 816).
North and Weingast (1989, 821) pick out four specific practices introduced at 
this time that were central to the public financial revolution. First, all new long 
term loans had specific taxes earmarked for paying their interest. Second, it 
was proposed that a Bank of England be incorporated. Although the first 
large long-term loan secured on specific tax revenue, raised in 1693 to pay for 
a war with France, was fully subscribed, by the next year it was thought that 
sources were largely exhausted. So, following the Dutch example, it was
107
proposed the new Bank would have a dual purpose. First, it was responsible 
for disbursing funds to government suppliers, and second, subscriptions 
would be sought which would be lent to the government. The dual role 
meant that should the government ever default on an interest or capital 
repayment, made in the first instance to the Bank and only subsequently to its 
shareholders, the Bank would immediately cease payments to government 
contractors. This created a strong incentive to the government to live up to its 
financial commitments, to avoid problems with unhappy suppliers refusing to 
continue trading with them, or taking steps to recover monies owed.
So successful was the proposed Bank that one third o f its initial capital was 
subscribed within one day, two thirds within the next two, and the whole 
amount ten days later. Two subsequent innovations further strengthened the 
financial system, the creation of a separate ‘sinking fund’ to make up shortfalls 
in taxes earmarked for a particular loan issue, and milling o f coin edges to 
reduce the practice of shaving coins, which debased the currency.
The effects o f the public finance revolution were startling. Previously 
government debt had been limited to around a million pounds, between two 
and three percent of Gross National Product (GNP), with government 
expenditure double that. Afterwards, Britain was able to follow the Dutch 
example, where long-term government borrowing cost four percent a year, 
while in England only short term borrowing was possible, and at rates varying 
from six to thirty percent annually. The initial loans of the 1690s were at 
fourteen percent, which halved by the end o f the decade to between six and 
eight percent. Within the first ten years, expenditure had quadrupled to -£7.9m 
and debt was at £17m. Remarkably, there was no significant price inflation 
over this period. By the 1730s interest rates were as low as three percent 
(North and Weingast 1989, 822-3).
Two consequences followed, one political and one social. Both o f which had 
important economic effects. Politically Britain, as England became in 1707
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following the Act o f Union with Scotland, became the dominant European 
and then World power during the eighteenth century. To a large extent this 
was a result o f the extraordinary way the state was able to raise finance to pay 
for ever more expensive wars. As North and Weingast point out, by 1765 
economic conditions may have been superficially similar in Britain and 
France. But while France had eroded its capital base to the extent that it was 
on the verge o f bankruptcy, Britain had strengthened its capital base to the 
extent that it was on the verge of the industrial revolution (North and 
Weingast 1989, 831). Not unrelated to this was the rise in influence o f what 
was called the monied interest, that is, those involved in business, as a political 
force. This was in contrast to the previous dominance in political society of 
the landed interest, aristocratic owners of large tracts o f farmland. 
Commercial considerations became significant, and geo-strategic policy was 
dictated at least as much by the need to protect and further commerce as it 
was by national security in the more conventional sense o f preventing foreign 
invasion.
The social consequence o f note was what could be called the de­
personalisation of credit. Prior to the Glorious Revolution, loans to the state 
were personal loans to the King, with all the additional complex issues that go 
with personal relationships. Once the Bank of England was established, 
lending to the government became to a much larger extent limited to the 
explicit contractual issues associated with the transaction. While the empirical 
evidence dted demonstrates how big and fast an impact it had on public 
finances, the impact was, if less easily demonstrable and less immediate, at 
least as great on the private sphere. As people became used to impersonal 
public debt, so they became open to private impersonal debt. The rise of 
private banks to provide the shield o f impersonality played a significant role. 
Government debt provided an interest rate benchmark, and bankers learned 
to measure commercial lending opportunities against this. So long as the 
bankers maintained and serviced people’s deposits, they did not much care
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where they were used, and entrepreneurs with collateral could borrow to 
invest with no encumbrance other than those explicidy in the contract.
However, as noted above, this was only one, albeit important, side o f the 
story. While political developments had been proceeding rapidly through the 
seventeenth century, so had commercial practice.
3.2.2 Private Working Capital
In much the same way that, in retrospect, public finance went through a 
revolution at the end o f the seventeenth century, but probably at the time 
appeared more like a gradual evolution than a sudden revolution, the same 
pattern occurred in the private sphere. It will help to start by drawing a 
distinction between working capital and investment capital. Working capital 
within the economy is to a large extent the same thing as the money supply, 
which expanded hugely in this period. It enables transactions to take place, by 
having some form of money or debt given in return for goods or services, 
which in turn can be used to purchase other goods or services. Investment 
capital markets, where purchasing power is temporarily transferred to 
purchase or develop assets that play an intermediary role in producing other 
goods or services, took a little longer to develop, and will be considered in the 
next sub-section.
In many ways the foundations o f developments in England were laid in the 
middle ages, and the path from the Italians through the Dutch to England 
was sketched out in the previous chapter. What was new in England was de­
personalisation, and particularly the strengthening o f negotiability of financial 
instruments that essentially were able to become a form of currency. There 
has been a considerable amount o f confusion over the process by which this 
occurred. Rogers suggests that because negotiability of instruments, that is 
their creating contractual obligations in their own right apart from the 
transactions o f which they form a part, is central to modem legal practice, it 
was assumed that this was so in the past (Rogers 1995, 2). The confusion was
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helped because many earlier writers, particularly in the eighteenth century, 
were making assertions regarding credit practices in support of essentially 
political arguments, but these assertions were there to add weight to their 
argument, rather than provide a dispassionate account o f the relevant legal 
principles (Rogers 1995,155,157).
By examining case law records, both official records and various digests, 
Rogers is able to document the changes in the use o f bills and notes before 
and after the middle o f the seventeenth century (Rogers 1995, 94). In the 
prior period the tone utilised in works describing their use is one of a 
specialixed and arcane activity. But by 1687 a Chief Justice even describes 
himself as being directly familiar with them through his own use o f them 
(Rogers 1995, 96-7). Rogers makes the point that developments in common 
law arise through responding to the need to adjudicate practical disputes, so 
changes were to a large extent a result of changing practices o f businessmen 
in the economy. Nevertheless, it is important to note a key shift from the 
early period. From their earliest use, bills were integral elements in foreign 
exchange transactions, and served the purpose of facilitating international 
trade in different currencies and locations. A merchant would sell his goods in 
a foreign city and give the money to another merchant trading in the opposite 
direction, in return for a bill payable to the merchant’s agent or principal in 
the merchant’s home city, by the agent or principal of the merchant to whom 
he has supplied the hard currency, so transferring hard currency in the other 
country in the other direction, from the person who sold goods there, to the 
one who purchased them. The benefits from being able to do this were 
considerably enhanced by the growth o f large ports and the existence of 
brokers who would match up merchants, based on their reputation for 
knowing the reputation o f the merchant to whom hard currency was being 
supplied.
After the middle o f the seventeenth century a significant change took place, 
with the development o f ‘inland bills’ where both parties were in England.
I l l
The earliest examples date from the beginning of the seventeenth century 
(Rogers 1995, 101). This can be explained by the rise of middlemen, with a 
shift from a largely local to a national economy. A good example o f this is the 
Blackwell Hall market for woollen cloths in London. Established as early as 
the late fourteenth century, there was a major change in the seventeenth 
century. Previously, the clothiers who organised the manufacture o f the cloth 
had dealt directly with the drapers who either exported or sold it to 
consumers. But further economic specialisation occurred, with the 
development of specialised product factors, who had clothiers ship them the 
cloth, which they then sold on a commission basis to the drapers (Rogers 
1995,104).
There were two gaps that needed to be filled for the system to work 
effectively. In most cases the cloth was manufactured a considerable distance 
from London, so while the clothiers’ expenditure would be in their home 
region, their income would be in London. Secondly, the drapers would often 
not be able to pass on the cloth for some time, so there was a considerable 
time lag from the expenditure on production to consumption or export. The 
factors filled in these gaps because they would extend credit to the drapers, 
albeit on behalf of the clothiers, to whom they would then also extend credit. 
This credit was, however, in London, not in the clothiers home region. The 
clothiers turned this situation to their advantage. As the major national trading 
centre, and the centre of government, funds flowed back to London from 
other areas in two ways, through tax remittances, and through local merchants 
who purchased goods in London, often from abroad, and sold them in their 
home region. What the clothiers were therefore able to do was to exchange 
the hard currency collected by tax collectors and local merchants for bills that 
drew funds from their account with their factor in London. The tax collectors 
and merchants could then avoid the costs and risks o f transporting cash to 
London. They simply presented the bills given them by the clothiers to their 
factors, who gave them the cash to pay into the treasury or to their own 
suppliers.
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The inland bill system really took off when it became the practice accepted by 
the courts that bills should be honoured regardless of any complications 
arising from the transaction of which they were a part. In this way they 
became currency in their own right. The practice grew up that people would 
use a bill payable to them, or their nominee, or even just the bearer, as 
currency, where necessary endorsing the bill as payable to the person they 
were transacting with. It became common for bills to be endorsed many times 
before finally being cashed in with the person on whom they were originally 
drawn. Clearly for this to happen there needed to be a good deal of 
confidence that they would be accepted once they reached their destination. 
The distinction between a bill and a note arose because a note was payable to 
the bearer and it was not possible to go back to the person from whom one 
had received it, while a bill could in theory be unwound by going back up the 
endorsement trail, though clearly this could not happen very often for the 
system to work.
Clearly the person who took a bill in exchange for cash or goods or services 
did not have to do so at its face value, they could discount it, and the 
difference between the face value and the discounted price would serve as 
their commission and effectively as interest. In this way many cloth 
merchants, particularly in Lancashire as early as the 1680s and 1690s, built up 
complementary businesses, and in some cases regularly sent cash to London 
hidden with their cloth, because they were selling bills in greater amounts than 
they were earning simply from the sales of their cloth (Rogers 1995,114).
At the London end the goldsmiths, many of who were by this time becoming 
bankers in all but name, spotted another business opportunity. Their expertise 
had made them successful in the business o f exchanging foreign and domestic 
coins, which had extended into the purchase of foreign bills o f exchange. The 
move to accepting, at a discount, inland bills was the next logical step (Davies 
1994, 251). This line of business was complemented by their role as deposit 
takers. Carruthers shows that at the time of the stop on the exchequer in 1672
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the twelve biggest creditors were all goldsmith bankers, who accounted for 
97.5% o f the total sovereign debt (Carruthers 1996, 63). They were clearly 
preferred by ordinary investors for investing savings as an alternative to the 
state, although in many cases the goldsmith bankers simply put the money to 
use by lending to the sovereign. Having said this, no doubt one o f a small 
number of large debtors was perceived as having more chance o f repayment 
than one o f a large number o f small debtors, given the personal nature of 
sovereign debt at this time. With the creation o f the Bank of England, 
competition for deposits opened up (Carruthers 1996, 141), although 
goldsmiths and private bankers needed to seek competitive advantage 
through lending to private rather than public clients. The Bank of England 
also became an active discount house, although this did create somewhat o f a 
conflict o f interest that needed careful handling from time to time (North and 
Weingast 1989, 827). The final step towards modem fiat currency was taken 
when goldsmith bankers, and shordy after its formation the Bank of England, 
started to loan money in the form of promissory notes, which paid the bearer 
metallic currency on demand, but was clearly a more convenient and often a 
more secure medium of exchange. By 1776 Adam Smith asserts that the level 
of bank money in circulation clearly exceeds that o f metallic currency (Smith 
1776, 389).
Banks as autonomous institutions outside London took some time to become 
established. Davies believes that the evidence is that there were only around 
twelve by the middle of the eighteenth century, including two in Bristol where 
Abraham Darby first started in business. But by 1775 there were over 100, 
and growth was rapid after that. After 1808 banks were required to have a 
licence to issue notes, and the peak of licences quickly followed in 1810 with 
783 (Davies 1994, 286). It is interesting that although Lancashire was one o f 
the first places for inland bills to be widely circulated, it was one o f the last 
places to develop local banks. Even in the late eighteenth century the primary 
circulating medium of the region was bills, over either Bank of England, or 
any other bank’s, promissory notes (Rogers 1995, 123). An Act of Parliament
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in 1708 clarified a previous act, and granted the Bank of England the national 
joint-stock banking monopoly, in return for taking on much o f the 
government’s debt. The 1708 act forbad associations o f more than six people 
from carrying out banking activities, and this remained in force until 1826. So 
there was no real possibility of consolidation until after this date.
So the public finance revolution was only half the story, although public and 
private finance were closely interconnected. The working capital that largely 
oiled the wheels of the industrial revolution was made available, either 
through discounted bills, or later through local banks, because it could be 
easily priced, at a level that was economic for manufacturers, as a result o f the 
benchmark provided by government debt.
3.2.3 Private Investment Capital
Even in the mid eighteenth century, calculations suggest that the ratio o f fixed 
to circulating Capital in British industry and commerce was 1:1, rising to 3.3:1 
by the mid nineteenth century (Daunton 1995, 259). So working capital was 
certainly more important around the turn of the eighteenth century, which 
explains why most developments were in working capital rather than 
investment capital.
Nevertheless, fixed capital was important To some extent it could be hidden 
within working capital, and Darby’s short term borrowing to support the 
development o f his process appears to use a mechanism more naturally 
applied to working capital, presumably because that was what was available. 
His initial reliance on business partners shows where the majority o f his 
investment capital came from. It is possible that partners did not even need to 
have funds immediately available, as in the case o f Guttenberg, although 
probably unlike Fust in fifteenth century Germany, loans would not have 
been secured on personal reputation but on the security o f existing 
businesses, and particularly on property. That this was becoming more 
important is shown by a 1704 Act o f Parliament to establish a deed register
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for West Yorkshire, copying another Dutch invention that later spread more 
widely across Britain. Because, as the Romans appreciated, securing loans on 
property is all very well, but how does a lender know that a potential 
borrower has not already used their property as security for a loan with 
someone else? The legal device o f selling the property, subject to the right of 
the vendor to repurchase at a fixed price in the future as well as maintaining 
use was utilised (Daunton 1995, 244), but is clearly messy and not what is 
really required. A deed register which is easy and cheap to use, particularly 
when it has the stick as well that the courts would not enforce a lien unless it 
was on the register, which is what the 1704 Act did, was a simple and elegant 
solution to the problem, and was soon copied.
Again, legal innovation provides a reliable and enlightening source o f 
evidence regarding development o f credit institutions. Buchinsky and Polak 
compared data from the West Yorkshire Deed Register, on building activity, 
with government debt interest rates and found that by the end o f our period, 
and beginning at the end o f the eighteenth century, England had become a 
single market for capital (Buchinsky and Polak 1993).
The joint-stock company, which was to become the standard mechanism for 
initial capital investment, started off as a mechanism for enlisting working 
capital. The most successful early joint-stock company, the East India 
Company, was first chartered in 1601, with stock being terminable after one 
year and a single voyage. This was repeated twelve times until 1612. From 
then until 1642 each round of financing was for a cluster o f voyages after 
which the capital was returned to the shareholders. It was only at this point 
that the Company adopted a permanent capital structure (Baskin and Miranti 
1997, 64). Each company however required an Act o f Parliament to establish 
its separate legal personality, and for largely political reasons, associated with 
monopolising intermediation of government debt, this ceased after an Act 
banning further incorporations in 1720.
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So the foundations were starting to be laid for mechanisms that would enable 
investment funds to be made available through capital markets, but the 
industrial revolution succeeded without making a great deal o f use o f these.
3.2.4 Capital and Creative Destruction
Perhaps ironically, once the mechanisms were in place to create credit, the 
need became apparent for a mechanism to destroy it. Credit, like any form of 
money, is a claim on real assets. From time to time investments will be made 
that will not pay off, and often in these situations the real assets on which 
claims can be made will not be available in sufficient quantity to fully repay 
the debt. In this situation the whole system benefits by recognising this and 
annulling  the claims that exist. Otherwise unsustainable tensions would build 
up and the system would break down. This is the role o f bankruptcy: it is the 
controlled destruction of money and credit, when the economic value from 
which it derived its value has been destroyed.
After 1706 businesses, defined as traders with debts o f at least £100, were 
protected from the worst sanctions o f the age such as debtors prison. They 
had to give over all their property to their creditors, and when eighty percent 
agreed they were released from outstanding obligations. I f  they repaid forty 
percent o f their debts, they were allowed to retain five percent o f their estate. 
Rather than brand bankrupt traders as dishonest parasites on society, the 
objective o f the new approach was to give them a clean slate on which to start 
again (Daunton 1995, 249).
3.2.5 Financial Revolution
From this survey it can be seen that effective credit mechanisms were in place 
and increasingly widely used after the beginning o f the eighteenth century. 
N ot only was there Dickson’s revolution in public finances, there was also a 
revolution in private financing, though in the initial stages limited to the 
provision o f working capital.
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At this stage of economic development, demands from businesses for fixed 
capital were relatively low, and were frequently combined with the working 
capital needs o f the business, which given the timescales involved in many 
transactions were considerable. When the demand for capital investment 
began to increase, there were problems, due to the restriction on establishing 
joint-stock companies. The next section describes developments that 
continued to take place through the eighteenth century around forming 
companies, which could then seek to attract finance. Once these changes 
were in place it was possible for large corporations to develop, and develop 
their own commitment and credit mechanisms, but that story must wait until 
the next chapter.
In a nutshell, for the first time in history a large body of people had the 
necessary institutional legal and financial support for sustained economic 
growth. The industrial revolution was no historical accident.
3.3 Consequences
The previous two sections have set out evidence that suggests there were 
effectively, if not overnight, nonetheless observable, revolutions in legal 
contracting and financial markets through to the beginning o f the eighteenth 
century. This section sets out to examine the evidence for a corresponding 
revolution in economic growth in the subsequent historical era, in the four 
areas o f income growth, firm growth, credit instrument variety and the start 
of a business cycle. After this the relevance of these to one business, namely 
that of Boulton and Watt, will be examined, before discussing what 
conclusions can be drawn from the evidence.
3.3.1 Output Growth
It is perhaps ironic that developments in contract law, and to some extent 
financial markets, are not regarded as significant to wider social and economic 
developments, but are well documented and, judging by the relatively small 
literature, uncontroversial. In contrast, the impact o f economic growth is seen
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as significant, although concrete evidence is sparse and, possibly because of 
this sparseness, subject to a considerable amount of controversy. Indeed, it 
has spawned so much scholarship that the constraints of this project make it 
impossible to present a thorough review of the literature. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to summarise the evidence and issues in a relatively straightforward 
way.
First, what is the observable evidence that there was a growth in output 
through the eighteenth century? In summary, it is considerable. 
Contemporary sources document many visible signs o f a growth in output. 
Defoe in his Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain in the early eighteenth 
century found what he called ‘manufactures’ in most o f the areas he visited 
and believed that their existence added to local prosperity (Sharpe 1997, 146). 
Hudson describes a number o f studies that, although challenging each other 
on the details, show an overall shift towards the creation o f consumer goods 
markets. Goods quoted include knitted stockings, knitted caps, cheap 
earthenware nails, tobacco pipes, lace and ribbon, processed foods and drinks. 
Alongside this was a substantial rise in the proportion o f people living in 
urban accommodation, and the corresponding rise in purchase o f household 
essentials such as clothes, beer, butter, candles and crockery (Hudson 1992, 
176). One particular example, well known at the time, was that o f Josiah 
Wedgwood’s pottery business. Although like Bottger a producer o f fine china, 
his focus was like Darby on the mass market, for which his focus was cheaply 
manufactured goods. His principal innovations however were in his 
development o f marketing techniques such as advertising and distribution 
channels (Hudson 1992, 174). Other entrepreneurs also became prominent in 
the 1760s. Although perceived primarily as technical innovators, as in the 
cases o f Guttenberg and Derby, there were considerable problems of 
financing, organisation and marketing to address. What people like Arkwright 
and Hargreaves did was not just to invent machines to automate aspects of 
textile production, but to build sustainable, and for a time very profitable, 
businesses.
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In the second quarter o f the eighteenth century river navigation 
improvements began to be undertaken, which required capital beyond an 
amount that could be provided by single individuals or small groups o f local 
worthies, and so were formed as joint-stock corporations (Harris 2000, 95). 
The novelty o f this development suggests that undertakings o f a more 
substantial nature than previously were being undertaken, but also that the 
commercial traffic that would result was expected to make them economically 
viable within a fairly limited timescale. In 1754 residents of Manchester 
petitioned Parliament to pass a bill authorising the construction o f a new 
waterway for carrying coal to Manchester and Salford. But the opposition this 
created was sufficient for the project to be abandoned. With this experience 
in mind, a similar project near Liverpool was promoted as an improvement 
project, but the brook that it was proposed to improve was in reality too 
narrow, and its improvement too impractical to be realistic, so that what was 
proposed and subsequendy undertaken was essentially a new construction. In 
1759 the first bill to explicitly authorise the construction o f a canal was passed 
(Harris 2000, 96). Probably for the first time in history, business activity was 
shaping the environment to greater extent than centralised religious or 
political-military concerns.
All this evidence presents a clearly observable picture of a growth in output 
over the course of the eighteenth century. But is it possible to go beyond 
observable phenomena consistent with output growth and quantify overall 
output growth? Unfortunately, direct quantification is impossible. It was only 
in the nineteenth century that extensive statistics were collected. The 
decennial population census from 1801 and the introduction o f the income 
tax in the 1840s are just two among a number of contemporary sources that 
provide extensive reliable quantification of many aspects o f national life by 
the middle o f the century. This is o f course another observable indication of 
greater overall production.
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Nevertheless, by projecting data backwards, and using more restricted 
datasets such as the limited tax data that was collected and samples o f data 
such as burial records, it has been possible to construct a number of 
quantitative estimates o f eighteenth century English economic activity (Harley 
1993, 177). It is generally agreed that output increased most dramatically in 
three key sectors, namely cotton, metalworking and agriculture. Harley 
estimates output growth in several industrial sectors (1993,181). Taking 1841 
production levels at 100, in 1770 cotton output was 0.8 and metal 7, then in 
1815 cotton was 19 and metal 29.
One series for agricultural output estimates a growth o f 0.77 percent annually 
between 1700 and 1750, rising to 0.80 percent for the next fifty years, and 
0.85 for the subsequent half-century (Harley 1993, 190). Much of the growth 
in agricultural output is said to arise more from capital investment than 
technical innovation, but the commitment-credit model does not see such a 
distinction as particularly strong. The enclosure movement can be seen as an 
intrinsic aspect of this, as the move to private ownership would be a necessary 
precursor to private investment, and the expected benefits from investment 
the motivation to undertake the steps to acquire the legal right to enclose. The 
effect o f output growth in agriculture can be observed from the growth in 
population in Britain from 8.5 million in 1770 to almost 21 million in 1851, 
when only 20 percent o f food was imported (Clark 1993, 230). Growth in 
agricultural productivity was more significant than these figures would suggest 
at first sight, because the proportion of people working in the sector fell, from 
around 50 percent in the mid eighteenth century, to around 25 percent in the 
mid nineteenth (Clark 1993,233).
It is clear from these figures that there were dramatic effects on some parts of 
the economy. Harley argues that the industrial revolution in Britain was 
essentially a matter of luck on achieving technical breakthroughs in the cotton 
and iron sectors (Harley 1993, 255). This seems to be a little weak, given that 
he does recognise that ‘the basic character o f the economy changed from one
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governed by the balance o f land and population to one dominated by 
technological change and capital accumulation’ (Harley 1993, 197). He also 
pointed out that prior to 1800, in general, real wages fell and rose in inverse 
proportion to population and without any secular change, while subsequendy 
real wages in Europe have steadily increased along with population. Others 
such as Landes see the steady acceleration o f industrial growth from the mid 
eighteenth to mid nineteenth century as a substantial revolution. Hudson 
points out that the growth that clearly occurred in total factor productivity 
from 1760 to 1830 probably took place around 40 years after an acceleration 
in the rate of new patents and patentable invention. To the extent that this is 
the case, it confirms even more strongly the commitment-credit model as a 
useful microeconomic theory o f growth.
3.3.2 Firm Growth
While studies o f the overall level of output o f the economy are relatively 
abundant, recent assessments o f changes at the microeconomic level appear 
to be almost non-existent. This is perhaps a result o f the neoclassical dogma 
in which non-price mediated organisation of production is taken to be 
dysfunctional. However, while overall assessments of organisational 
developments are absent, it is possible to observe the effects o f the growth of 
larger firms from a number o f angles.
The first observable development consistent with a growth in the size of 
economic units o f organisation, is what in many ways is the defining 
characteristic o f the industrial revolution, namely the creation o f the factory 
system. Sharpe dates the birth o f the modem factory to 1724, when John 
Lombe opened his silk mill at Derby. Driven by waterpower, it employed 300 
women and children in two shifts through a 24-hour day, though it failed 
financially in the next decade (Sharpe 1997, 149). Richard Arkwright 
developed his spinning machine around 1768, and formed a number of 
partnerships to provide the capital to develop it. He patented it in 1769, and 
shortly afterwards set up a mill at Cromford in Derbyshire. By 1782 he
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claimed to employ over 5000 people (Baines 1835, 32). Zuboff in a study 
primarily focused on the introduction o f computerisation to businesses in the 
1980s, compares this with evidence of the introduction of the factory system 
in eighteenth century England, and finds many of the same issues needing to 
be addressed. In many ways the technical problems can be the easiest to 
overcome. The organisational and managerial challenges are at least as 
formidable (Zuboff 1989).
Another observable development is in the legal environment. A growth in 
firms would create a growth in demand for resolving the disputes that 
inevitably arise when people work together for an extended period o f time. 
Resolving these disputes effectively requires a body of legislation and legal 
doctrine dealing with the issues. The eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
saw a wide variety o f possible approaches, before an enduring solution was 
found in the limited liability company.
The Bubble Act of 1720 is often seen as barrier to the use o f the joint-stock 
form, but in fact it only confirmed the existing illegality of formation without 
Parliamentary sanction. Rather than a reaction to the excesses o f the South 
Sea bubble of that year, as has sometimes been supposed, this aspect o f the 
Act was a manoeuvre by South Sea Company directors to secure its position 
during the investment bubble of that year, by making investors wary o f other 
stocks and so more likely to put money into their company’s stock.
Given these complications, and the relatively small size o f early industrial 
companies, the joint-stock approach was unpopular because o f its cost and 
complexity. However, the construction o f transport infrastructure was one 
driving force for legal developments in this area. Canals were initially funded 
through local government or by wealthy landowners, such as the Duke of 
Bridgewater. But the scale of the undertakings led to projects being 
incorporated as joint-stock companies from 1766 (Harris 2000, 99). Railways 
in many ways followed the pattern o f canals. In both these cases
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Parliamentary approval was necessary, even without joint-stock organisation, 
because it was the only effective way to ensure that no landowner could hold 
the company to ransom, because an Act could give the company the right to 
purchase the land it needed (Harris 2000,282).
Another early user o f the joint-stock form was the insurance industry, which 
is by nature capital concentrating. Indeed, the granting o f a joint-stock 
insurance monopoly was the purpose o f the rest of what has become known 
as the Bubble Act, and was probably the more significant aspect at the time o f 
its inception. Initially, insurance firms took a very diverse range o f 
organisational forms including monopolistic corporations, incorporated 
mutuals, unincorporated joint-stock companies, unincorporated mutuals, and 
a syndicate o f individual underwriters, the latter being Lloyds. There were few 
developments from 1720 until the 1760s, after which many new firms were 
promoted, quite a few fraudulently. Nevertheless some sustainable businesses 
were created, including several based in the regions outside London (Harris 
2000, 102).
Once the possibility of a standardised incorporation procedure became 
apparent, one argument against it was that it would diminish property rights. 
Specific parliamentary approval allowed the use o f lobbying by vested 
interests to create a block, or negotiate compensation in some form, to 
prevent damage to existing property rights. Harris quotes insurance as a 
market where this view was particularly prevalent (Harris 2000,135).
Around the beginning o f the nineteenth century developments were 
becoming more rapid. Harris argues that the rise o f limited liability was not 
monolithic, but by the start of the century it was taken to be an element of 
Parliamentary incorporation (Harris 2000, 129). As well as transport and 
insurance companies, the other sectors where joint-stock incorporation was 
applied were water and gas supply, the latter from 1815, and docks and mines. 
The latter are probably the only ones not requiring Parliamentary sanction, to
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prevent hold up by individual property owners, to construct their 
infrastructure. Presumably it was their initial scale, and the highly visible and 
irremovable nature o f the investment, that made incorporation a beneficial 
investment for their promoters. The other sector affected was banking, as 
mentioned briefly in a previous section, and although incorporation was 
possible after the Bank of England lost its monopoly on joint stock banking 
in 1826, banks were subject to their own regulation.
Despite objections, the need for routine joint-stock creation was clear. The 
1844 Companies Act introduced a standard process for automatically forming 
a joint-stock company. But Gladstone, who as a young secretary of state 
piloted the legislation through Parliament, avoided limited liability as too 
contentious. This was finally introduced in the 1856 Act.
The final area where evidence o f the growth o f firm size is readily available is 
in studies o f working class life and early industrial relations. Indeed, in many 
respects the turn o f the nineteenth century saw the beginnings of what 
became class-consciousness. The way this was realised was to some extent 
fragmented. Nevertheless, developments were widespread enough for a 
sustainable argument for the beginnings o f class-consciousness to be 
presented by a number of historians (Hudson 1992, 204). Alongside this, 
more direct evidence from 1802 is the first Factory Act, which primarily 
limited child labour. While child labour would have been far from a novelty, 
the factory system had clearly become a national phenomenon.
3.3.3 Financial Structure
The growing size and sophistication of firms in eighteenth century England, 
and particularly the substantial capital requirements o f canal and railway 
companies, led to a growing variety in the financial mechanisms available. 
Again, recent studies do not give much attention to these developments. 
Nevertheless, several mentions are made, even if just in passing, so some brief 
details o f evidence can be sketched out. In particular, a number o f Acts o f
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Parliament deal with these issues, so they were treated as significant at the 
time.
Controversy over the questionable nature of share trading was ongoing 
throughout the eighteenth century, particularly after the collapse of the South 
Sea bubble in 1720. Nevertheless, trading of the joint-stock vehicles for 
government debt, including the South Sea Company as well as the East India 
and Bank of England companies carried on. The twice-weekly Course of the 
Exchange was founded in 1697 and published continuously through the 
eighteenth century, under a number of publishers, until in 1803 it came out 
under the authority of the Stock Exchange itself. However until 1810 it only 
regularly published prices on the three moneyed joint-stock companies 
(Harris 2000, 120). So, while trading in the other joint stock companies, 
primarily the insurance companies until the arrival o f canal stocks, would no 
doubt have taken place, it was not a primary concern o f the London business 
community. It is an interesting aside that an Act o f 1735 prohibited trading in 
stock not actually held, thus nipping in the bud the early legitimating o f 
derivative trading (Kindleberger 1993,192).
While London finance played a role in financing canals and railways, most 
funding was found closer to the developments themselves, most o f which 
were in the north of England. Up until 1845 only one London banker, namely 
Glyn, played a prominent role (Kindleberger 1993,194).
Alongside straightforward equity investment, debt instruments were also 
used. Debentures were invented during the eighteenth century and were loans 
made to companies in return for a guaranteed rate o f interest. They were 
believed to be more secure than stock, and could be backed by security in 
land or other assets held by the company. One security device was to only 
issue debentures up to the unpaid portion of share capital, so that in theory 
shareholders would be liable to debenture holders in the case o f bankruptcy. 
In other industries the practice later developed of leaving a proportion o f
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each share unpaid as security for bank loans or as a reserve that could be 
called on in the case of accident liability (Kindleberger 1993, 197). An 1836 
Parliamentary standing order limited railway loans to one third of authorised 
capital, with borrowing forbidden until half of the share capital had been paid 
up (Baskin and Miranti 1997,146).
Partly because debentures were not, in practice, substantially less risky than 
equity, the preferred stock was developed for canal companies after 1800 
(Harris 2000, 227). It was initially used to provide capital to complete the 
construction o f financially troubled projects. This financial security also did 
not automatically dilute the ownership of the original stockholders. It 
provided a guaranteed dividend rate, but if dividends fell into arrears the 
company would not be forced into receivership. By 1849, 66 percent o f total 
share capital in British railways took this form (Baskin and Miranti 1997,152).
3.3.4 Business Cycle
In many ways it is curious to suggest that the business cycle is a consequence 
of the commitment-credit model. Sustainable growth was the novelty o f the 
eighteenth century. Previous centuries had not been static, but cyclical. 
Obvious cycles described previously include, on the largest scale, the end of 
the Roman Empire and the Black Death, and the subsequent recovery of the 
European economy from both. This begs the question, how can the cycles 
due to shifts in intertemporal expectation be distinguished from other cycles, 
and indeed are they in any meaningful way different from other cycles? The 
answer is that the evidence suggests that financial expectation driven cycles 
did become more significant than other sources o f cycles, what are known in 
the neoclassical literature as exogenous shocks.
One phenomenon already noted in the development o f the credit market was 
the development of a national market in the course o f the eighteenth century. 
The synchronisation of interest rates was used as the test for this, so to some
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extent it assumed the existence o f cycles, but it is significant that 
synchronisation did shift in the period under consideration.
Mirowski carried out an extensive examination o f the evidence o f business 
cycles, albeit in a very different theoretical context. A number o f his 
observations support the hypothesis that the economic cycle was becoming 
endogenised in the course o f the century. His examination starts at the end o f 
the seventeenth century, and there is evidence that cycles were correlated with 
wars at the beginning of the period under consideration. However, the boom 
of the early 1730s, measured by the rate of profit, was not directly linked to a 
war (Mirowski 1985, 235). Furthermore, a chi-squared causality test for likely 
cause and effect relationships between a number o f variables, including 
temperature, for its effect on crop yields, exports to Asia, GNP and share 
prices finds only two relationships to be significant at a five percent level. For 
the period 1755-1826 exports to Asia predict share prices, and for the period 
1830-1875 GNP predicts share prices. For the early period East India 
company shares were a large proportion of the share index, and as it still 
conducted a large amount o f trade, in conjunction with its role in the 
management of the national debt, this provides an explanation o f the first 
observation. While GNP was not used directly for the earlier period, a profit 
index was used as a proxy. This makes it possible to observe the shift to 
financial market performance following output growth, which is an 
endogenous economic relationship of the type predicted by the commitment- 
credit model (Mirowski 1985,263-264).
Another cyclical phenomenon, market manias and panics, are a well-attested 
historical observation. Well-documented examples with widespread impacts 
include the Dutch tulip mania o f the seventeenth century, and the South Sea 
bubble in England, and John Law’s financial schemes in France, both in 1720. 
Similar cycles occurred in England towards the end o f the eighteenth century 
in connection with canal building. Parliament passed 122 Acts for canals in 
the years between 1755-1814, most in two waves. The first was in the late
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1760s and early 1770s and the second in the early 1790s. The difference in 
this case was that much of the money, though by no means all, went into 
genuine investments, rather than simply fuelling further price rises until the 
supply o f new money dried up (Harris 2000, 99).
The nineteenth century saw more booms associated with the creation of joint- 
stock companies, including 1807, and 1825 (Harris 2000, 202, 218). Trumping 
canal speculation, as it did other aspects o f canal building, was the railway- 
building boom of the mid nineteenth century, and this too created speculative 
manias and panics. Kostal cites the railway panic o f 1845 as an event from 
which Victorian railways never really recovered (Kostal 1994, 360), although it 
did lead to the building of 5000 miles o f track (Morgan 1984, 617).
One additional source of evidence is a recent chronology of British history 
(Morgan 1984, 616-617). This lists no commercial booms before 1799, then a 
regular series in 1799-1801, 1809-1810, 1815-17, 1824, 1835-6. Economic 
cycles were becoming important events in the life o f the nation, along with 
output growth, firm growth and a growth in the variety of financing. One way 
to see how these all worked together is to consider the progress of one 
business.
3.3.5 Boulton and Watt
James Watt was bom in 1736, and trained as an instrument maker in Glasgow 
and London. Following early employment at the University of Glasgow, he 
went into partnership with John Craig, an architect who provided the initial 
capital, making and repairing a range o f musical and scientific instruments. 
One o f the projects Watt undertook for the university was the repair of a 
model o f Newcomen’s steam engine. He was intrigued by its inefficiency, and 
discussed the problem with Joseph Black, a professor at the university. Black 
explained the problem in terms o f his own theory o f latent heat. Using this 
information Watt was able to devise a mechanism to make the engine far
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more efficient. Fortunately, machining techniques were becoming available 
that would make his ideas practicable.
However, in 1765 Craig died, and Watt had to pay back most of the capital in 
the business to his trustees. Black was able to put Watt in contact with John 
Roebuck, an industrial chemist who had established a successful steelworks. 
He was also attempting to exploit deep coal seams, and was having problems 
because his Newcomen engine was not properly removing the water entering 
the workings. Roebuck was interested but sceptical, so would provide only 
limited support. With the first canal boom underway, Watt took up surveying 
and civil engineering to make ends meet. By 1768 he had constructed a model 
that worked effectively enough for Roebuck to finance further work, pay off 
his debts, and pay the costs o f patenting the invention, in return for a two 
thirds share in the patent (Davenport 1989, 8-13).
On the way back from a visit to London in connection with the patenting 
process, Watt stayed with a friend in Birmingham and was introduced to 
Matthew Boulton. Bom in 1728, Boulton was already a very successful 
businessman. His father was a ‘toymaker,’ whose principal product was 
buckles, which were used on shoes and knee breeches. It has even been 
suggested that they were exported to France and then re-imported as the 
latest thing’ from the fashion leading French (Dickinson 1936,25-28).
Boulton had taken over his father’s business by 1760, and was also 
representing the whole of the trade for Birmingham, Wolverhampton and 
Warwick in a petition to Parliament. By his testimony, around 8000 people 
were employed across the region in the trade at that time (Dickinson 1936, 
31). Over the next few years he established a successful manufacturing 
operation in Soho, just outside Birmingham, producing steel jewellery and 
buttons, and employed 600 people by 1765 (Dickinson 1936, 48).
By 1766 Boulton was looking for a solution to a problem of lack o f power 
from his waterwheel, particularly in the summer. One solution he was
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investigating was to use a steam engine to pump water back up after it had 
turned the wheel (Dickinson 1936, 75). Meanwhile, Bouton had already made 
the acquaintance of Roebuck, who had even made him an offer of 
partnership in his coalmining venture, which was declined. Boulton was 
however very interested by the steam engine, which seems to have spurred on 
Roebuck, and although he offered Boulton an involvement, it was very 
limited, and Boulton again declined.
1772 saw problematic business conditions, and a tightening o f credit, and 
Roebuck became insolvent. Boulton, with Watt’s support, took over the 
engine patent in 1773 in consideration of a debt of £1200 owed to Boulton 
from his previous business dealings with Roebuck. Once Watt had completed 
his last canal survey he moved to Birmingham in 1774 (Dickinson 1936, 84).
Given that patents only had a life o f 14 years, by 1774 there were only 8 years 
remaining on Watt’s patent, and it was clear that this would not be enough 
time in which to make a return on the considerable investment still required. 
It was therefore resolved, and with some effort achieved, to petition 
Parliament for an extension of 25 years to the patent. The two men entered 
partnership, with Boulton supplying the necessary funding in return for two 
thirds o f the profits, and Watt providing his share o f the patent and his 
services in return for an annual salary o f £300 and one third o f the profits 
(Dickinson 1936, 86).
Watt continued to work on a prototype, which continued to show that his 
ideas were practicable. He wanted to develop a larger experimental version, 
but Boulton persuaded him to move straight to commercial construction. 
Two contracts were obtained, one for a colliery in nearby Tipton and another 
for John Wilkinson the ironmaster, and competitor to the still thriving 
Coalbrookdale company. Wilkinson was also employed to manufacture the 
cylinder bore using a new process he had developed, originally for drilling 
cannon bores. The business arrangements entered into for these and
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subsequent engines were more those of consulting engineers than 
manufacturers. The client would pay for all the costs o f the parts and 
construction. Boulton and Watt would supply detailed drawings, some key 
parts, and an engineer to supervise the construction; other parts could be 
supplied as the customer chose. The income for Boulton and Watt would 
come from one third o f the coal saved in the use o f the engine.
Cornwall with its tin and copper mines became the biggest early market. By 
1780 the firm had built forty engines, o f which twenty were in Cornwall. 
Because direct comparisons were not direcdy possible, the contracts actually 
specified payment based on coal consumed and water pumped. A tax rebate 
on coal used in pumping water from mines meant that this was reliably 
measured, and Watt developed a counter to measure the number o f strokes 
made, which allowed the water pumped to be measured. Nevertheless, the 
payment arrangements, at least in part due to their complexity, were proving 
problematic, and Boulton negotiated a fixed annual premium depending on 
each engine’s size. Boulton’s other business lines were also expanding at this 
time, and he was able to use this income as security against capital invested in 
his growing business, a relatively unusual practice at this time. As has been 
observed, the normal practice would be to enter into partnership with a 
capital provider, but Boulton already having several partners was reluctant to 
enter into more, each o f which would incur a joint and several liability 
(Dickinson 1936, 97). By 1780 it was clear that the toymaking business was 
making a loss, and income from the steam business was not yet substantial. It 
was 1785 before the business was financially secure (Dickinson 1936,112).
In the meantime, Boulton was conscious o f the limited size o f the Cornish 
market, and consequently of the need for diversification. He encouraged Watt 
to turn his attention to applying steam power to rotating motion, which 
would provide an alternative to waterpower, and for which he could foresee 
considerable demand. The obvious route was to use a crankshaft, but this 
had, albeit somewhat dubiously, been patented immediately prior to this, and
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to avoid confrontation Watt devised a number of alternatives, the one that 
came to be used being the ‘sun and planet’ gear. The charging mechanism was 
slighdy different for rotating engines, and was based on the equivalent 
horsepower of the machine, the annual charge being £6.6s in London and £5 
in the provinces, per horsepower. Wilkinson took the first in 1783 to power a 
tilt hammer.
Another early application was the Albion flourmill. The promoters, including 
Bouton and Watt, applied for joint-stock incorporation, but mainly due to 
opposition from existing mill owners, this was rejected (Harris 2000, 178). 
The Albion mill burned down after five years production, and was not rebuilt. 
Boulton and Watt lost several thousand pounds from their initial investment, 
but one innovation was developed as a result. Boulton observed that a 
rotating sphere mechanism was used to lower the rotating upper wheel of the 
mill as its speed increased, and vice versa. He communicated this to Watt who 
applied the mechanism in what was possibly the first example of an automatic 
feedback mechanism. For his rotating engine, as the speed o f rotation started 
to increase, a valve operated to diminish the supply o f steam to the cylinder, 
thus reducing the pressure and the speed of rotation. Although this was a 
remarkable advance over its application in the flourmill, its superficial 
similarity probably discouraged Watt from applying to patent his application 
(Dickinson 1936,126).
The shift to rotary engines meant contracting for engines with firms that did 
not have existing sources for supplying machinery, and the Soho factory was 
increasingly called upon to provide many of the parts. By 1793 approximately 
fifty percent o f engine parts were manufactured there. It was also apparent, 
particularly to Boulton, that with the expiry of the patent in 1800 the firm’s 
competitive advantage as providers of drawings and expertise would not be 
much of a differentiator. To this end, in 1796 a new plant was built not far 
away, but adjacent to the canal network, and set up legally as a partnership 
between Boulton and Watt and their sons (Dickinson 1936,168). Watt senior
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gave his share to his surviving son, and when Boulton died in 1809 the two 
sons held equal shares in the business, which continued to be regarded as the 
market leader in steam engine production for many years (Dickinson 1936, 
171).
3.3.6 Conclusions
The consequences of the industrial revolution in England were deep and 
profound, and so far irreversible. By the end o f the 1850s most o f the 
economic environment we now recognise was in place. In 1851 the Great 
Exhibition brought mass crowds to London, many on the railway. Also in 
1851, the Amalgamated Society o f Engineers formed, the first Tlew Model 
Trade Union.’ The 1852 Patent Act brought intellectual property law into the 
modem age, and the 1856 Limited Liability Act brought into place most of 
the modem features o f corporate governance. In practically every indicator of 
human life the changes that came about in this period were also enormously 
beneficial.
The previous revolutions in legal contracting and financial markets predicted 
by the commitment-credit theory, while not so well known, were just as 
observable. So, not only do historical observations confirm the commitment- 
credit theory, the theory also provides a clear and concise explanation of 
important historical developments.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN  TH E  USA 1850-1950
Britain was the wealthiest and most productive country in the world right 
through the nineteenth century; but it was overtaken at the end o f the century 
by its former colony, the United States of America. This chapter focuses on 
that shift, to test another prediction o f the commitment-credit model, namely 
that the rise o f the multidivisional company, which was the most visible 
economic difference between the US and the rest o f the world in the early 
twentieth century, was preceded by fundamental shifts in commitment and 
credit mechanisms; and that its consequences included growth as envisaged 
by the model. As in the previous chapter, the dates are only indicative. 
Nevertheless, before 1850 there was little distinction between economic life in 
the US and Britain, and in many ways the US was behind Britain. While by 
1950 the US was clearly the dominant economic superpower, probably to a 
greater extent than it could ever have been able to maintain, although 
subsequent developments will not be discussed here.
Both of the previous chapters, dealing with pre-modem Europe and the 
industrial revolution in England, have had to cope with limited primary data; 
but from the second half of the nineteenth century extensive data becomes 
available. The problem with data for most of this period is that although 
primary sources exist in abundance, the secondary sources are fewer than they 
are for the industrial revolution. To some extent, it can be argued that there 
are only fewer recent works compared to the amount of data available. But it 
is also likely that this period is often perceived to hold less interest.
Much of the study o f modem business tends to rely less on general theories 
than on the analysis of a variety o f cases. The neoclassical model that 
dominates contemporary economics, in contrast, ignores the key aspects of
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the transformation, such as market concentration, as well as the fundamental 
observation this thesis sets out to explain, the increased level o f innovation, 
and consequent increase in growth rates. So when historians or economists 
interested in testing the neoclassical model look for historical epochs where 
the model may help understand changes, this is not an era that has much to 
offer. So by explaining many observations from this epoch, the commitment- 
credit model again offers an improvement over neoclassical theory.
One work in particular dominates the secondary historical literature, Alfred 
Chandler’s The Visible Hand, and is the most widely used source relied on 
here. Nevertheless, other work does exist and is used here to ensure that a 
variety o f narratives are used in testing the hypotheses. As before, because 
hypotheses are being tested, rather than a narrative being set out, and the role 
of other narratives here is in making the primary evidence accessible, the use 
of a relatively small number o f sources, and little claim to comprehensiveness, 
is not the weakness it would be if the objective were simply the construction 
of an explanatory narrative.
There is overwhelming evidence that a major transformation did take place in 
the nature of economic activity at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning 
o f the twentieth centuries. Centrally directed business organisations o f a size 
never seen before came into existence, and organisations o f this type grew in 
influence as the century progressed. The commitment-credit model suggests 
that this should have been preceded by significant changes in the 
commitment and credit mechanisms available to the managers who exercised 
overall control of these enterprises. The model furthermore suggests that this 
growth in size will have had four aspects, first that the economic output of 
these organisations will have increased, secondly that observable distinctions 
at an intermediate level between the overall organisation and the individual 
people who made it up will have grown in size, thirdly that the variety of 
mechanisms by which credit was provided to allow investment will have 
increased, and finally that within the overall growth in output there will have
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been an observable cycle in the of rate o f change. This chapter sets out the 
evidence that these changes can be observed.
4.1 Commitment
It is the principles of financial accounting that provide the mechanism 
through which commitments are made within large organisations, and 
between large organisations and their investors and creditors. Very large 
private organisations first developed in an economy governed by the rule of 
law, and in particular with contract law, broadly understood, as set out in the 
previous chapter. But within these large organisations, it was not legalistic 
contracting that formed the basis of most agreements, but budgets and 
financial reports. Much as with contract law, effective principles only become 
‘obvious’ over a considerable period of time, and other approaches were tried 
along the way that, although promising at the time, proved to be 
inappropriate. This section sets out these developments.
Although it was only at the beginning o f the twentieth century that the whole 
conventional framework o f modem accounting became established, it is in 
the commercial maelstrom o f the late middle ages that the concepts at the 
core of the modem conception of accounting have first left a visible trace, 
particularly in late medieval Italy. The origin o f the term accounting is in the 
concept o f giving an account to someone who has entrusted one with an 
office or activity; that is, submitting a report on the extent one had lived up to 
the commitment one gave in taking on such a responsibility. The origins of 
commercial accounting must be far earlier, hidden in the mists o f time. Some 
of the earliest records made by human beings concern what would now be 
labelled as accounting information. When the concept o f number and of 
writing emerged at a similar time in the evolution o f humanity they were 
probably intrinsically connected with recording economic activity. The word 
itself is very ancient; and as far back as the thirteenth century there was an 
‘action o f account5 in English law (Harris 2000,161).
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4.1.1 From Bookkeeping to Accounting
Historical certainty begins with the publication in print of Luca Pacioli’s 
Summa in 1494 (Previts and Merino 1998, 4). Some sources indicate that the 
double entry concept from which accounting builds was employed as early as 
the fourteenth century, in Genoa and Florence (Previts and Merino 1998, 2, 
3). The double entry convention recognises the essential truth that every 
commercial transaction has two sides, a giving and a receiving as well as 
providing an effective check, even more important in pre-computer ages, that 
the entry has been recorded correcdy.
While double entry ledgers in themselves solved the problem of maintaining 
records o f complex transactions between a firm and its customers and 
suppliers, they did not in themselves provide a way of understanding what 
was going on inside the firm. Clearly, for relatively small owner-managed 
entities this was not a significant problem. An intimate knowledge o f their 
business, gained through daily experience dealing with people inside and 
outside the business, making purchases, and seeing activity and output in the 
workshop, would provide them with sufficient data to enable them to manage 
the business effectively.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that for as long as firms have used double 
entry ledgers to keep track o f their external commercial relationships, they 
have also kept records to help ascertain the economic relationships between 
different elements within the business. Gamer provides an extensive number 
of examples o f developments from the middle ages until the 1920s. Early 
examples include Genoese ships’ accounts. From the thirteenth century many 
maritime towns in Italy required a seagoing ship to employ a scribe. Their 
careful records became public documents so, as it became common for 
several people to sponsor a voyage, there was a clear basis on which disputes 
could be resolved. There is even some evidence o f the use o f relatively 
sophisticated concepts such as depreciation, by which the cost o f something 
used over a period o f time is spread over that time (Gamer 1954, 3, 4).
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In the fourteenth century the Del Bene wool manufacturing firm used two 
sets of books that, although not double entry, separated trading from 
manufacturing activities (Gamer 1954, 15). Towards the end o f the century, 
records o f Niccolo di Pero, a dyer in Prato, compute a cost o f production, 
and then adjust it to allow for the revenue from two by-products which had a 
market value, namely filling and warp yam (Gamer 1954,19).
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Fugger family developed a 
structured set of accounts for mines they owned, and for linked activities such 
as a foundry. Over the same time period the Medici family produced silk and 
wool, and many ledgers, journals and similar records are extant. An extensive 
system of double entry records enabled calculations to be made to calculate a 
cost o f finished cloth manufactured over a particular period o f time, based on 
the costs o f wool, dyestuffs and manufacturing costs such as workmen’s 
wages, oil, combs cards and teasels (Gamer 1954, 9). Contemporary 
accounting texts do not match the sophistication the Medici achieved in 
practice, although some manuscripts dealing with textile manufacture do 
show a greater sophistication than the accounting texts. Some depreciation is 
taken into account, but overall capital costs such as machinery are not 
factored in. In large part this is understandable given that, as the previous 
chapter shows, even in the industrial revolution in England, investment 
capital costs were not a significant element of manufacturing costs (Gamer 
1954, 15). While the examples described here do show a considerable level of 
sophistication, it is not clear to what extent the practices were widespread 
(Gamer 1954, 25).
From the very beginning o f its European settlement, commerce was a 
fundamental part of life in what were to become the United States of 
America. As such, commercial arithmetic, sometimes called casting accounts, 
was a key element o f formal education (Previts and Merino 1998, 21). The 
heart o f any mercantile establishment was the counting house, and this was 
where transactions were recorded, providing both an authoritative record and
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a mechanism for determining from time to time the capital position o f the 
business (Previts and Merino 1998, 48). By the end o f the eighteenth century 
textbooks on the ‘modem Italian method’ were being written and published 
in the US, and establishments for teaching it began to develop (Previts and 
Merino 1998, 52). Some early teachers were as much entrepreneurs in their 
own right. Between 1853 and 1866 Bryant and Stratton developed a chain of 
more than fifty commercial colleges (Previts and Merino 1998, 76). In 
practice, most learning continued to be as it had been for centuries, as an 
apprentice clerk in an existing establishment.
It was only with the work of Thomas Jones, including his textbook 
Bookkeeping <& Accountantship published in 1859, that the foundation of 
teaching moved away from ledger balances, and rules for specific types of 
account entry, towards a focus on the financial statements as the objective 
towards which financial transactions were recorded (Previts and Merino 1998, 
78). This signals the shift from bookkeeping to financial accounting.
4.1.2 Accounting for Management Control
The industrial revolution had magnified many times over the problems early 
cost accounts had wresded with. More complex processes and increasing sunk 
costs made the ‘cost’ o f a product more difficult to define precisely. 
Nevertheless, developments continued. One major difficulty in assessing the 
evidence is that cost accounting, even at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, was seen as a source o f competitive advantage (Gamer 1954, 30). So 
whereas well-kept systematic trading accounts would probably help build 
confidence with customers and suppliers, as well as being widely recognised 
as a necessity for all but the smallest merchant, for a manufacturer the benefit 
o f making accounting information available was far less clear.
There is evidence that the introduction of formal systematic accounting for 
management control was primarily a response to increases in working capital 
(Levenstein 1998, 29). And one commentator on nineteenth century
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glassmaking in the United States attributed frequent bankruptcies to a lack of 
reliable cost accounting systems (Gamer 1954, 76). A range o f studies suggest 
that through to the 1870s the introduction o f cost accounting systems was a 
strategic response to the need to control labour and material costs in the face 
of competitive pressure. New England textile mills wanted to be able to 
determine the extent to which materials and labour were wasted in the 
production process. The paper industry focused more on monitoring and 
controlling raw material and finished product inventories. In one well known 
case, Lyman Mills in Holyoke, Western Massachusetts, while transactions 
were recorded and data exchanged between mill and head office every day, 
the actual calculations were only carried out every six months (Johnson and 
Kaplan 1987, 25). The effect of having this information available was 
probably a device for motivating managers, it was unlikely to be available 
prompdy enough to provide an effective input into planning decisions 
(Levenstein 1998, 31).
Formal internal cost control systems also show evidence o f having been 
introduced primarily in situations where there was a separation between 
management and ownership. In the case o f New England textile mills this 
separation was geographical. The owners had offices in Boston, where they 
negotiated commercial arrangements for purchases o f materials and sales of 
finished goods, while the mills themselves were inland, managed by agents.
Accounting innovation in the cut nail industry followed the sale o f several 
companies from groups of partners to groups of stockholders outside the 
industry. A novel approach was taken in the 1850s by firms in the Ohio River 
Valley, where a standard cost accounting system was introduced to allow 
firms to compare production performance (Levenstein 1998, 31). The latter 
was clearly an enlightened attempt to shift competition away from destructive 
price competition, to competition on quality and service.
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The inventory monitoring of the paper industry, which retained direct 
management by the owners, was carried out simply through elaborating the 
standard mercantile accounting system with the use of detailed and 
subdivided inventory accounts (Levenstein 1998, 32).
There is evidence from the 1860s that some cost data was collected for the 
direct purpose o f decision-making. One example is o f data analysed to help in 
comparing the impact of different power sources in the paper industry, and 
later on choosing between cloth and wood as the basic raw material. There is 
evidence o f a transition period in the textile industry. Managers at Lyman 
Mills used costing information to help decide issues o f minor machine 
modifications, while in other mills only the agent, the highest-level local 
manager, had access to the figures, while the ‘overseer o f repairs’ on the 
factory floor made technical decisions.
Increasing product differentiation resulted in different competition dynamics 
in different markets. Where products were uniform there was often an 
industry association that set a standard cost calculation, to help prevent 
destructive price competition. For special-order driven industries, often 
employing a tender based selling process, the incentive was for individual 
firms to understand their underlying cost structure as accurately as possible. 
Where this was not possible, establishing a relatively accurate variable cost for 
a product would set a minimum acceptable price. Sophistication developed 
even to the extent that by the end of the century many firms were responding 
to slowdowns by reducing output rather than prices (Levenstein 1998, 34-5).
The next problem, to which some of the answer was found in cost 
accounting, was long-term capital investment decision-making. Early in the 
twentieth century DuPont Chemical is the first company for which evidence 
exists that a rate o f return of current processes was calculated, based on the 
profit earned for the capital invested in a particular factory or product 
(Levenstein 1998, 36). However, this calculation needs a figure for the capital
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invested, and this is not as straightforward as it may seem at first sight. But 
before delving into the details o f measuring capital investment, other 
developments largely in parallel with cost accounting need to be understood.
4.1.3 Railway Accounting
The railroads were for much of the nineteenth century the largest and most 
complex business enterprises that the world had ever seen. A combination of 
commitments to repay large initial investments and tough competition meant 
that poor decision making would have serious consequences, so considerable 
investments were made in collecting and processing the complex mass o f data 
related to road operations. Chandler identifies this as the point at which 
bookkeeping became accounting (1977, 109). However, capital and 
operational accounting remained largely separate, although even after a 
century o f subsequent developments a distinction endures, suggesting that 
there are considerable difficulties in reconciling the two.
As by far the largest integrated railroad for many years, the Pennsylvania 
played a leading role in many developments. As early as 1851, the company’s 
annual report showed information such as the number o f passengers each 
month embarking from each station, as well as local and through tonnage 
passing each way-station. While even the largest textile mill had four or five 
sets of accounts to integrate, by 1857 the Pennsylvania had one hundred and 
forty four. While mill accounts were compiled semi-annually, for the railroad 
it was monthly, presented to the directors by the fifteenth of the following 
month. Comparison between railroads was not simply between profits or 
losses, but focused on the ‘operating ratio,’ comparing earnings with the 
volume of business (Chandler 1977,110).
So much for collecting and aggregating the raw data: the problem remained of 
how to deal with the fact that because much of the cost o f the road had been 
incurred before the first train ran, it was difficult to judge the overall 
economic viability of the business. A crucial distinction was made between
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the construction, or capital, account and the operating account. The operating 
account was made up o f expenditure that was essentially consumed 
immediately, while the capital account showed expenditure o f enduring value. 
Nominally, it was this enduring value that gave a value to the business. 
Although fairly clear conceptually, in practice fine distinctions often had to be 
made. Sometimes there were strong incentives to misallocate expenditure. For 
example, charging operating expenses to the capital account would have the 
affect o f both increasing operating profits and adding to the book value o f the 
business. Alternatively, the opposite tendency would make operating cost 
look higher, probably leading to higher prices, and while the book value 
would be lower, the expected future income stream would be higher 
(Chandler 1977, 111).
Once a road was in operation, there was in some ways an even more difficult 
accounting problem; namely how to take account o f the cost o f initial 
construction in relation to the income received. Related to this was the 
question o f how to deal with renewals and repairs. O n the one hand, these 
were a cost necessary for the continued operating o f the road. O n the other, 
they could be considered as adding to the capital value of the business, 
particularly where they involved upgrades and improvements. Initially the 
widely used practice o f putting funds into contingency or surplus accounts 
was employed. From time to time, generally when profits were strong, the 
initial cost o f plant and equipment would be written down. However, in 1855 
the Pennsylvania explained that it had adopted what became known as 
‘renewal accounting’. Repairs and even direct replacement of existing plant 
was recorded as an expense, and only clearly additional assets or 
improvements, but only the additional value o f the improvement over the 
original cost, were added to the construction account (Chandler 1977, 111- 
112).
Along with these developments in measurement, the potential for 
inaccuracies for any reason, accidental or voluntary, was also apparent. So it
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became common practice to employ consulting accountants as auditors. 
Previts and Merino quote in full one letter addressed to the President and 
Directors o f the Western Rail Road from William Ritchie in 1855. Five brief 
paragraphs set out what he did, checking the consistency within and between 
the different sets of books in use, and his findings, namely that everything is 
in order. An 1857 annual report for the Boston and Worcester Railroad 
included a four-page report, including recommendations for improving the 
system (Previts and Merino 1998, 85-86).
The 1860s, at least after the Civil War, saw attention switch from capital to 
cost accounting. The cost per ton-mile was already well established as the 
basic operational measure in railway companies. A man named Albert Fink 
was largely responsible for this next phase o f developments. Initially trained 
as a civil engineer and bridge builder, he worked on the Baltimore & Ohio 
line before joining the Louisville & Nashville, rising to become senior vice 
president in 1869. An important precursor to the system he introduced was to 
re-categorise existing accounts according to the nature of their costs, rather 
than according to the organisational units in which the function was carried 
out. Fifty-eight distinct expense accounts were established, in three categories. 
Twenty-three accounts of general maintenance and management costs were 
allocated to maintenance expenses per ton-mile. Eight types of station 
expenses were distinguished, and twenty-seven types o f movement expenses. 
These three categories, combined with data on interest and construction 
costs, miles o f track, miles and freight weight run, as well as revenue, enabled 
Fink to establish four components o f the total cost per ton-mile, namely 
movement expenses per ton-mile, station expenses per ton-mile, maintenance 
o f road per ton-mile, and interest per ton-mile (Chandler 1977,116-119).
Attempts at self-regulation, to prevent destructive price competition, had 
broken down by the 1880s, and in 1887 President Cleveland signed the 
Interstate Commerce Act, which established the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC). Initially this was part o f the executive as a branch o f the
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Interior Department. Railroad rates had to be published and ‘reasonable and 
just.’ This also satisfied the big direct customers, the shippers, whose primary 
concern was parity of rates with their competitors. The commission had three 
powers, namely compelling witnesses, petitioning a court o f law for a 
determination, and requiring from railroads annual reports using a uniform 
accounting system. Although the standards specified by the ICC drew on 
those widely applied within the industry, for the first time, firms found to be 
failing to use accounting standards were subject to serious penalties.
The administration of President Harrison, which commenced in 1888, created 
a new type o f body when it cut the ties of the ICC to the Interior 
Department. Although the president continued to appoint members, for 
seven year terms with no one political affiliation being allowed to dominate, it 
became the first independent market regulator (Vachal 1993).
4.1.4 Financial Accounting
The benefits o f independent confirmation o f a corporation’s regular financial 
reports to its investors were always apparent. In the 1870s it was common 
practice for teams of shareholders to visit corporation headquarters in order 
to verify reports. While few corporations, outside the railroad industry, 
continued to exceed ten million dollars in assets, this was to some degree a 
reasonable approach. However, the 1880s saw a significant increase in the 
numbers o f what were by then becoming known as public accountants. The 
city directories of New York, Philadelphia and Chicago for example show an 
increase in the number listed from 81 in 1884 to 322 in 1889 (Previts and 
Merino 1998,132,133). Success was not guaranteed for new entrants. For the 
same three cities between 1850 and 1899 1,370 different individuals were 
listed, o f whom 662 appeared only once. Nevertheless, a recognised 
profession was beginning to emerge, and 1882 saw the creation o f its first 
professional organisation, the Institute of Accounts o f New York. It required 
a test o f qualification prior to admission, and published a periodical named 
Accountics (Previts and Merino 1998,135-6).
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By the 1890s the Institute of Accounts and a competitive organisation, the 
American Association o f Public Accounts (AAPA), began to seek legal 
recognition for their profession. Both submitted Bills to the New York state 
legislature at the beginning of 1895, the AAPA to the State Senate, the 
Institute to the State Assembly. In March a meeting was called to attempt to 
reconcile the differences, and a committee was established. The Institute’s 
approach of a recognised tide, Certified Public Accountant, was chosen over 
the Association’s proposal for licensing. After a further year o f work, from 
April 17, 1896, the law recognised the profession. Certification was the 
responsibility o f the Regents of the University o f the State o f New York and, 
by the end o f 1897, 108 professionals were certified on the basis o f being in 
established reputable practice, and 4 were certified through passing the 
examination (Previts and Merino 1998, 138-141). Other states followed the 
New York example, Pennsylvania in 1899, Maryland in 1900, although it was 
the mid 1920s before all states had legislation in place (Previts and Merino 
1998,144).
One early market for the services o f independent accountants was the public 
sector, where they offered scrutiny o f public officials to guard against 
corruption and inefficiency. The introduction o f a uniform accounting system 
was popularly believed to be one way of combating inefficiency at least. The 
irony was that as these systems were introduced to many municipalities, in the 
first decade o f the twentieth century, it became apparent to the officials 
involved that uniform systems did not require professional accountants 
exercising their independent judgement, but technicians trained in the rules, 
so that particular market for professional services quickly dried up (Previts 
and Merino 1998,178-9).
While official employment, at least initially, is perhaps not a surprising 
consequence of official recognition, in practice the primary effect o f this 
recognition was on conceptual standardisation. For example, what to examine 
would have been one significant question. This would have been influenced
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by practical issues of current concern, and in turn would shape the way those 
issues were dealt with. Given that the issue o f reporting capital investment 
had already been identified in certain contexts as the central problem, it 
should come as no surprise that this was in many ways central to the debate 
around establishing a firm conceptual underpinning o f financial reporting. An 
additional factor was the difficulty, in some ways the most easily recognised, 
of general price changes. From 1865 to 1897, with a respite between 1879 and 
1884, deflation persisted, and then from 1898 to 1919 inflation took over 
(Previts and Merino 1998, 209).
Through to the end o f the nineteenth century, in general, the focus of an 
audit was on the current value o f the business in terms o f its assets, 
conventionally set out in terms o f a balance sheet. To a large extent this 
reflected the prevalent view that ownership o f shares in a company 
corresponded to ownership o f the assets o f that company. This focused 
attention on the relationship between revenue and capital transactions. 
Depreciation started to become accepted as the best way of dealing with the 
relationship between capital and revenue items, where capital is defined as 
those purchases that were used for more than one accounting period, 
generally a year, and revenue those that were consumed within that period. 
Depreciation allocates a proportion of the total cost o f an asset used over a 
number of years to the costs for each o f those particular years, until all the 
original cost is accounted for. This superseded renewal accounting, as 
developed in the railroad industry, which up until then had been viewed as the 
best available practice.
The focus on the balance sheet helped to maintain a good degree of 
confusion over the role of depreciation, even within the profession. To some 
extent this was because a claim that the balance sheet should provide a 
valuation o f the firm led to debates such as whether current market values or 
historical costs should be used. In some cases depreciation was treated as a 
reserve for replacing existing assets, though in general it was understood that
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this was a spurious application. However, by the nineteen twenties it was 
becoming appreciated that the value of a firm was a function o f its future 
earning power, and there was no necessary logical connection with its balance 
sheet, except as possibly setting a minimum ‘break-up’ value on the firm, and 
this would explain why the value of a firm whose shares were actively traded, 
and so for which an overall valuation could readily be calculated, could be 
higher than the asset value shown on the balance sheet (Previts and Merino 
1998,218-221).
Depreciation only really become standard practice once it was included in the 
calculation o f corporate excise tax, introduced by the federal government in 
1909. Although shortly after it was introduced this tax was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and only came into effect with the 
ratification o f the sixteenth amendment in 1913 (Previts and Merino 1998, 
181).
Given the necessity for applying judgement on issues such as depreciation, 
the role o f the accountant was from the earliest days inherendy problematic. 
One difficulty was the need to precisely express fundamentally unknowable 
quantities, not least because they depended on an uncertain future; for 
example the length of time for which a piece of capital equipment would be 
employed. Another problem was the difficulty o f dealing with the sheer 
quantity of data. Within the firm, or as an advisor to the firm, policies had to 
be decided upon, and in their role as an independent auditor, the accountant 
had to be able to make a meaningful determination o f the reasonableness of 
the policies and the extent o f their consistent application.
Understandably, there was resistance, and not just from self-interest in 
remaining well-paid autonomous professionals, to the standardisation that 
some saw as the solution to these problems. This would just create a different 
set o f problems. For example, when a general rule had to be applied in a 
particular case, but a different treatment would have been a better way of
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reflecting the underlying business situation. And with more rules would come 
more occasions for mistakes, until they lost their usefulness because the 
selection o f one among a number o f rules would become in turn a question of 
professional judgment.
The solution found to the problems of fundamental uncertainty and a variety 
o f justifiable interpretations, albeit one with its own limitations, was the need 
for ethical practice among accountants. To a large extent this was seen as 
being taught during the period o f professional experience necessary, in 
addition to examination success, in becoming a CPA. Debates were ongoing 
in this area, but in practice the AAPA applied a concept o f “acts discreditable 
to the profession.” However, given the voluntary nature o f the professional 
association this was not a strong deterrent to questionable practice. Because 
of the opposition o f some to any form of self-regulation, names o f persons 
found guilty were not publicised. However, facts o f the case and 
determinations were, so for the vast majority who wished to employ best 
practice there were guidelines available. As has remained the case however, 
concerted attempts to distort accounting information are almost impossible to 
prevent (Previts and Merino 1998,205-206).
4.1.5 Managerial Accountability
Unlike in Britain, in the US an annual audit was not compulsory for
corporations, but was done for the sake of investors, normally by
management as a confidence building measure. Clearly, this was most
important when a firm needed or anticipated a need for substantial new
investment. The great merger wave o f the 1890s was a particular catalyst for 
this. The audit was management’s commitment to the veracity o f the 
information they provided to the investment bankers who provide large 
injections o f capital, the subject of the next section.
The system continued to function through the first quarter o f the twentieth 
century, even with a significant hiatus for the duration o f the first world war,
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although its impact on the United States was far less than in Europe. 
Nevertheless, the international nature o f the financial markets was brought 
home by the need felt necessary to close the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) on July 31st, the day after Russian mobilisation commenced and 
European stock markets suspended operation. All restrictions were only lifted 
on April 1st 1915 (Carosso 1970,193,195).
In retrospect, the financial markets had got seriously out o f hand by the end 
o f the 1920s, and the Wall Street Crash, particularly black Thursday* of 24* 
October 1929, threatened to destroy confidence in the whole system. By 
December 1931 the US Senate had authorized an investigation into the 
NYSE, which became known as the Grey-Pecora Investigation, after the two 
lawyers who acted as council to the committee and carried out much of the 
investigation. By the time its hearings came to an end in December 1933 a 
catalogue o f deception and abuse of trust by both corporate managers and 
bankers had been brought to light. Even before it had completed its 
investigations, significant new legislation had come in to force (Carosso 1970, 
348-351).
Two acts in consecutive years, the Securities Act o f 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, proved to be particularly important. The Glass-Segal 
Banking Act o f 1933, in mandating a separation between investment and 
commercial banking also had a significant impact on the industry, although in 
hindsight this innovation has not stood the test o f time. More than just 
legislation, as existed in Britain to some extent already, the two securities acts 
established an effective regulatory mechanism for supervising the operation of 
financial markets, and in particular defined the disclosures that corporations 
were required to make. In many ways this built on the regulatory frameworks 
previously established to effectively supervise transport and federal trade. 
Indeed, initially the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), established in 1915, 
was given the role of regulator, though it was quickly relieved o f the
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considerable burden that the new role required with the establishment o f the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, widely known as the SEC.
The Securities Act was a key plank of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s TSIew 
Deal,’ and was one of the actions taken in the first hundred days o f his 
administration. The great depression was at its worst, and the investment 
banking business had almost collapsed. New corporate security offerings had 
gone from almost $9.4 billion in 1929 to less than $400 million in 1933 
(Carosso 1970, 352). Proposals for reform had been campaigned for since the 
1880s, and earlier in the century several states had enacted so called ‘blue-sky’ 
laws, named because they were designed to prevent the selling by fraudulent 
promoters o f building plots in the blue sky (Carosso 1970,156). However, the 
Securities Act was the first ever at a Federal level, and in contrast to the state 
laws aimed not at endorsing or limiting particular types o f security, but in 
ensuring full and fair disclosure. The issuer o f a new security was required to 
provide detailed information, along with a fee of one hundredth of one 
percent o f the total offering price to the FTC, and most o f the information 
had to be set out in a prospectus to prospective investors, the form and 
content o f which were carefully defined. Registration statements did not 
become effective until 20 days after filing, providing both a ‘cooling off 
period’ and time for analysts and journalists to digest and comment on the 
data. Failure to abide by the conditions imposed wide ranging civil liabilities, 
as well as criminal liabilities of a $5,000 fine and five years imprisonment 
(Carosso 1970, 356-9). In addition, the FTC was given the authority to 
prescribe accounting standards in very explicit terms, such as policies for 
differentiating investment and operating income and for determining a 
standard depreciation policy (Previts and Merino 1998,273).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 extended and in some relatively minor 
ways amended the Securities Act o f 1933. While the Securities Act primarily 
concerned new offerings, the new Act extended federal supervision to trading 
on exchanges. It required the registration o f exchanges and regulated their
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operations and members, and established the SEC to take on this role, as well 
as that previously given to the FTC in the 1933 Act. The Commission itself 
was to be made up of five members, no more than three of whom could 
belong to the same political party, and it was given wide discretionary 
authority. Corporations whose securities were traded on the exchanges had to 
register themselves, file regular detailed reports and report the transactions of 
their officers, directors and major shareholders in the corporation’s securities. 
Among the several small amendments to the 1933 Act, the most significant 
was the limitation o f an underwriter’s civil liability to the price o f the 
proportion of the securities they had underwritten (Carosso 1970, 364, 379).
The shift to valuing firms on the basis of their future earning power, rather 
than the capital previously invested in them, finally became firmly established 
by the end of the 1930s, when bodies such as the NYSE and the SEC, and 
CPAs in general, came to the view the income statement as the focal point of 
accounting (Previts and Merino 1998, 278).
4.1.6 Accounting Revolution
By the end of the nineteenth century the accounting profession was firmly 
established in the United States. It was another four decades before the 
conceptual issues on representing the economic condition of a large 
corporation were resolved in a manner that has largely stood the test o f time, 
but standards were starting to be enforced, sometimes directly such as by the 
ICC for the railroad industry, and sometimes indirectly though the standards 
o f peer review to which the CPAs hired to perform the regular independent 
audits required by investors held themselves.
Accounting information is by its very nature historical, and past performance 
is no guarantee o f future returns, but by the end o f the nineteenth century 
managers and investors both knew that managers would be held to account 
for their performance in a relatively well understood way. To secure the 
investment necessary to realise the profit opportunities innovation made
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possible, managers had to commit their whole enterprise to achieving a level 
o f performance necessary to service the equity and debt instruments they 
exchanged for the credit, and be able to demonstrate that this was the case.
4.2 Credit
Alongside the rise of management accountability, the end o f the nineteenth 
century also saw sums of money coming together on an unprecedented scale, 
and available for privately owned businesses to spend on long-term 
investment. Projects that previously could not have been contemplated, 
because they required such a large initial investment, began to be considered 
as a matter o f routine. This section sets out these developments in detail. 
Again, as with the previous chapter, this is not meant to suggest that 
developments in credit were separate from those in commitment devices; in 
this era they were if anything more closely interrelated than previously. 
However, as well as easing the process o f exposition, this division also 
emphasises the separate logical nature o f the developments, from the 
perspective o f the commitment-credit theory.
The early development o f financial markets in the United States to a large 
extent followed the pattern in Britain, with early growth in metalworking and 
particularly textiles investment in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
funded through the savings of individuals, small partnerships and their 
families. In general, US developments were copies of British pioneers, though 
in some areas US innovations were unique, for example integrated cotton 
factories. Integration was enabled pardy through the availability of 
concentrated financing from several established merchants, and led to further 
innovations and greater productivity (Chandler 1977, 67). However, one 
obvious and ultimately decisive difference was the geographical size o f the 
US, which in 1850 had a population even smaller than that o f Britain.
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4.2.1 Continental Scale
The sheer area of land that makes up the United States not only provided far 
greater resources, but also needed fundamentally novel solutions to novel 
problems. From its inception in 1776, the US had largely the same 
institutional legal and financial infrastructure as Britain, because these were 
largely retained on independence. What were needed on a scale never seen 
before were large sums of capital to bridge the continental distances involved, 
particularly in the railroad business. So, while the railroads were largely the 
culmination o f the industrial revolution in Britain, for the financial revolution 
in the United States they are where our story commences.
Railroad construction in the US started at very much the same time as in 
England. Some roads had been built to operate using horsepower even before 
the opening o f the Manchester to Liverpool line in Britain in 1830, but after 
this had proved the practicability o f the steam engine, large-scale building got 
underway in the US, as in Britain. However, the scale of the landmass in the 
US was in time to bring crucial differences.
Before 1850 however, the only railroad to connect one regional section of the 
country with another was the Western Railroad, from Worcester to Albany, 
connecting coastal Massachusetts with up-state New York. It had cost $8 
million to build, when Boston was still an important source for regional 
funding. In the 1840s over 6,000 miles of track had been built, bringing the 
total to 9,000 miles. The uncertainty that still existed is shown by the fact that 
400 miles o f canals were also built in that decade, though in the next more 
miles were abandoned than constructed. The 1850s saw over 21,000 miles of 
railroad constructed, including the almost simultaneous completion of the 
four major intersectional truck routes connecting east and west between 1851 
and 1854; that is the Erie, the Baltimore and Ohio, the Pennsylvania and the 
New York Central (Chandler 1977, 82-83, 90). By this stage New York had 
become the dominant location where investment capital was to be found.
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4.2.2 Rise of New York
In much the same way as in Britain, early railroad building in the US was 
financed through the savings o f local farmers, merchants and manufacturers. 
While London had always acted as the linchpin o f the English financial 
markets, primarily because most monetary saving was in government 
securities, no dominant national financial centre existed in the United States at 
the beginning o f the nineteenth century. Significant securities markets existed 
in Philadelphia, Boston and New York. A combination o f this 
decentralisation, together with a distinct antipathy in some quarters towards 
federal level institutions, made the establishment o f an equivalent to the Bank 
o f England problematic. Two attempts were made however, the first Bank of 
the United States being chartered by congress in 1791 for a twenty-year term, 
which was not renewed. The second was granted another twenty-year charter, 
but when that lapsed in 1836 no further attempts were made (Bodenhom 
2000, nl68). The Second Bank was located in Philadelphia, and when it 
expired that city’s financial role was significandy diminished. For a time 
Boston became the major source of capital, but by 1850 New York had 
established itself in its nationally dominant position.
New York’s success can be attributed to two self-reinforcing features, namely 
its pre-eminence as a foreign trade centre and its active secondary trading 
markets. Both owed something to the success o f the Erie Canal.
The continental expansion o f the United States westward was severely 
restrained in its early days by limited means o f transporting goods in an east- 
west direction. The only effective commercial route from the west was using 
the Mississippi River down to New Orleans, then across the Gulf o f Mexico, 
and up the Adantic coast. Never mind the distance involved in reaching the 
eastern seaboard o f the United States, wheat and flour sent by this route often 
rotted or soured in the process, because o f the heat and humidity o f the 
southern part o f the journey (Chandler 1977,24).
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Added to this, Boston and New York both had direct access to the Adantic, 
and Philadelphia had indirect access through the Delaware River, and each 
competed strongly as transhipment points. As early as 1792 the New York 
State Legislature chartered two corporations to connect the Hudson River, 
which reached the Atlantic at New York City, with the Great Lakes, which as 
well as their extensive shoreline also provided a northern terminus for many 
of the extensive north-south river systems dissecting the continent. Despite 
state aid, in the form of stock purchases and loans, both suffered from 
inadequate planning and management, and neither could attract sufficient 
investment; and neither made any practical headway. Finally, the State 
legislature took the bit between its teeth and determined that a canal between 
the Hudson River and Lake Erie would be built under State auspices with a 
publicly appointed management board and financing provided through the 
sale o f bonds guaranteed by the State.
The Erie Canal proved a huge success. First o f all in attracting financing. 
There were forty-two separate issues between 1817 and 1825, raising $7 
million. Secondly the success of its operations after its completion in 1825 
was sufficiently visible to lead to the construction o f a whole network of 
canals through Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and Ohio (Werner and Smith 
1991, 86; Chandler 1977, 34, 45).
The launch of the Second Bank in 1816, together with the first floating of 
Erie Canal bonds in 1817, added a new vitality to the nascent trading in 
securities, and was certainly one significant factor behind the launch o f the 
New York Stock & Exchange Board in 1817 (Werner and Smith 1991, 38). 
Although there is also evidence that this was a response to a similar exchange 
organised by the brokers in Philadelphia (Werner and Smith 1991, 28). The 
volume of trade attracted by the Canal brought with it the commercial paper 
through which the working capital supporting the trade was mediated.
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With the paper came the institutions necessary to support the financial 
market, namely the banks. Much of the attraction o f dealing in the secondary 
securities market was that it offered the chance, though certainly not the 
certainty, o f a quick way to make money, with even a modest amount o f initial 
capital. Banks found an attractive market for loans that were highly liquid, and 
so a profitable oudet for their excess cash balances, in ‘call loans.’ Speculators 
could leverage their securities trading by borrowing money with securities as 
collateral and a small down payment, but had to repay on demand.
New York quickly became the leading national market for secondary trading, 
although Philadelphia and Boston remained more important for primary 
trading in initial issues through most of the first half o f the nineteenth 
century. However, because an active secondary market adds considerably to 
the attractiveness o f initial issues, by the middle o f the nineteenth century 
New York’s predominance in secondary trading had led to it becoming the 
favoured location for all security dealing (Werner and Smith 1991,45).
For the first time ever, a national level market for private investment finance 
had developed. Between 1849 and 1854 more than thirty large railroads were 
completed, and the sums o f money involved were unprecedented. Three 
roads were capitalised at between $10 and $17 million, and the four great east- 
west lines at from $17 to $35 million.
However, domestic resources were soon too limited. Partly because o f the 
political unrest sweeping Europe in 1848, people there found United States 
securities increasingly attractive. Initially government bonds were preferred, 
but by 1851 and 1852 first German and French savers, but followed shortly 
afterwards by the British, purchased private railroad securities in quantity. By 
1859 investment in private railroads had exceeded $1,100 million, including 
almost $700 million in the previous ten years (Chandler 1977, 90).
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4.2.3 Civil Wat Interlude
In 1861 the Civil War broke out, and suddenly the federal government needed 
considerable amounts o f finance for purchasing resources, in a situation 
where its ability to repay was far from assured. In 1862 the Secretary o f the 
Treasury Salmon P. Chase needed to find a new approach.
Jay Cooke had started his banking career with E.W. Clark & Co. in 
Philadelphia, two years after it was founded in 1837. He became a partner 
four years later in 1843 (Carosso 1970, 11). In 1861 he had opened his own 
private banking house in Philadelphia with his brother-in-law. Until that point 
investment opportunities had been targeted at banks and wealthy individuals. 
Small investors could only participate indirectly though holding deposit 
accounts. However, in the summer o f 1861 Cooke, together with the more 
conservative and established Philadelphia banking house o f Drexel & Co., 
employed extensive newspaper advertising, aggressive salesmanship and 
statewide agents, to place a $3 million Pennsylvania state defence bond at par. 
The issue was fully subscribed in lots from $300,000 to $50 (Carosso 1970, 
14).
Secretary Chase appointed Cooke as special agent for distributing an unsold 
portion o f a $500 million federal twenty-year six-percent bond issue, 
authorised late in February 1862. Cooke took his successful statewide 
approach and applied it nationwide. He appointed established brokers and 
private bankers to act as his agents in cities such as Boston and New York. In 
the less well financially served western states he appointed a variety of 
community leaders and local businessmen, as well as other volunteers, to act 
as his agents. Overall 2,500 people acted as salesmen in every state and 
territory (Carosso 1970, 15). Every social and economic group in the country 
had their patriotism and self interest called on in a nationwide publicity 
campaign. By mid-January 1864 the loan was closed and Cooke’s organisation 
had sold close to $362 million, with the treasury having disposed of the rest 
through more conventional means.
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Cooke’s fee was only one sixteenth o f one percent, and his bank only really 
made any profit through trading this and other government securities on its 
own account. The combination of trading in government securities and the 
close relationship with the treasury that the loan issue involved led to 
considerable controversy, and he was not engaged as an agent again until 
January 1865.
Cooke set out to refine and extend his approach, including establishing 
W orking Men’s Savings Banks,’ which in practice were night sales offices. 
However, the end o f the war later that year brought a shift in both the 
government’s need for capital and people’s willingness to invest (Carosso 
1970,16).
4.2.4 Railroad Dynamics
The growth in railroad building following the end o f the civil war continued 
to be accompanied by speculative dealing in securities. What was different in 
the United States, compared to England, was not so much the scale in itself, 
big as it was, but the consequence o f the scale. Through traffic became a 
significant factor in the competitive dynamics, in a way that never occurred in 
England, or any other European country. It was the interaction between 
competing railroad firms and financial speculators that created modem 
corporate finance, and ultimately the modem corporate landscape.
The capital intensity o f the railroad firms was unprecedented. Huge amounts 
o f resources had to be poured into them to construct the lines and the rolling 
stock before they could earn a cent. Then, once operations were underway, 
the fixed cost o f servicing the debt accrued was very high in relation to the 
variable cost o f each ton-mile o f goods shipped. These factors created a risk 
that competition could get out o f hand and start to force prices down below a 
level that was able to fund the debt repayment. To minimise this risk railroad 
managers adopted two strategies. The first was a territorial strategy of 
informal alliances between roads in a limited geographical area. The
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increasingly important proportion of through traffic, however, created the 
threat o f driving prices to unsustainable levels. This was met through more 
formal arrangements, including national conferences to set official rates, and 
regional cartel agreements. Most at risk were the major east-west lines, 
competing, as always, for traffic between the interior and the Adantic ports.
The combination o f the fundamentally unstable strategic positions, together 
with the search for quick profits through security speculation, came together 
in 1868. Cornelius Vanderbilt had made a career as a transportation 
entrepreneur. First, through successfully challenging the river ferry monopoly 
between New Jersey and Manhattan, then later through trans-Atlantic 
shipping, before taking on control of the New York Central railroad in 1867. 
He saw the weak condition o f his nearby competitor the Erie as dangerous. 
Should the Erie fail, its debt would be written off, or at least significantly 
reduced, and it would then be able to operate profitably while charging far 
lower prices, forcing his New York Central to reduce prices or lose traffic, 
either being likely to bring about its bankruptcy.
However, Vanderbilt’s concern did not go unnoticed. Jay Gould, Daniel 
Drew and Jim Fisk had already made a name for themselves as successful 
speculators in the 1850s. They saw an opportunity to buy up a controlling 
interest in the Erie before Vanderbilt, which they duly did, albeit using many 
underhand tactics that they were nevertheless able to get away with. 
Vanderbilt withdrew from his takeover bid and, after Drew and Fisk sold out, 
Gould was left in control. Realising he was now in somewhat o f a 
predicament, Gould sought to secure his position by buying up railroad 
companies that could feed into the Erie. This however threatened his 
competitors, particularly the New York Central and the Pennsylvania, which 
understandably were concerned that it would be problematic to come to an 
amicable arrangement with Gould. Vanderbilt responded by successfully 
buying controlling stakes in feeder roads, but kept them as essentially separate 
businesses. The Pennsylvania however, under the effective control o f its
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professional management, decided to build what would quickly become by a 
long way the largest single private enterprise that had existed until that point.
4.2.5 The Birth of Corporate Finance
In the five years from 1869 to 1874 the Pennsylvania Railroad went from a 
line with 491 miles o f track to one o f just under 6,000 miles. With its 
capitalisation at $400 million it accounted for almost 13 percent o f the total 
capital o f US railroads. The actual amount spent was rather less, as many 
properties were leased rather than purchased, and only 51 percent of the stock 
of a firm was needed to assure control.
Nevertheless, the finance necessary was considerable, and in 1870 the 
company turned to Jay Cooke. The previous year Jay Cooke & Co and E.W. 
Clark & Co had joindy sold a $2.5 million bond issue for the Lake Superior & 
Mississippi Railroad. So Jay Cooke formed the first modem underwriting 
syndicate in the US, and together with seven other firms underwrote a $2 
million bond for the Pennsylvania (Carosso 1970, 53). Over the course o f the 
five years $87 million worth of securities were sold (Chandler 1977,155). For 
subsequent issues Drexel and Company became the Pennsylvania’s lead 
banker, a role they fulfilled until 1880, when Kuhn, Leob took over.
Possibly, winning the Pennsylvania account was one factor in helping the 
young J Pierpont Morgan to partner with Drexel, and form a private bank in 
New York, when his father retired. J.S. Morgan had been running the bank he 
had taken over from George Peabody as an oudet for US securities in 
London (Chandler 1977, 155). In time, J.P. Morgan & Co. would come to 
dominate the investment banking industry for half a century.
The other major east-west lines, the Baltimore & Ohio and the New York 
Central followed similar but less ambitious system building strategies. John 
Work Garrett, the president of the Baltimore & Ohio from 1858, preferred a 
territorial strategy based on alliances, but nevertheless found it necessary to 
protect its traffic by building a feeder into Pittsburgh in 1866, and a new line
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to Chicago in 1874. He also leased and bought controlling stakes in other 
lines in the late 1860s, and in 1878 gained control o f the Ohio & Mississippi 
when it went into receivership.
The Vanderbilts, who controlled the New York Central, expanded even more 
slowly. Cornelius Vanderbilt even sold stock in the Wabash and other mid 
western roads, when his son-in-law who ran them died suddenly. William 
Vanderbilt who took over when his father died in 1877 made minimal 
purchases; the Michigan Central as part o f a deal with Jay Gould, and then the 
Canadian Southern that connected the Michigan Central to the New York 
Central when that went bankrupt in 1878. The expenses involved in these and 
a few minority purchases to help sustain alliances, together with restoring the 
condition o f the poorly maintained roads he took over, went a long way 
towards convincing Vanderbilt o f the wisdom of selling off a sizable portion 
of his New York Central stock, which he did through the services o f Drexel, 
Morgan and Company in 1879. The New York partner J.P. Morgan put 
together a syndicate to sell these shares in London. Morgan became an active 
member o f the board, and the age when ownership and management were in 
the same hands for the largest companies was drawing to a close, to be 
replaced by the largely faceless ownership activity o f the financial markets 
(Chandler 1977,156-8).
4.2.6 Self Funded Consumer Business Expansion
Chandler in The Visible Hand describes the development o f numerous 
industries in the United States in the final quarter o f the nineteenth century. 
Without exception, the railroad played an important role, either as a customer 
as in the case o f the iron and steel industry, or as a key link in the distribution 
chain as in the case o f catalogue retailers. As Chandler points out, whether in 
distribution or production, what was really novel was the speed at which 
activity took place (1977, 235, 281). As much as any other element o f the 
economy, this changed the nature o f the financial markets, because it 
removed the need for the huge amounts o f working capital that were tied up
163
in the processing and distribution o f goods throughout the industrial 
revolution. So even though these businesses relied on internal sources for 
capital investment, like the earliest industrialists, they were unlike them in 
their credit relationships. To illustrate the scale o f the changes, and drawing 
largely on Chandler’s work, the impact o f two industries that came to 
combine processing and distribution will be described.
The first example is that o f the meat industry. Through the 1870s meat was 
transported east ‘on the hoof. Given that sixty percent o f the animal was 
regarded as waste, and that the long journeys in poor conditions led to some 
catde dying and many losing weight, the opportunity for profiting from safely 
transporting just the meat was considerable. However, the scale o f the 
industry also created many entrenched interests. The railroads were concerned 
that they would lose revenue though fewer ton-miles of cargo, and existing 
wholesale butchers would find their whole viability put at risk. Nevertheless, 
one wholesale butcher from New England, named Gustavus Swift, moved to 
Chicago and successfully took up the challenge.
The key to Swift’s success was to build an integrated enterprise. First o f all he 
began winter shipments in 1878 while building a network o f branch houses in 
the northeast. In the meantime he sought to improve the refrigerated car, 
employing a leading refrigeration engineer. This resulted in cars with a 
recognisably modem design being introduced in 1881, after which Swift 
extended his network to the rest o f the country. Each branch included 
refrigerated storage space and a sales office with staff to sell and deliver the 
meat to retailers. This was also supplemented with cars that sold small lots 
direcdy in towns and villages. As well as refusing to build refrigerated cars, 
many railroads refused to carry them. However the competitive nature of the 
east-west links meant that Swift found one that would. As the market 
expanded, Swift expanded production, both by increasing the speed of 
throughput using moving ‘dissasemblying’ lines, and by building new plants in 
six cities along the cattle frontier.
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Many existing meat wholesalers formed a national association to fight the 
newcomer, trying to create a significant prejudice against fresh meat killed 
days before and hundreds o f miles away. Some existing players realised that 
competition was the only answer, and firms based in Chicago, Detroit, 
Omaha and New York succeeding in building similar networks, so that by the 
end of the 1880s a small number o f large integrated meat-packing businesses 
dominated the dressed meat business (Chandler 1977,299-301).
The second example is the sewing machine business. Machines had been 
produced commercially from the early 1850s, but until a legal battle over 
patents was settled in 1854, firms were reluctant to produce in quantity. 
Twenty-four firms were awarded access to the pooled patents, but within a 
few years three firms dominated the industry, because they had developed 
marketing networks in the form of agents, paid largely on commission, who 
were solely responsible for marketing their firm’s products in a defined 
territory. The three firms, led by Grover and Baker, started to establish 
branch offices, and by 1869 Grover and Baker produced 85,000 machines a 
year, and the other two firms 55,000 each, accounting for seventy five percent 
o f the industry output.
After 1860, one of the two smaller firms, I.M. Singer, started to move more 
aggressively in replacing regional distributors with branch offices. By 1876 the 
decision was taken to eliminate independent agencies altogether. Common 
procedures and official policies were introduced in areas such as credit sales. 
By this stage the structure covered not just the United States but northern and 
central Europe, as well as more widely spread oudets in Africa, the Near East, 
Latin America and the Far East. By the end of the 1880s the company had 
built two huge manufacturing plants, a cabinet making plant, and a foundry. 
In the 90s the firm obtained timberlands, and an iron mill.
All the necessary investment was financed out o f current earnings provided 
by the cash flow from sales o f machines. The cash flow was such that surplus
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funds were often invested in railroad and government securities, and 
sometimes in other manufacturing firms.
4.2.7 Competitive Investment Banking
Meanwhile, speculator Jay Gould had not disappeared. Economic activity 
went into cyclical decline in 1873. One firm to feel the effects o f this was the 
Union Pacific railroad, which together with the Central Pacific formed the 
first transcontinental road. Gould saw an opportunity for profitable 
speculation, and by 1874 held a controlling stake. Although at first he 
concentrated on reorganizing the road’s finances and management, by 1878 
he felt that he was exposed through having to depend on other roads for 
eastern connections. He set about a sustained campaign o f system building, 
and by 1881 controlled 15,854 miles o f road, fifteen percent o f the national 
total. Things did not stand still for long however. He disposed o f the Union 
Pacific by 1882. Then another recession meant that by 1884 he had been 
forced to dispose of most o f his eastern lines, and from the mid 1880s he 
concentrated on putting together a system in the southwest (Chandler 1977, 
159-60).
While the systems Gould built were never meant to be permanent, and were 
soon disposed of, the change in the competitive environment was permanent. 
The Vanderbilt group felt obliged to respond through purchasing other roads. 
One of these, known as the Nickel Plate, connecting New York, Chicago and 
St. Louis, had been built explicitly as a speculative venture, and indeed 
Vanderbilt bought it on completion as much to stop it getting into Gould’s 
hands as for any other reason (Chandler 1977, 161). Gould’s successor as 
chairman of Union Pacific, Charles Francis Adams Jr., was a conservative 
representative of Boston investors, but was soon persuaded by his managers 
that it was necessary to build a self sustaining system to remain competitive, 
which in practice meant purchasing or constructing almost 2,500 additional 
miles o f road. To the south the Santa Fe became the largest railway system in 
the world, operating over 8,000 miles o f track, albeit on the verge of financial
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collapse. In all, the 1880s saw 75,000 miles o f track built across the United 
States, the largest amount built in any decade in any part o f the world 
(Chandler 1977,163,164,171).
As well as providing Gould’s opportunity to buy the Union Pacific, the 
recession o f 1873 had also had another effect; the end o f the first major effort 
by investment banks to develop a large permanent market o f small investors. 
As at the start Jay Cooke led the way. From mid-August 1873 his depositors 
started to withdraw their money and, unable to stand the pressure, the house 
failed on September 18, triggering a panic that brought down many other 
firms (Carosso 1970,25-26).
The firms that subsequently flourished, and facilitated the provision o f the 
funds that were invested and exchanged in railroad system building, were 
primarily those with the capability to find investors domestically and 
internationally. Lee, Higginson drew on the close personal ties that existed 
between its partners, and directors and officers o f a variety o f New England 
financial institutions. Kidder, Peabody had similar links, but also dose ties 
with Barings in London, for whom it acted as attorney and agent. 
Domestically, key customers were commercial banks, savings banks, trust 
companies and life insurance companies (Carosso 1970, 27).
After the beginning of the economic recovery in 1878, and up to 1893, the 
total o f railroad bonds and stocks increased from $4.8 billion to $9.9 billion 
(Carosso 1970, 29). This represented both new building and increases in asset 
valuations. Alongside this, takeover activity would often involve exchange of 
one firm’s securities for another, sometimes in the same hands but sometimes 
in different hands. Overall foreign investment increased between 1879 and 
1900 from around $1.4 billion to around $3.3 billion. So although important, 
and additionally taking into account that much of the foreign investment went 
into government issues, most funds were domestically generated (Carosso 
1970, 30).
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A significant source o f domestic funds was the commercial banking system. 
The figures are not wholly available, but there is evidence to show some of 
the changes that occurred. The other major component o f the 1863 Act 
authorising the borrowing undertaken by Jay Cooke, after the start of the 
Civil War, was directed at the organisation o f the banking system. Until this 
time banks were either chartered by States or held privately. The Act 
introduced federally chartered national banks, and restricted note issuing to 
these banks. Standard criteria for capitalisation were introduced to make the 
system more secure and improve confidence. The number of national banks 
increased rapidly, and the number o f state banks declined, though they later 
recovered. National banks had to submit regular returns, and from these the 
growth in holdings o f securities as bank capital can be readily observed. While 
in 1863 only 0.5 percent of national bank assets were in the form of securities, 
by 1890 they accounted for 3.6 percent, rising rapidly to 7.2 percent over the 
next decade, most of these held in the form of bonds, particularly railroad 
bonds. Between 1880 and 1910 the ratio o f bonds held as secondary reserves 
increased from one in twenty up to one in six (James 1978, 50-1).
The critical role o f external finance in railroad operations was reflected in 
increasingly close relationships between the railroads and the banks. Ongoing 
relationships between a railroad and an investment bank became the norm, 
and became more formalised through bank representatives sitting on railroad 
boards and finance committees. The banker’s presence facilitated security 
sales for the railroad both directly and through increasing investors’ 
confidence, while the banker could protect both their customers and their 
own reputations by supervising operations and discouraging unnecessary 
risks. Kidder, Peabody functioned as financial advisor to the Santa Fe railroad 
for example. During the 1870s one of the bank’s partners sat on the board 
and chaired the finance committee. The bank had four primary roles. First, it 
provided new capital. Between 1885 and 1888 bonded debt increased from 
$52 million to $154 million. Second, it acted as transfer agent for the railroad’s
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securities. Third, it acted as bank of deposit, and fourthly it provided financial 
advice to management (Carosso 1970, 34).
The Santa Fe’s problems started to come home to roost in late 1887. A sharp 
decline in earnings, among other problems, combined with the interest 
commitments it had entered into, brought the basic financial viability o f the 
whole enterprise into question. In their role as financial advisors Kidder, 
Peabody proposed three immediate responses. First curtail expenditure 
wherever possible. Second, delay a new bond issue, and third reduce its 
planned dividend to shareholders. Unfortunately, these measures failed to 
solve the problems, and the bank began to become more and more involved 
in the operations of the railroad. Kidder, Peabody had a representative re­
appointed to the finance committee, which had to authorise any expenditure 
over $25,000. Improvements were adopted in the accounting system, and to 
raise capital for investment Kidder, Peabody agreed to sell a $7 million six 
percent three-year note issue, secured by a second mortgage. At the May 1888 
annual general meeting the bankers essentially took over the board of 
directors, appointing six new directors including two bank partners, one of 
whom became chairman. With effective majorities on the executive and 
finance committees Kidder, Peabody set about reorganising the railroad’s 
financial structure, at the heart of which was converting more than twenty 
types o f outstanding bond into just two. Mortgage bonds paid four percent 
and income bonds five percent, payments were also conditional on sufficient 
current earnings. The cash needed to service the debt reduced from $11.1 
million to $7.4 million. In part because these changes made the payments 
vulnerable to unscrupulous manipulation, as well as the vulnerable position its 
difficulties put it in, the railroad was perceived to be attractive to speculators, 
so the bankers recommended putting stock into a ten-year voting trust 
controlled by them (Carosso 1970, 35-36).
Investment banks had become key players in the economy. The recession of 
1893 brought severe problems across the railroad industry. Between 1894 and
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1898, 40,000 miles of track, with a capitalisation of around $2.5 billion, went 
into receivership, and the leading investment banks set to work reorganising 
and refinancing bankrupt and close to bankrupt roads (Carosso 1970,171).
4.2.8 Corporate Financial Revolution
The capital available in the United States for private investment by the last 
decade o f the nineteenth century was o f a quite unprecedented magnitude. 
The investment banking intermediaries able to bring massive sums together 
for a single enterprise were becoming very effective.
While the enduring assets of railroads, most o f all their track, was clearly 
visible to the naked eye, and gave investors confidence in the underlying 
capacity o f the firm to create value, for other firms this was not the case. It 
was necessary to develop the techniques to ensure that as far as possible 
invested funds would be put to productive use. The management systems that 
made this commitment possible, accounting systems, had been established in 
parallel with developments in the capital markets. As the commitment-credit 
model predicts, these two developments brought about fundamental changes 
to the economic structure first in the United States, but then in many other 
countries as well. The next section describes the extent to which growth in 
the form predicted can be observed.
4.3 Consequences
The historical evidence is conclusive that there were indeed revolutions in 
commitment and credit preceding and during the ‘managerial revolution’ in 
the United States at the end of the nineteenth and beginning o f the twentieth 
centuries. But what is the evidence regarding the nature o f this managerial 
revolution? Did it consist o f the four elements o f growth predicted by the 
commitment-credit model, namely output growth, unit growth, financial 
sophistication growth and growth cycles?
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4.3.1 Output Growth
The evidence that a great merger wave swept through US manufacturing 
industry between 1895 and 1904, substantially increasing the size o f firms 
operating in many industry sectors, is incontrovertible. Lamoreaux identifies 
four mergers in 1895, six in 1897, sixteen in 1898, and in 1899, the height of 
activity in this period, sixty-three (Lamoreaux 1985, 1). The years 1900 
through to 1902 saw twenty-one, nineteen and sixteen mergers respectively, 
before tailing off to five in 1903 and three in 1904. She also reports Thoreli, 
with slightly different criteria, as finding fifty-seven mergers from 1890 to 
1893, twenty-seven from 1894 to 1897, one hundred and eighty six from 1898 
to 1901, and then thirty-four from 1902 to 1903. Overall, Lamoreaux 
identified over one thousand eight hundred firms that disappeared within 
consolidations (1985,2).
Chandler charts in some detail the evolution o f what he named the managerial 
revolution; much of the evidence he cites has already been used to chart the 
development o f commitment and credit mechanisms in the previous two 
sections. He shows that by the end o f the 1880s, for the first time, a number 
o f industrial enterprises were beginning to serve the whole o f the USA. With 
the coming of the twentieth century many surpassed the railroads in the size, 
complexity and diversity of their operations (Chandler 1977, 289). Indeed, a 
long depression from 1873 was exacerbated to a large extent by price declines, 
resulting from a combination o f limitations to the money supply and a rapid 
rise in overall output capacity (Chandler 1977, 316). During the 1880s 
manufacturers in a small number o f industries began to consolidate. Two, 
namely cattle and cordage, were short lived, while six, namely petroleum, 
cottonseed oil, linseed oil, sugar, whisky and lead processing, resulted in the 
creation o f a single trust that ended up dominating its industry for decades. In 
all the successful cases there were considerable economies o f scale, and the 
opportunity for technical innovation in the finished product was limited 
(Chandler 1977, 320).
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The depression of die 1890s, for Chandler, demonstrated that it was now very 
difficult for small, single-unit enterprises operating under a single legal roof to 
remain viable, because if they could maintain prices at a reasonable margin of 
profit then competitors would appear. In many cases, these new entrants were 
run by people who had previously sold out o f their business to a trust, which 
had been created to bring a market under the control o f one firm (Chandler 
1977, 335). While this explanation certainly fits with the evidence, it is less 
clear why this had apparendy only started to happen at this particular time. 
However, the commitment managers were able to make through audited 
disclosures, and the development o f investment banking, was new, and 
explains why freestanding businesses, that had been viable, were no longer so; 
because previously the infrastructure necessary to make large investments, 
necessary to start a substantial business from scratch, had not been available 
to potential competitors.
As Chandler makes clear in his analysis, not all markets functioned in this 
way. While there were many enduringly successful mergers, there were also 
many that responded to the many apparent successes, but could not be 
sustained: only more productive merged firms survived in corporate form. A 
catalogue o f mergers analysed by Chandler lists 156, between 1888 and 1906, 
which were large enough to affect the market structure o f the industries in 
which they operated. O f these, all but eight were in manufacturing or 
processing. O f the 148 in manufacturing and processing, there were fewer 
mergers, and a higher proportion of failures, in labour intensive industries. 
There were none in the apparel industry, only one in furniture, three in 
printing and publishing, and one in lumber. In none o f these did 
concentration of production reduce costs, or enable high volume distribution 
or specialist servicing to any significant extent (Chandler 1977, 337). By 
comparison, mergers were much more likely to be successful in areas such as 
food, and complex, but standardised, machinery. These were capital-intensive 
businesses that distributed standardised products to many customers. On the 
whole they were high volume, large batch or continuous process industries, or
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those needing specialised marketing services. Chandler, while recognising the 
evidence as incomplete, believes that it is safe to say that by 1917 all the 
successful mergers had integrated production with distribution. Some of these 
successes also required a change of strategy from horizontal merger for 
market power, which proved unsuccessful, to a strategy o f administrative 
centralisation for improved productivity (Chandler 1977, 338).
The conclusion Chandler draws from all this evidence is that the consolidated 
corporations only enjoyed continuing success where they used the resources 
under their control more efficiently than was possible without the 
combination. This was despite the fact that in many cases the motivation for 
the merger was in controlling competition, or the winner’s personal gain from 
consolidation. In practice, mergers succeeded when value was created, 
because they enabled the control of a high volume of materials through the 
processes o f production and distribution, from raw material to consumer. 
Improved information and cash flows increased the intensity with which 
resources were used, and so reduced unit costs. Chandler, not unreasonably, 
suggests that this evidence refutes the hypothesis that markets are always the 
most effective form of economic organisation (Chandler 1977,338-9).
The statistical evidence from the economy as a whole also backs up the 
evidence set out by Chandler from within markets. Levenstein analysed US 
Department o f Commerce figures, and found that between 1870 and 1913 
total output, per capita output, and labour productivity, all grew more quickly 
in the US than in any other leading industrial country. Between 1890 and 1914 
real output actually doubled, albeit with an increase in population. And the 
United States went from being a net importer to a net exporter (Levenstein 
1998, 190). So ironically, while much of the initial impetus for investment 
banking had been to supply foreign funds used to purchase goods abroad to 
invest in US businesses, the US as a whole was now looking for its surplus of 
exports to be invested overseas, for a future return. Competitive large 
corporations were a benefit to the whole economy.
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4.3.2 Form Elaboration
While the growth in size of firms within a market was clearly observable 
during the industrial revolution, it is not necessarily so obvious how the 
prediction o f the commitment-credit model could apply to the growth of 
corporations with effective commitment-credit governance mechanisms. 
However, this pattern does appear to match up with what is referred to as the 
shift from U-form to M-form corporations.
The start o f the 1920s saw a significant post First World War depression, after 
the initial euphoria accompanying the end of hostilities. Large corporations, 
central to whose existence was a steady flow of products to the market, found 
themselves having to deal with significant inventory excesses. Meat packers 
Armour, for example, needed to turn to outside sources o f working capital, 
and the founding family lost control o f the business as a consequence. Sears 
Roebuck, the retailers, avoided default on supplier payments only because its 
president Julius Rosenwald could draw on his family’s personal fortune. 
Chemical and mechanical processors and manufacturers with longer and 
more complex supply chains found themselves in greater difficulties. Henry 
Ford’s business survived, because he forced his dealers to buy and pay for 
cars they could not sell, with the threat to cancel their dealerships if they did 
not. As a consequence, Sears Roebuck as well as General Electric and United 
States Rubber developed techniques to carefully forecast future demand, and 
set and adjusted their flows accordingly. At D u Pont and General Motors 
their managers and financiers went further, creating what became known as 
the multidivisional structure (Chandler 1977,456).
The multidivisional M-form corporations consisted o f autonomous divisions, 
each o f which had a well-defined market for which it integrated production 
and distribution, through coordinating flows from suppliers to consumers. 
Each o f these divisions resembled the earlier U-form corporations, where 
overall control was centralised and activities were divided into functional 
departments. For the M-form corporations, a general office o f top managers
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with a large administrative and financial staff supervised the multifunctional 
divisions. The top managers evaluated the market and financial performance 
o f the divisions, ensured that their flows were tuned to fluctuations in 
demand, and that they applied consistent policies in areas such as purchasing 
and personnel; most o f all, the top managers decided between the competing 
opportunities for capital investment (Chandler 1977, 457). This structure 
came to be adopted by large enterprises through the 1920s and 30s. Holding 
companies such as Allied Chemical, Union Carbide and United States Steel 
found that it was more flexible, and so more effective, than either the holding 
company, sometimes called the H-form corporation, where there is no 
operational coordination between divisions, or the U-form centralised and 
functionally departmentalised structure (Chandler 1977,463).
Alongside the development o f M-form corporations was the adoption of 
diversification as an explicit strategy for growth. Many businesses had 
previously added lines that permitted them to make use o f their marketing 
and purchasing organisations, and to exploit by-products o f their processing 
operations. In general these had been ad hoc responses o f middle managers to 
relatively obvious opportunities. What was new was the conscious search by 
top managers for new products and new markets (Chandler 1977, 473).
D u Pont was one o f the first corporations to take this approach. A 
manufacturer o f explosives, they had expanded considerably during the war, 
and wanted new products and markets that would make good use o f existing 
facilities and managerial talent. Their adoption of the multidivisional structure 
was a response to the challenges posed by their diversification programme, 
alongside the general recession o f 1920-21. They moved into dyes, chemicals, 
fibres, film and paint, but found that this overloaded the organisational 
capability o f the centralised U-form. It was only once decentralisation had 
taken place that these newlines showed a profit (Chandler 1977, 473,475).
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Chandler suggests that diversification and growth strategies may well have 
created controversy among boards of directors, as they did in the railway 
companies, because o f the costs of these new operations. Little evidence 
exists one way or the other, but capital invested in the new operations could 
have been returned to shareholders. However, partly at least due to more 
sophisticated accounting practices, the large industrials were able to maintain 
dividend payments while pursuing their growth strategies. N ot only were 
previous accounting concerns with balance sheets now more correcdy 
focused on income, but growth now required smaller amounts o f capital over 
longer periods o f time than had building or acquiring new railroad capacity. In 
general, diversification was funded through retained profits. So shareholders, 
while perhaps receiving smaller dividends, also had the expectation of 
substantial increases in the future as a result o f continuing growth. In many 
cases oligopolistic positions enabled firms to survive the gruelling recession of 
the 1930s, because they avoided cutthroat price competition and could absorb 
some losses from time to time (Chandler 1977,474).
Much of the expansion was generated internally through research 
organisations. While often set up originally to improve products and 
processes, they were additionally tasked with developing new products. In 
some cases considerable investment was required to achieve this, for example 
in chemicals or large machinery. If  the products were outside the firms 
competence, they could be licensed to another firms, otherwise either a new 
division could be created, or new product could simply be added to those of 
an existing division, if its requirements for production and marketing were 
sufficiendy similar to its current ones (Chandler 1977, 474-476).
In making the decisions as to which opportunities merited capital investment, 
large M-form corporations acted in may ways as a miniature capital market 
(Williamson 1988, 281). It quickly became apparent that the appropriate way 
to make these comparisons was through selecting those that offered the 
highest return on capital. Although the computational techniques and the
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ultimate usefulness of a single number were clearly capable o f being taken to 
excess, as compared with the real underlying issues, some standard techniques 
for organising the available data and performing calculations would be of 
great benefit, which naturally brings us to the third element of growth 
predicted by the commitment-credit model.
4.3.3 Capital Allocation
Historical evidence suggests that Du Pont was, if not the most influential, 
certainly one o f the leading firms in the early development and application of 
internal capital allocation techniques. These occurred in the two decades prior 
to its diversification drive, described above. Indeed, Johnson and Kaplan 
suggest that by the end o f the first world war Du Pont had developed a 
management accounting system that would be a model for complex modem 
enterprises (1987, 87). Although there were overlaps, this system had 
fundamentally different objectives to a financial accounting system.
Du Pont was established initially in the early nineteenth century as E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours and Company. Alfred Du Pont, a partner in the original 
company, and his two cousins Coleman and Pierre, founded the Du Pont 
Powder Company when they performed what in modem terms was a 
leveraged buyout o f the original firm. Bonds were issued to the partners in the 
old firm paying a level o f interest equivalent to the profits expected by that 
firm in the future. The cousins were clearly confident they could make a profit 
that would exceed this, and having done so would have this as their reward. 
The cousins bought out numerous competitors and set about creating a 
centrally managed enterprise. Effective capital allocation decision-making was 
central to their scheme (Johnson and Kaplan 1987, 66-67; Chandler 1962, 52).
The pivot of the D u Pont management system was the measurement of 
return on investment. While contemporary techniques enabled income to be 
determined, the new system required the establishment o f an asset accounting 
system. This was inaugurated in 1903, when a complete inventory o f assets
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and equipment was recorded. Subsequently, new construction was charged to 
this account at cost, and dismantled assets credited. A comprehensive 
construction appropriations procedure was developed to supply the basic data 
(Johnson and Kaplan 1987, 69).
Each o f the three major departments, namely manufacturing, sales and 
purchasing, provided carefully designed operating statistics. This enabled the 
top managers to concentrate their attention on planning future capital 
investment, while monitoring the performance o f the divisions, but leaving 
decisions regarding day-to-day management with the divisions and their 
managers. For example, the manufacturing division provided a profit and loss 
sheet and a works cost report for each of the division’s more than forty 
geographically dispersed manufacturing facilities. Only the executive 
committee saw the profit and loss sheet however, works managers were 
assessed on the basis of their works cost report, so their incentive was very 
much on efficient use of the facilities in place (Johnson and Kaplan 1987, 70- 
71).
D u Pont’s policy was to finance expansion out o f cash generated through 
operations and stock sales, avoiding external debt financing. A cash flow 
forecast enabled the Executive Committee to determine the maximum 
amount of construction to which the firm could commit itself. Accounting 
data provided an estimated contribution margin for each product, and the 
sales department provided estimates o f projected sales. Figures took into 
account expected changes in prices and costs, and to these were added non- 
operational income such as land sales and income from financial securities 
held, so that by 1910 the Executive Committee received monthly forecasts on 
the firm’s cash position for a year ahead (Johnson and Kaplan 1987, 69-70).
One investment decision considered by the firm was backward integration. A 
recession in 1907 caused a problem because o f the decentralised purchasing 
system. As prices fell, the Vice President of Purchasing accumulated
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significant stocks of raw materials. Payment required for these purchases 
became due just at the time that declining orders reduced revenue, thus 
squee2ing working capital, to an extent that required considerable effort by 
top management to overcome the problem. Following this, a proscribed stock 
level was set for raw materials, and the purchasing department’s remit became 
to buy at the lowest price, up to this level. However, this introduced the risk 
o f supply shortages in the event o f an emergency. To reduce the risk o f being 
held to ransom by suppliers, the company began to acquire ownership of 
many sources o f supply, although only if  this met the return on investment 
criteria. The return required was set at fifteen percent, the normal return 
earned in dynamite making, which was the most profitable manufacturing 
activity (Johnson and Kaplan 1987, 82-3).
Another significant factor taken into account by the firm, in addition to return 
on investment, was their competitive position. Du Pont took the view, as had 
Andrew Carnegie, the founder o f US Steel at the turn o f the century, the first 
billion dollar corporation, that it was potentially counter productive to 
compete ruthlessly to eliminate all competition. A critical factor in sustaining 
the return on investment was operating expensive capital plants at as close to 
full capacity as possible. Smaller, and almost inevitably higher cost producers, 
would provide the excess capacity during market recessions. Keeping prices 
close to those o f competitors would also ensure that there was a return on 
investment, so that capital as well as revenue costs were covered, and without 
which the business could not be sustained (Johnson and Kaplan 1987,78).
This system was fully elaborated by F. Donaldson Brown, assistant treasurer 
o f the firm from 1914. Although not trained as an accountant, but as an 
electrical engineer, his analytical training and business experience across 
engineering and marketing gave him the necessary perspective (Johnson and 
Kaplan 1987, 86-87). Between 1915 and 1918 a unique system for reporting 
the information for each product line and each mill was established. A series 
o f 350 wall-sixed charts were updated each month and maintained for easy
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viewing in a Chart Room at the headquarters (Johnson and Kaplan 1987, 84- 
85).
While the focus on return on investment identified the key role o f the 
corporation as a user of savings to create future value, it was clearly not a 
panacea. As noted in the previous subsection, with diversification it became 
too problematic to maintain the centralised structure. The aggregate picture 
assumed, o f necessity, that changes in output or prices occurred only as 
predicted, and that nothing else occurred that would disrupt the normal flow 
of activities. O f course these assumptions were frequently violated, the over­
purchasing induced crisis of 1907 being a classic example o f the problems of 
aligning subordinate goals and overall goals in an environment subject to 
change. Nevertheless, the evidence would suggest that in dealing with these 
relatively long term investment decisions, the corporation was more 
successful than the market, albeit for corporations existing within a broader 
overall market economy.
4.3.4 Product Cycle
While the overall investment cycle for the whole economy is manifested 
through the business cycle, which although now subject to a degree of 
influence through monetary and fiscal policy, is one o f the most illusive 
economic phenomena to pin down, in the corporation it has come to fruition 
in the product cycle, which like most aspects o f the corporation, benefits 
from a far higher degree o f explicit control.
Thomas Edision established what was probably the world’s first active 
product development process, eventually having 1,100 patents to his name. In 
1879 he established a research laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey (Treacy 
and Wiersema 1995, 83). By 1896 however, George Eastman, o f Eastman 
Kodak fame, was proposing to establish an Experimental Department, with 
the aim of bringing out improved goods every year: depending for 
competitive advantage not on patent protection, but on better products
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(Chandler 1977, 572). Chandler, as noted above, lists a plethora of large 
corporations who established substantial research laboratories to help them 
maintain dominance o f their markets. His list includes commodity firms such 
as Americal Cotton Oil, National Lead, Goodrich Rubber and National 
Carbon, as well as technology firms such as Western Electric, Westinghouse 
and General Electric (Chandler 1977,375).
However, it was not only large companies that established laboratories. The 
end o f the nineteenth century also saw the creation o f an industry of 
independent research laboratories, which provided contract research and 
development services to other companies. Between 1900 and 1940, almost 
350 independent laboratories were established, employing 3,300 scientists and 
engineers. It is also interesting to note, however, that from 1921 to 1940, the 
proportion o f scientific professionals employed in independent research 
organizations fell from 15.2 percent to 8.7 percent (Mowery and Rosenberg 
1989,79, 83).
There is evidence that anti-trust legislation played a role in encouraging firms 
to develop new markets, and investing in research and development to this 
end, rather than taking over competitors to achieve growth. A decision o f the 
Supreme Court in 1904, brought about through the advocacy o f the U.S. 
Justice Department, opposed horizontal mergers. Studies o f both Eastman 
Kodak and D u Pont suggest that research laboratories were established to 
create new products that would enable them to grow organically. Antitrust 
policy did not focus on the acquisition o f new technologies from other 
sources; so many acquisitions o f this type were made (Mowery and Rosenberg 
1998,14).
The capability o f large firms to develop new products as a matter o f course 
was increasingly widely recognised as the twentieth century progressed. 
Whitehead in 1925 wrote, ‘The greatest invention o f the 19th century was the 
invention o f the method o f invention.’ And Schumpeter in 1942 wrote,
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‘Innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Technological progress is 
increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained specialists’ (Mowery 
and Rosenberg 1998,1,2).
Perhaps the ultimate early pioneer o f concept o f the product cycle was the 
automobile industry, and the next section describes the growth o f the most 
important source o f these developments, namely General Motors. To some 
extent there was an interaction o f the product cycle with the business cycle, 
but the end result was that it institutionalised innovation within a firm. 
Ultimately, the difference between the industrial revolution and the 
managerial revolution was that the industrial revolution made continuing 
innovation possible, while the managerial revolution made it necessary.
4.3.5 General Motors
For most o f the first half o f the twentieth century the paragon o f business 
enterprises in the United States, or anywhere else, was General Motors 
Corporation. This serves as an excellent final case study to highlight the role 
o f managerial commitment and credit mechanisms, and the consequences o f 
output growth, sub-system growth, capital sophistication and investment 
cycles.
William C Durant formed General Motors on September 8, 1908, the same 
year that Henry Ford built the first Model T. Durant’s first business venture 
had been in 1885, when as a twenty-four year old insurance salesman he paid 
$50 for a patent for a two-wheeled horse drawn cart. Flint, Michigan where 
Durant was based was already one o f the largest centres for vehicle 
manufacture in the US, and he and a partner contracted out the 
manufacturing, and concentrated on building a national sales and distribution 
network. Production expanded to two hundred carts a day. And by this stage 
the firm had its own plant for final assembly, with an annual wage bill o f over 
three million dollars. It was apparent that, at this scale, disruptions to supplies 
would have serious consequences. So Durant and his partner began to set up
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their own plants for supplying the necessary components. By 1900 the firm 
manufactured and marketed a whole range o f buggies, carriages and wagons. 
However, that was also the first year when over four thousand automobiles 
were produced in the US, and a few of the many firms involved were starting 
to show a profit (Chandler 1962,115-119).
By 1904 it was apparent to Durant that the rise of the automobile was both an 
opportunity and a threat to his existing business. The Buick Motor Company, 
one o f the many small ventures, but one with a factory in Flint, failed that 
year, and Durant agreed with its creditors to take it on. His skills, experience 
and contacts soon transformed the business. The firm had produced 16 cars 
in 1903, and 31 in 1904, but by 1906 production increased to 2,295, and two 
years later to 8,487, to become the leading producer in the country, with 
Henry Ford second at 6,181 (Chandler 1962,117-118).
Durant reasoned that the quickest and cheapest way to increase production to 
the degree necessary to meet the surging demand he saw developing, was 
through combining existing manufacturers, so this was the purpose with 
which he formed General Motors. Within eighteen months he had gained 
control o f Cadillac, Oakland, six other automobile firms, three truck 
companies, and ten parts and accessory firms, in large part through 
exchanging the stock o f the purchased companies for stock in General 
Motors. Between 1908 and 1910 sales income grew from $29 million to $49 
million, though with much of it still from Buick. In 1910 however, there was a 
slight downturn in the business cycle. Sales dropped below production and 
Durant lacked the funds to pay his suppliers and workforce. In addition, the 
inventory o f finished automobiles was quickly becoming obsolete as product 
improvements in the industry continued at a rapid pace. Durant obtained $15 
million in finance from a banking syndicate, but had to sign over control of 
the company to a trust controlled by the bankers for five years (Chandler 
1962,118-120).
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The five years of the banker-led trust saw a degree of consolidation, but there 
was a lot o f resistance from the managers o f the constituent firms, particularly 
when they were profitable. One example was that attempts to institute a 
centralized accounting system failed. The allocation of funds for capital 
expenditure was officially centralized, but Chandler found little evidence of 
this being done in a rational or systematic way.
Durant was not idle during this time though. He acquired control of 
Chevrolet, another volume-production automobile firm, and financial backing 
through Pierre du Pont. Durant used capital made available through the 
security o f his existing firms and his relationship with du Pont to regain 
control o f General Motors, with du Pont as Chairman. Over the course o f the 
war, when their explosive manufacturing business made huge profits, Du 
Ponts invested over $50 million in General Motors. With the end o f the war 
Durant expanded massively. General Motors, however, was hit by the 
recession towards the end o f 1920 at least as badly as other corporations. To 
make matters worse, Durant started borrowing money in an attempt to 
maintain the price o f General Motors’ stock, which was the security he 
pledged against the loan. Matters came to a head towards the end of 
November, and Du Ponts and the bank J.P. Morgan & Co had to rescue 
Durant, who resigned at the end o f the month (Chandler 1962,120-129).
Piere du Pont took on the additional role o f President, despite having 
previously gone into semi-retirement. He was however able to devolve much 
of the responsibility for planning the subsequent reorganisation to Alfred P 
Sloan Jr, a senior manager responsible for several component manufacturers 
within the General Motors Empire. Sloan had previously been president o f an 
engineering firm taken over by Durant, and had been appointed by him as 
president o f United Motors Corporation, a holding company owned in turn 
by the General Motors holding company. With Durant’s approval Sloan had 
already put together a plan to integrate the whole enterprise, based to a 
considerable extent on his experience o f bringing more central coordination
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to United Motors Corporation. Durant failed to make any direct response to 
the proposal, but du Pont took it up enthusiastically. Sloan became a vice 
president, then in May 1923 took over as President, the role he maintained 
until 1937, when he became Chairman of the Board. A post he retained until 
1956 (Chandler 1962,129,130,156,160).
Sloan was not satisfied with the level of integration before 1925 (Chandler 
1962, 142). But many issues had to be resolved to make significant progress. 
During 1921 the managers o f the major automobile divisions of Olds, 
Oakland, Cadillac and Chevrolet were replaced. The apparently unintentional 
consequence of these changes was to reduce significandy the barriers to 
further integration (Chandler 1962, 141). The development o f uniform data 
definitions and procedures was recognised by du Pont and Sloan as a major 
challenge that needed to be addressed. Donaldson Brown was brought in 
from D u Ponts and set to work.
The first stage, in 1921 and 1922, was to build information procedures for 
controlling first the purchasing and then the production scheduling o f each 
division, then to systematise the allocation of capital and the effective use o f 
cash. Uniform accounting procedures were an important part o f this work. 
Following this, the focus moved to developing data and controls to deal with 
future conditions (Chandler 1962, 145). For planning purposes a standard 
volume of eighty percent o f plant capacity was used to allocate fixed costs, 
with adjustments being made as appropriate as the actual figures became 
available (Chandler 1962,148). In 1924 Sloan thought he detected a downturn 
in demand again, and visits to dealers with crowded lots confirmed his 
suspicions. Following this, more information was collected on a regular basis, 
including ten-day reports from dealers and periodic reports from an 
independent company on new car registrations (Chandler 1962,150).
By 1925 comprehensive plans incorporating sophisticated long-term forecasts 
were drawn up by each division, including factors such as industry growth,
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seasonal variation, general business conditions and competitive activity 
(Chandler 1962, 151). In all this, each divisional manager had responsibility 
for his own division. Corporate standards had to be adhered to, but 
operational decisions were for the division. The Executive Committee, 
composed primarily o f officers without day-to-day operational responsibility, 
took the more strategic decisions, but in general the divisional managers were 
too busy with day-to-day operations to have much time for these, so an 
effective division o f labour had developed (Chandler 1962,158).
By utilising the commitment and credit mechanisms available, General 
Motors was able to achieve extraordinary levels of growth, in the form that 
the commitment-credit model predicts. Output soared. Between 1924 and 
1927 the corporation’s share o f the automobile market grew from 18.8 to 43.4 
percent. Data from a similar time, between 1921 and 1925, shows that the 
output o f the industry as a whole grew from 1.5 to 3.7 million units. In 1928, 
albeit the year before the crash, the corporation’s profits were over a quarter 
of a billion dollars, which given that the industry did not exist thirty years 
before is quite extraordinary (Chandler 1962,158).
To bring a degree o f rational order to the internal organisation o f the 
corporation, the approach taken by Sloan was to segment the market, in 
classic M-form style. Each division aimed at a particular segment o f the 
market, largely based on price, from Chevrolet at the bottom end to Cadillac 
at the top. A new division of Pontiac was formed to fill the gap perceived to 
exist between Chevrolet and Oldsmobile, Oakland and Buick then following 
Oldsmobile (Chandler 1962, 143). Other manufacturing units were allocated 
to either the Parts or the Accessories groups, the former being those that 
supplied at least forty percent of their output within the corporation, rather 
than to resellers, as marketing and distribution were far less significant for 
them (Chandler 1962,135).
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By 1923 a capital allocation system similar to Du Font’s was in operation. 
Detailed plans needed to accompany appropriation requests, including the 
specific use o f the funds, the amount o f funds and the savings that would 
result. Divisional Managers could sign off smaller amounts, above that the 
President and the Group Executive responsible on a consultative basis for the 
division, as well as the divisional manager, were required to sign off. Larger 
still amounts needed either the Executive Committee or the Board’s Finance 
Committee to sign off. Divisions themselves were relieved o f concern for 
handling cash. Over a hundred banks across the country had accounts 
established, and the financial staff in the general office made the actual 
disbursements. If  deposits exceeded a certain maximum the excess was 
automatically transferred to a selected surplus account. Interdivisional billing, 
although at market prices, was however settled centrally without any exchange 
o f cash, so the corporation in many ways had its own monetary system 
(Chandler 1962,147).
Finally, a key innovation that emerged during the nineteen twenties was the 
annual model change. Sloan describes this as having in general two one-year 
long phases. In the first the basic engineering and styling changes were 
decided on, then in the second the engineering issues necessary to bring the 
model into production were resolved. While each o f the chassis units, the 
frame, engine, transmission and suspension were rarely changed all at one 
time, each evolved over time. These changes were coordinated between 
divisions and required considerable investment. Development moved from 
drawings to clay models to plastic models. Estimates o f costs and weights 
were made and extensive coordination between the styling and engineering 
staff needed to take place, and suppliers needed planning information in good 
time. Prototypes were built from around eight to three months before being 
available for sale, and production started six weeks before (Sloan 1965, 239- 
246). In sum, innovation had become routine. Economic growth was the 
norm, not the exception.
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4.3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has tested the commitment-credit model by applying its 
predictions to the managerial revolution in the United States from 1850 to 
1950, and found that its predictions are very much confirmed in the evidence 
provided by secondary historical sources. The model has therefore in large 
part explained the economic rise of the western world, and done so in a 
scientific fashion, based on active observation, not the assertion o f certain 
‘obvious facts.’ Before discussing the implications of this, and to help assess 
the contribution o f the confirmation o f the model’s predictions, 
developments in economic theory in the twentieth century need to be 
considered.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e
GOVERNANCE IN  ECONOM ICS
Useful as the commitment-credit model has proved itself to be, in holding up 
to the testing which has made up the bulk o f this study, it would scarcely be 
credible to claim that it was the first time governance has been considered as a 
significant economic factor. Two alternatives merit detailed consideration, and 
that is what this chapter aims to achieve. These will each be considered in 
turn, with a focus on the extent to which they take account o f active 
observations o f economic phenomena.
One approach, although not wholly successful in terms o f its acceptance 
within the profession, possibly because it is not a single framework but a set 
o f similar proposals, focuses on the microeconomic level at which this study 
has focused, and does continue to receive attention. This is the new 
institutional framework.
There has only been one outstandingly successful attempt to introduce a clear 
role for governance, although its value has been severely challenged in the last 
decade or two. And, while it does envisage governance operating at a different 
level to the observations considered here, what has subsequently been termed 
macroeconomics, it does address many of the issues dealt with in the 
commitment-credit model, such as the connection between uncertainty and 
investment. This is the Keynesian framework. Partly because it does deal with 
observations at a different level, that of aggregate national statistics rather 
than institutional support for interactions, the focus here is as much on why it 
was successful within the profession, as on directly comparing how it deals 
with the issues.
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5.1 New Institutional Economics
New institutional economics is the best-developed approach to introducing 
governance at the microeconomic level and, at least on the surface, shares 
many features with the commitment-credit model. The biggest difference is 
that, while it has a central unifying idea, namely that institutions matter, the 
way that they matter is less well defined. However, it does map in a relatively 
straightforward way on to real world issues, although only in one early 
example in a similar way to this study, which will be considered first.
5.1.1 North and Thomas
One of the earliest and most enduring new institutional works is that of 
North and Thomas (1971). North has subsequently labelled the approach in 
this book as the efficiency view, and admits that he has now abandoned it 
(North 1990, 7). Nevertheless, in applying a relatively simple conceptual 
model to a specific historical narrative, namely the prelude to the industrial 
revolution, o f all the works considered in this chapter, it is the closest in 
approach to that taken in this study. The record inside a recent copy of the 
book o f five reprintings in the 1990s suggests, in addition, that many still find 
a use for it.
North and Thomas focus on property rights, and specifically on the 
incentives for people to benefit from their own innovations (North and 
Thomas 1973, 1). They claim that their ‘comprehensive analytical framework’ 
is ‘consistent with and complementary to standard neo-classical economic 
theory.’ It is however presented as no more than ‘an interpretive study,’ 
primarily to provide a contrast with both traditional and new economic 
history, where the former is much more detailed and exhaustive while the 
latter works by way of precise empirical statistical tests (North and Thomas 
1973, vii).
The central thesis is set out right at the start o f the book: ‘Efficient economic 
organization is the key to growth; the development o f an efficient economic
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organization in Western Europe accounts for the rise o f the West’ (North and 
Thomas 1973,1). And the key institutional mechanism necessary to bring this 
about is the one that brings the private rate o f return close to the social rate of 
return, namely property rights.
A list o f factors are identified as leading to growth, namely technology, human 
capital, reduction of information costs, economies o f scale and population 
expansion; although growth in effect means per capita growth so population 
is not as straightforward a concept as it may at first appear. But they argue 
that there must be a gap in the theory because Sve are left wondering: if all 
that is required for economic growth is investment and innovation, why have 
some societies missed this desirable outcome?’ North and Thomas suggest 
that these factors are what constitute growth, and none o f them provide a 
causal explanation. The missing link is that ‘individuals must be lured by 
incentives to undertake the socially desirable activities’ (North and Thomas 
1973, 2). But, ‘if the private costs exceed the private benefits, individuals 
ordinarily will not be willing to undertake the activity even though it is socially 
profitable’ (North and Thomas 1973, 3).
The underlying pressure for changes in property rights, according to North 
and Thomas, is a result of an increasing scarcity of resources, which in the 
case o f Western Europe was a result of population growth (North and 
Thomas 1973, 19). Together with this was a difference in climatic conditions 
and density o f population, which brought an opportunity for specialisation, 
particularly in agricultural products, which vary in their suitability by 
geographical area. The rise o f the market enabled this specialisation to occur, 
and gains from trade reinforced the success of the process (North and 
Thomas 1973,26).
An integral element o f the market was money, which had not been a 
necessary or widely used mechanism in the feudal economy, when a peasant 
exchanged some of his labour for the security his lord provided. Money began
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to replace the more varied but less flexible feudal exchanges (North and 
Thomas 1973,28).
Despite these developments, North and Thomas argue that a tension built up 
during the thirteenth century, because of the misalignment between individual 
and social incentives. Individuals continued to perceive a benefit from large 
families, but landowners saw the disruption caused by the improvements 
necessary to produce more food as insufficient to pursue them. Although 
significant beneficial changes were made in the area o f trade and industry, the 
overwhelming dominance of the agricultural sector more than cancelled them 
out (North and Thomas 1973,70).
The tension between population growth and conservative landowners 
reached a crisis point in the fourteenth century, when famine, disease and war 
brought about significant reductions in the population (North and Thomas 
1973, 71). The shift in the balance of power from lords to labourers finally 
brought about the end of the feudal system of obligations, leaving only the 
monetary payment of rent from the occupier to the owner (North and 
Thomas 1973, 80).
Population growth started to return in what is now termed the early modem 
period, and assisted the expansion of the market. North and Thomas assert 
that improving the efficiency of exchange was the source o f the greatest 
economic gains. They identify two sources o f costs, the reduction o f which 
provided efficiencies, namely production costs and transfer costs. Another 
name for transfer costs are transaction costs, which are made up o f search 
costs, negotiation costs and enforcement costs. Unlike the production of 
agricultural and industrial goods, the transaction sector is subject to 
economies o f scale because they have a significant fixed component, so the 
cost o f this fixed component decreases as a proportion o f total cost as 
volume increases. So, where declining productivity in agriculture does not 
outweigh the benefits, it is possible for per capita income to increase with
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population growth in the absence o f technological change (North and 
Thomas 1973, 93).
It was differences in the type o f property rights created by the different 
emerging states o f Western Europe between 1500 and 1700 that caused the 
differences in economic performance (North and Thomas 1973, 97). 
Population growth appears to have been the norm during the sixteenth 
century, but the seventeenth century saw distinct divergences along national 
lines. Germany and Spain saw the population cycle go into decline again, with 
famine, disease and war returning on a significant scale. In France and Italy 
population remained stable, while in the Dutch Republic and England growth 
was sustained; although in spite of, rather than avoiding, disease and war 
(North and Thomas 1973,105).
In France a strong central government resorted to increasingly rigid controls 
on economic activity, to enable the government to extract the maximum tax 
revenue. Ironically, to keep pace with England and Holland’s rising tax 
revenues from rising income, it resorted to increasing extraction, and so 
further stifled economic improvement. North and Thomas identify the major 
problem as the restriction of product markets, on the basis that property 
rights were protected and factor markets, with the exception o f capital, were 
able to develop (North and Thomas 1973,127).
The situation in Spain was in many ways worse. It needed to sustain an 
extensive empire, including large tracts o f the Americas and the Netherlands. 
Extraction from these provinces sustained their defence but, particularly 
when silver and gold extraction from the Americas suddenly reduced in the 
early seventeenth century, there was little in the way of economic 
infrastructure at home, and what there was became subject to desperate 
government interference, bringing considerable reductions in the little 
economic activity that already existed (North and Thomas 1973,131).
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North and Thomas cite the United Provinces of the Netherlands as the first 
area o f Western Europe to experience both population growth and per capita 
income growth (North and Thomas 1973, 132). Political developments 
created the opportunity for markets to flourish. These included the successful 
rebellion o f the northern provinces from Spanish rule, and their organisation 
as a republic. Costs were reduced in all three of the transaction type areas, 
namely search, negotiation and enforcement. Working capital markets 
developed in the sixteenth century. Lending to governments also developed, 
though due to the fact that the Spanish crown was a large borrower, but 
regularly defaulted, development here was not so rapid; but it was well 
underway later in the seventeenth century (North and Thomas 1973, 141). 
Agriculture became increasingly capital intensive and specialised. For example, 
large areas were reclaimed from the sea (North and Thomas 1973,143). Trade 
was the primary economic activity, with Amsterdam becoming the primary 
market in Europe. But industry also developed, particularly textiles, with the 
guild-protected towns concentrating on the luxury end of the market, and the 
unrestricted countryside serving the value-for-money end (North and Thomas 
1973,144).
However, it was England where economic growth really took off. The clear 
distinction North and Thomas perceived between England and the 
Netherlands was the institution of a workable form of intellectual property, 
through the Statute o f Monopolies o f 1624. This proscribed royal grants of 
monopolies, except in the case o f genuine innovations (North and Thomas 
1973, 148). Over the seventeenth century most of the post-medieval 
European commercial and institutional innovations were brought to England 
from the Netherlands, where on the whole they had been copied from the 
Italians (North and Thomas 1973,155).
From the detailed summary just set out, it is clear that there are significant 
similarities in North and Thomas’ book to the approach taken here in testing 
the commitment-credit model. It is by far the closest equivalent in the
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literature. Nevertheless, there are important differences and problems with 
their approach, which in fact has led North to move away from the approach. 
The alternative he has found to his ‘efficiency5 approach, namely transaction 
cost economics, will be set out before discussing new institutional approaches 
as a whole.
5.1.2 Coase
North and Thomas’ use of the concept of transaction costs, though not 
specifically cited as such, is a clear reference to the work of Coase, and in 
particular to his 1937 paper, which is an early attempt to explain the 
increasing prevalence o f large firms, when the neoclassical model would 
suggest that smaller units operating in a market environment would always be 
the most efficient economic form.
Coase introduced the concept o f ‘transaction costs’, the term he invented to 
describe the cost o f using the price mechanism (Coase 1937, 38). Price 
discovery and negotiation costs are two elements he identifies, as well as a 
willingness to pay more to reduce uncertainty. These costs do not exist within 
the firm, or at least not to the same extent. There may be additional incentives 
for firms to form because of tax effects, for example through a sales tax that 
was levied on market transactions, but not on transactions within a firm, but 
these are unlikely to lead to the creation o f firms by themselves (Coase 1937, 
41).
While transaction costs limit the price mechanism, diminishing returns to 
management limit the size to which firms can grow. Three factors contribute 
to determining the equilibrium point at which market and management costs 
balance, and so the size to which firms will grow. First, the lower the cost of 
organising, through such things as the cost o f telecommunications 
technologies that facilitate internal communication, the larger firms will be. 
Second, the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes, the larger the
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firm will grow. Thirdly, the larger the benefit from bulk purchasing the larger 
firms will grow (Coase 1937,45).
Two alternative explanations o f the firm are considered by Coase, but rejected 
as being in theory capable o f being dealt with efficiendy through market 
mechanisms. First is the division o f labour. But this fails as an alternative 
explanation because the whole essence of the market mechanism is the 
decentralised coordination o f different activities (Coase 1937, 47). The second 
possible explanation is the existence o f uncertainty, but in principle this can 
be dealt with through contracts between market participants using the price 
mechanism, so this also fails to explain the existence o f the firm (Coase 1937, 
51).
For Coase, two dimensions determine the quality of a theory, namely its 
tractability and its correspondence with the real world (Coase 1937, 33). The 
correspondence o f his model with the legal definition o f employer and 
employee is presented as evidence o f its correspondence with the real world 
(Coase 1937, 54). The precise definition o f the costs o f a transaction in 
determining the size of the firm enables the marginal product o f the 
entrepreneur to be defined, and so provides a clear integration with what is 
now called the neoclassical model, so making the concept tractable (Coase 
1937,55,34).
5.1.3 Williamson
The work of Williamson draws firmly on that o f Coase (Williamson 1988, 3), 
although he makes it clear that transaction cost economics is an alternative to 
the neoclassical model (Williamson 1988, 2). He characterises this as the idea 
of the firm as a production function being supplanted by the idea o f the firm 
as a governance structure (Williamson 1988, 16). It is clear that governance 
structures generalise the concept of property rights.
Three aspects o f economic transactions, or contracts as Williamson most 
often chooses to label them, are identified; namely bounded rationality,
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opportunism and asset specificity. This characterisation leads naturally to a 
distinction between four approaches to economic analysis. Three take into 
account two of these, but not a third, while only the governance approach is 
able to deal effectively with all three aspects.
Bounded rationality is the characteristic most often associated with the work 
o f Herbert Simon. It is the idea that people act in economically rational ways, 
but that there is a limit in their capacity to deal with all the information that 
may be available, so that although they aim to act rationally they do not always 
succeed in doing so.
Opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile. The idea being that 
what people say they will do, and what they choose to do, may not be the 
same thing. This is not to say that people always act like this, but that some 
people do sometimes.
Asset specificity recognises that in order for a transaction to take place, 
investments often need to have been made previously, which will only return 
their cost over several transactions o f that type, and cannot be utilised for 
other transactions. This is the most critical dimension o f transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1988, 30).
The three approaches to economic analysis that fail to deal effectively with 
one o f the three characteristics are planning, promise and competition. 
Planning deals with opportunism and asset specificity, but assumes perfect 
rationality. Promise can cope with bounded rationality and asset specificity, 
but assumes people will carry out their promises. Competition copes with 
bounded rationality and opportunism, but because all transactions are 
instantaneous exchanges, cannot cope with asset specificity.
Governance, by combining aspects of all three can deal with all three 
characteristics o f economic transactions. While bounded rationality and 
opportunism are generally well-understood phenomena, and can be handled
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within the neoclassical market framework, the concept of asset specificity may 
benefit from a little more explanation. As in many other cases, the concept 
can be found in the work o f Marshall, but was not developed, and indeed 
disappeared from sight as the neoclassical model was developed (Williamson 
1988, 53).
Asset specificity requires a dynamic treatment, because it only makes sense in 
an intertemporal context. The central issue is the trade-off between the cost 
savings o f a specialised technology and the hazards that arise from the 
irreversibility o f the investment. The governance approach is able to 
systematically vary the nature of the trade-off. Williamson points out that, 
although perhaps superficially the same, there is a distinction between asset 
specificity and the accounting concepts o f fixed and variable costs. Asset 
specificity is a consequence o f redeployability rather than ease o f allocability, 
which is the basis o f the accounting distinction. In practice, in much the same 
way as the idea o f fixed costs, specificity is not an either/or attribute but a 
matter o f degree (Williamson 1988, 54). This clearly has consequences for its 
observability.
Asset specificity leads to what Williamson terms the ‘fundamental 
transformation.’ This is the point at which the producer is committed to 
providing the specific asset. While the dynamics of an auction where there are 
several bidders is well understood without asset specificity, once it is 
introduced the dynamics change, at least given bounded rationality and 
opportunism. After the fundamental transformation the identities o f the 
parties matter, they are no longer faceless market participants (Williamson 
1988, 62). The frequency o f the type o f transaction, together with the degree 
o f specificity, then implies the efficient governance structure. In particular, 
ownership, observed as vertical integration, becomes efficient for recurrent 
idiosyncratic investments in specific assets. Mixed investments, where there is 
some standardisation from which economies o f scale result, as well as some 
degree o f idiosyncratic specialised investment being required, benefit either
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from bilateral contracts enforced through reputation effects, or need a third 
party to arbitrate. Reputation can work where the transaction is recurrent, but 
arbitration is necessary where transactions are only occasional (Williamson 
1988, 79).
Within transaction cost economics Williamson makes a distinction between 
two branches, namely the governance branch and the measurement branch. 
Both emphasises are only necessary when the three issues o f bounded 
rationality, opportunism and asset specificity are present. Although written in 
the mid 1980s, and still the leading source, in regard to the issue o f 
observability, it is clearly problematic that he states, ‘the relevant dimensions 
for ascertaining where the measurement difficulties reside remain somewhat 
obscure’ (Williamson 1988, 81).
Williamson argues that ‘transaction cost economizing is the previously 
neglected but key concept for understanding organizational innovation in 
general and vertical integration in particular’ (Williamson 1988, 129). 
Organisational innovation in this context refers to innovations in 
organisational form and function. Nevertheless, the explanation Williamson 
provides is through comparing the before and after states o f organisation, and 
indeed why, contrary to neoclassical doctrine, large organisations exist at all. It 
does not address the process by which more general innovation is possible.
Williamson is clearly aware that there are also conceptual limitations to the 
transaction cost approach, though this is not made particularly explicit. For 
example, it is clear from the context that transaction cost economics is 
included in the statement ‘The economic factors that lie behind the size, 
shape, and performance o f the modem corporation, however, are poorly 
understood’ (Williamson 1988, 295). Transaction cost economics, as 
Williamson observes, does take the corporation seriously, largely as a result of 
asset specificity. And to some extent it can explain the benefits o f the M-form 
multiple unit firm, compared with the H-form holding company or the simple
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hierarchical U-form, through the factors o f bounded rationality, which limits 
the U-form, and opportunism, which limits the H-form. Nevertheless, there is 
no explanation, never mind prediction, o f why the form would appear at one 
point in history.
5.1.4 North: the Sequel
For Douglass North ‘history matters,’ and his more recent work pays close 
attention to transaction costs, although he believes that gains from trade, as 
introduced by Adam Smith, still form the primary source o f economic 
development (North 1990, vii). However, the primary argument of his most 
recent book is that even the combination o f transaction and production costs 
is not sufficient to explain economic phenomena. He attributes to Coase the 
observation that, when it is costly to transact, institutions matter (North 1990, 
12). However, he does believe that it is important to recognise that costs are 
only one side of the equation: benefits the other. It is the institutional 
structure o f a society and economy that shapes the incentives which 
determine performance (North 1990,135).
To a large extent, institutions are a response to limited rationality. North 
highlights two particular limitations, namely motivation and understanding the 
environment (North 1990, 20). Motivation is an issue because o f the evidence 
that people are not always as directly self-seeking as conventional economic 
analysis assumes (North 1990, 22). Understanding the environment is the 
more commonly cited limitation on rationality, namely that without complete 
information, perceptions o f reality vary between people, so that not only can 
an individual not make optimal choices, but also the choices that other people 
make, and that have an impact on others, are for this reason fundamentally 
unpredictable (North 1990,23).
Institutions are introduced as a cost effective way o f dealing with limited 
rationality, and particularly the limited environmental understanding. They 
provide standardised ways o f dealing with common situations that avoid the
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need for negotiation, or analysis, on how best to proceed. And they come in 
two varieties, namely informal and formal (North 1990, 36). Informal 
constraints take three forms. First they can be extensions and elaborations of 
formal rules. Second they are socially accepted norms, and thirdly they can be 
internally enforced behavioural standards. In many cases they are self 
enforcing, because the costs to an individual o f not following them exceed 
those o f conformity. In other cases they are more problematic to enforce, but 
can still be effective if reputation is a significant factor in interactions (North 
1990,41).
The distinction between informal and formal constraints is in practice only 
one o f degree, and has come about because of the growth o f complex 
societies with extensive specialisation and division of labour (North 1990, 46). 
Particular rules are not necessarily efficient, but generally represent influential 
groups’ perceived interests. North distinguishes three levels, namely political 
rules, property rights and contracts (North 1990, 48). When constraints are 
introduced, some attention to compliance and enforcement costs is generally 
given, but enforcement is often not costless, and its lack is the major block on 
economic development (North 1990, 54).
Institutions form a complex web that through their interrelations provide a 
stable background for conducting economic transactions. Nevertheless, 
continual incremental changes are taking place, which over time can bring 
about significant changes. The higher the costs imposed by the institutional 
constraints, the more informal institutions will be used, and it is possible that 
if costs are high enough, then no economic exchange will take place. 
Transaction costs are the most visible manifestation of institutional costs, 
although while some transaction costs are clearly measurable, others such as 
search costs and delays are much more difficult to measure (North 1990, 68).
The transaction costs that result from the network o f formal and informal 
institutions are the underlying reason, as Coase asserted, for the existence of
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the firm. Individuals create firms to maximise their wealth, as defined by the 
institutional structure of their society. In pursuing this objective organisations 
will incrementally alter the institutions through which they operate (North 
1990, 73). Organisations benefit from two specific factors, namely tacit 
knowledge and repeated team play. T adt knowledge, unlike communicated 
knowledge, can only be developed through practical experience. And 
organisations benefit in competitive situations from devdoping routines and 
modes o f action that enable more effective coordination in the face o f limited 
rationality (North 1990, 74).
Entrepreneurs are the agents o f economic change. Changes boil down to two 
possibilities, namely changes in relative process or changes in consumer tastes. 
These can both bring about changes in bargaining power, and it is this as 
much as anything else that brings about changes in institutions, sometimes 
even formal political institutions (North 1990, 84). Although radical 
discontinuous change can occur, overwhelmingly institutional change is 
incremental (North 1990, 89).
One o f the major motivations behind North’s recent work is to develop a 
theory that, unlike his previous one, is able to explain the enduring differences 
in economic performance levels between countries. He believes that it is the 
nature o f institutional change that provides the explanation. Two factors 
dominate the paths o f institutional change. The first is path dependency, 
which is the situation where changes happen in a way that is contingent on 
what has gone before, not simply on what the future possibilities are. The 
second is the significant transaction costs present in imperfect markets (North 
1990, 95). One example of this is the adoption o f constitutions very similar to 
that of the United States in many countries in Latin America in the nineteenth 
century. However, because the enforcement mechanisms, and subjective 
models and norms o f actors were different, the outcomes o f the adoptions 
were very different from the United States (North 1990,101).
202
Underlying the success of the western world, North identifies three 
organisational innovations. The first were those that increased the mobility of 
capital, including bills o f exchange and accounting techniques for monitoring 
agents’ behaviour. The second were those that lowered the costs of 
information, such as printed price-sheets and technical commercial manuals. 
Thirdly, there were those that spread risk, such as insurance (North 1990, 
125). He also perpetuates the myth o f a distinctive legal doctrine for the law 
merchant as playing an important role in enforcement, through relying on 
merchants to determine accepted practice among themselves (North 1990, 
128).
North argues that his contribution is largely in providing an alternative to 
diometric economic history, which applies the neoclassical model to historical 
data. As he says: ‘Although the systematic application o f price theory to 
economic history was a major contribution, neoclassical theory is concerned 
with the allocation o f resources at a moment o f time, a devastatingly limiting 
feature to historians whose central question is to account for change over 
time’ (North 1990, 131). Indeed the only major body of economic theory to 
take institutions seriously is that o f Karl Marx, but that is problematic not 
least because it requires a fundamental change in human behaviour to bring 
about a utopian ending (North 1990, 132). North concludes with the 
observation that his own theory is far from comprehensive, at least because 
the serious study o f institutions is only beginning (North 1990,140).
5.1.5 New Institutional Economics and Observability
It is clear from the analysis just presented that many elements o f the 
commitment-credit model and its applications in previous chapters have been 
proposed previously, although not in the same specific form. The real claim 
to novelty of the model, and its improvement over the works considered in 
this section, is not in giving different weights to previously recognised factors, 
but in relation to the application of abstract models to making observable 
predictions.
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North and Thomas take an approach that looks very promising, and is in 
many ways similar to the overall approach taken here. Their conceptual 
framework, combining property rights and efficiency, is straightforwardly 
defined and tested. To some extent, because the work is not set out as a test 
o f predictions, it is more difficult to assess its success. For example, the 
attribution o f England’s success as due to intellectual property rights is not 
couched as a prediction, but as an explanation, although it is perhaps possible 
that it could have been predicted from the framework. The failure that North 
himself attributes to the work is that property rights are considered in terms 
of their costs and not their incentives, so although the framework survives 
testing, the logical model is under-specified.
In many ways the problem of the property rights approach as a whole is that 
identified by Atiyah (1979, 138). In offering legal recourse to enforcing 
contract rights, there is an implication that society can enable reasonable 
expectations to override property rights. One o f the reasons for the power of 
the commitment-credit model is that it recognises the central role of 
contracting over property rights in economic growth and development.
Although Coase’s work has been very influential, as an observable theory it is 
enormously problematic. There is a clearly and concisely defined conceptual 
framework, but, at least in Coase’s work itself, no testable prediction. A 
crucial reason for this is probably the problematic nature o f measuring costs, 
as section 4.1 highlighted in describing the evolution o f managerial 
accountability. Despite Coase’s contention that it is a complement, rather than 
a substitute, for the neoclassical model, transaction costs do perhaps explain 
why if the neoclassical model were testable it would quickly be falsified. As 
North wrote in a work between the two considered in detail in this chapter, ‘a 
neoclassical world would be a jungle and no society would be viable’ (North 
1981,11).
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Williamson, although ostensibly following the transaction cost tradition, in 
fact makes a considerable jump, by recognising the role o f incentives as well 
as costs, and in the process recognising the incompatibility with the 
neoclassical model that this implies. The introduction o f the notion o f asset 
specificity clearly recognises that investment or innovation goes hand in hand 
with uncertainty and cost, which is also the primary focus o f the 
commitment-credit model.
Having said this, the framework Williamson proposes is not really clearly 
defined. His objective, it is clear from the remainder o f the book, is policy 
recommendation, rather than any form of active observation. He explicitly 
recognises the weakness of observability, or measurement as he describes it, 
in his framework, but clearly sees this as a secondary issue. His conceptual 
framework does seem to be at a similar level o f complexity to the 
commitment-credit model presented here. However, his treatment o f benefits 
is largely limited to negative costs, and the role governance plays in shaping 
these.
North’s most recent approach, utilising a conceptual framework much closer 
to Williamson’s, but with an explicit focus on institutional logic, should be 
very promising. Unfortunately, it makes no real attempt to relate the 
framework to specific situations, and it is difficult to see any concise 
conceptual core. While North believes the weakness o f the work to be a lack 
of comprehensiveness, it is in fact a lack o f specificity. While his early work 
was essentially under-specified, he has now succumbed to the opposite 
temptation, trying to incorporate too many factors, all o f which no doubt play 
some role, but in the process fails to develop a coherent self-supporting 
logical framework.
Like the commitment-credit model, North’s work does have the considerable 
benefit however, over much of contemporary microeconomics, which 
focuses on the consequences o f imperfect information for small numbers of
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actors, that it is motivated to a large extent through a desire to explain long­
term economic development. That is, it focuses on the relations between 
individual economic actors, or at least on the effects o f many interactions of a 
particular form, and the economy as a whole. So in many ways this thesis is 
firmly embedded in the tradition o f new institutional economics, and in 
particular solves the main problems identified here with North’s most recent 
work.
While contracts and other commitment devices naturally and conventionally 
suggest a microeconomic approach, growth and financial markets are more 
conventionally considered from a macroeconomic, or whole economy 
perspective. So, while the commitment-credit model clearly deals with the 
microeconomic domain, it is to the macroeconomic domain we now turn, to 
enable an assessment of the contribution o f the commitment-credit model to 
be made that takes some account o f work in this area.
5.2 Keynesian Economics
The most successful twentieth century attempt to incorporate governance in 
some form direcdy into economics came from John Maynard Keynes’ work 
in the 1930s. This was clearly focused on a different level to the commitment- 
credit model, focusing on the role o f national governments in using public 
spending to stimulate economic activity in certain situations. In the process, 
Keynes largely created the distinction between microeconomics and 
macroeconomics, because while the neoclassical framework continues to 
dominate the teaching of economic analysis at the level of the firm and the 
consumer, it has largely been abandoned, or at least bypassed, at the level of 
the economy as a whole. Despite the differences between Keynes’ focus on 
aggregate measures for an economy as a whole, and the commitment-credit 
model’s focus on the systemic consequences o f the institutional factors 
experienced by individual people and firms, several o f the concepts
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introduced by Keynes do bear a similarity to those in the commitment-credit 
model.
But as well as the inherent interest in making these conceptual comparisons, a 
consideration o f the reasons for the success of the Keynesian model will 
provide a comparator against which some assessment can be made o f the 
potential contribution of the commitment-credit model to the economics 
discipline, which is the subject of the next chapter. Given the massive amount 
o f work extant on Keynesian economics, even a survey would be problematic, 
so it is not attempted. Instead the focus here is much more on preparing for 
the assessment o f the commitment-credit model and its contribution, by 
focusing more on what might be called the sociology o f the Keynesian 
revolution. That is, examining what it actually entailed at the level o f the 
economics profession, and to what extent it is possible to explain why it took 
place.
5.2.1 Theoretical Background to Keynes
According to Skidelsky (1992, 418), prior to Keynes’ publication o f his The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, the basic framework of 
economic theory, with no distinction between micro and macro, was that set 
out by Alfred Marshall in 1890 in his Principles of Economics. This was 
particularly so in Keynes’ base at Cambridge University, which was also 
Marshall’s home. Marshall’s contribution, and in many ways the reason for his 
subsequent role, was that he synthesised existing, and apparendy conflicting, 
alternative theoretical conceptions. Most important was his reconciliation of 
the classical theory of value with utility theory, and in particular the marginal 
utility formulation (Skidelsky 1983, 43). Also of importance was his 
reconciliation of Jevonian and Ricardian value theories, though this 
reconciliation was by pulling them apart, rather than bringing them together, 
which is possibly why Marshall’s insight in this case seems less powerful than 
the classical and utility case (Skidelsky 1992, 419).
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The classical theory of value, applied in almost identical ways by economists 
as diverse in other aspects of their work as Adam Smith and Karl Marx, holds 
that the value o f a good expressed as its price is fundamentally determined by 
the cost o f its component elements. Smith, for example, recognised that from 
time to time the price in the market may diverge from the production 
determined ‘natural price’ because of fluctuations in demand, but held that 
with competition the natural price would coincide with the market price 
(Blaug 1997, 38-43). Marx argued that concentration o f ownership o f capital 
prevented workers receiving the benefits of all the labour they put into a 
product, this being consumed by the capitalist class on non-essential, that is 
luxury, goods (Blaug 1997, 221-227). This theory o f value, made explicit to a 
greater or lesser extent, was that employed by many writers from the earliest 
times.
Then, in the early 1870s, three men introduced the principle o f diminishing 
marginal utility as the fundamental building block o f a formal economic 
model. William Stanley Jeavons in Manchester, Carl Menger in Vienna and 
Leon Walras in Lausanne came to this discovery by very different routes. The 
success o f this development was a consequence o f its relatively 
straightforward mathematical formalisation, and the amenability o f the 
formalisation to analysis using the differential calculus (Blaug 1997, 277-8). 
Utility itself was a concept developed by Jeremy Betham earlier in the century, 
as a way or formalising the process of deciding between conflicting choices 
faced by society.
While marginal utility theory addressed the issue of demand in a precise way, 
it had nothing to say on supply. The leading approach to the supply side was 
that o f David Ricardo, who at the beginning o f the nineteenth century had 
brought together what was in effect the first rigorous formulation of 
economic logic, largely to address the most contentious political issue o f his 
day, the British Com Laws. For Ricardo there were only three factors to 
consider, namely labour, land and capital. Land was given, and capital and
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labour were potentially augmentable. Ricardo’s insight was that less and less 
productive land would have capital and labour invested into it, up to the point 
where the value o f the crops harvested equalled the value o f the labour and 
capital input. For all the land more productive than this the landowner would 
be able to charge rent on the difference between value o f inputs and output. 
In this way the role of the margin, at least for the supply side, was introduced 
into economics.
Marshall’s achievement was to reconcile marginal utility and Ricardian supply, 
along Smithian lines, by proposing concurrent roles for marginal utility, in 
regulating demand, and for Ricardian supply. Both could operate in parallel, in 
such a way that equilibrium exists where the two effects balance. A key 
conceptual device in this reconciliation was the introduction o f distinct time 
periods. In particular, a ‘market period’ in which supply is fixed, a ‘short run’ 
in which productive capacity is fixed, but quantities can be varied, and the 
long run’ in which productive capacity can be augmented. Blaug also 
identifies a fourth period in Marshall’s thinking, where production techniques 
can be altered, though this was not made explicit. However, by largely 
ignoring this possibility, Marshall’s theory became one o f production and 
consumption, and in the process the primary concerns o f the classical 
economists, which Marshall also shared to some extent, became obscured 
(Blaug 1997, 278, 354). It is Marshall’s formulation that continues to provide 
the foundation for microeconomics.
Macroeconomics did exist to some extent before Keynes, or at least macro 
type questions were addressed. There was however little in the way of a 
coherent theory. The questions addressed were rather obscure, such as the 
degree o f ‘roundaboutness’ in the economy, the level o f hoarding and over­
indebtedness (Blaug 1997, 647). No connection was perceived between 
monetary policy and overall economic performance. The reason underlying 
this seems to have been the implicit assumption that the price mechanism was 
the most important economic phenomena, and prices would change far more
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quickly than quantities. In many ways it is a great irony that Smith’s work was 
contemporary with the industrial revolution, and perhaps most symbolically 
with Watt’s engine, and so was made obsolete while it was being written; then 
Marshall’s Principles were first published at the beginning o f the 1890s, when 
the mechanisms were almost in place that led to the great merger wave in the 
United States, creating a vastly different economy to that dealt with by his 
theory.
Keynes initial focus as an economist was monetary theory. Prior to his time, 
this was on the whole treated as a short run problem of disequilibrium. The 
issue was how monetary policy could stabilise the price level when outside 
fluctuations changed the equilibrium point (Blaug 1997, 616). Marshall in his 
Principles did not deal with this, and his approach was only published in book 
form in 1923, when Marshall was over 80. However, it was taught through 
‘oral tradition,’ augmented by published records o f Marshall’s evidence to 
government committees on monetary policy (Skidelsky 1992, 418). Wicksell, a 
contemporary o f Marshall’s, had addressed the issue o f interest rates, but 
Marshall largely ignored them, focusing instead simply on the level o f cash 
balance that each individual endeavoured to maintain to facilitate regular 
transactions (Blaug 1997, 618). However, before setting out Keynes’ 
innovations, it will be worthwhile to describe the broader economic 
environment in which he lived.
5.2.2 Historical Background to Keynes
The nineteen twenties saw very mixed economic experiences in Britain and 
the United States. In Britain, unemployment remained around ten percent for 
the whole decade, and by 1925 industrial production was fourteen percent 
below its level in 1913. In the United States production had in this time risen 
forty-eight percent. Until the crash of 1929 prosperity was widespread, helped 
by new goods such as electricity and automobiles being widely consumed 
(Backhouse 2002, 214). This all changed in the 1930s.
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Skidelsky describes Keynes as: ‘an applied economist who turned to inventing 
theory because the theory he inherited could not properly explain what was 
happening’ (Skidelsky 1992, 405). While this description fits his investigative 
style, it is not wholly consistent with the fact that his first major research 
project dealt with the abstract subject of probability theory. Although that was 
apparently inspired by what could be described as a practically driven 
problem, namely his determination to enlarge the scope o f individual 
judgement and narrow the concept of custom as the ‘guide to life’ (Skidelsky 
1992, 56). Perhaps it is better to say that he was a theoretician who was most 
inspired not by other’s theoretical work but by practical problems. Economics 
has never been short of significant practical problems, and in many ways 
Keynes’ economic theorising was inspired by the two most widely recognised 
problems of his lifetime, first of all the business cycle and then by 
unemployment (Skidelsky 1992, 318).
Up until the 1930s, unemployment was not seen as a problem in itself, but 
one o f adjustment to the constant ups and downs o f the business cycle, 
particularly from the 1890s to the 1920s. The problem was seen to be in the 
fluctuations, particularly as this was influenced by monetary policy. The 
problem was seen by many as one o f prices, and particularly the price of 
labour; in other words wages. However, by the 1930s the problem was 
starting to be perceived as one of the normal level o f unemployment 
(Skidelsky 1992, 318). In the US, industrial production, following the crash, 
quickly fell to half its level of 1929 and unemployment rose to over 25 
percent, and by 1936 had still not fallen below 15 percent. Other countries 
had a similar experience. In 1933 unemployment was at 26 percent in 
Germany, 27 percent in the Netherlands, 24 percent in Sweden, 33 percent in 
Norway and 21 percent in Britain (Backhouse 2002, 215).
Perhaps o f most direct relevance among the events preceding Keynes’ 
development of his General Theory, was the first tentative systematic 
development o f national economic statistics. Various estimates had been
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made from time to time, based on a variety of guesses and inferences from 
sources such as tax and census data. But only in the 1920s were the first 
systematic studies undertaken, first of all by the National Bureau o f Economic 
Research in the United States. The US government became directly involved 
with the onset o f the depression and its social and political consequences, and 
in June 1932 a Senate resolution committed the Bureau o f Foreign and 
Domestic Commerce (BFDC) to submit estimates o f national income for 
1929, 1930 and 1931 (Backhouse 2002, 241). At this early stage, there was 
little consensus on what data actually constituted national income. The BFDC 
produced two figures, one measuring the net product o f the whole economy, 
and another o f payments to those who produced the net product. A third 
estimate was produced by the Brookings Institute o f the sum of final 
products passed on to consumers and businesses. This latter figure was the 
first to be described as Gross National Product (Backhouse 2002,242).
In the United Kingdom, work got underway more slowly. Keynes was 
however able to draw in particular on the work o f Colin Clark. Figures were 
felt to be very politically sensitive. For example, the government denied the 
existence of the national income figures it calculated in 1929, because they 
estimated wages as being lower than other existing estimates. This even went 
to the extent that, according to Backhouse, despite Clark being appointed to 
the secretariat of the Economic Advisory Council in 1930, the Treasury 
refused to buy him an adding machine. Nevertheless, in 1932 Clark was able 
to produce figures for UK GNP, broken down into the categories of 
consumption, investment and government spending (Backhouse 2002,243).
5.2.3 Keynes* Theory
Keynes’ first major theoretical contribution to economics, A  Treatise on Money, 
was published in October 1930. Skidelsky characterises it as an attempt to 
theorise about economic instability, though in a pre-depression worldview, 
and drawing in particular on Britain’s experience in the 1920s. In line with the 
thinking o f the time, and the neoclassical view, the central problem was seen
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as adjusting to price changes, particularly when they are in a downward 
direction. Although agreeing with the diagnosis of the problem, Keynes broke 
with the neoclassical approach o f analysing everything in terms o f a static 
equilibrium. His central argument was that unlike the neoclassical model, 
saving and investment were not necessarily the same thing, in part because 
different people made decisions regarding saving and investment, and partly 
because, in a credit money economy, banking policy played an important role; 
but there was no mechanism to ensure that the quantity o f credit available 
was at a level required to keep saving and investment equal. By the end o f the 
seven years it had taken Keynes to write his Treatise however, he had come to 
believe that while monetary conditions reflected monetary fluctuations, 
because the fluctuations originated in the realm of business psychology this 
should be the real focus for investigation (Skidelsky 1992,314-5).
The General Theory of Employment\ Interest and Mony, published in February 1936, 
was Keynes’ attempt to reconcile the importance of psychology with the 
neoclassical framework. Despite the potential slipperiness o f observability of 
psychological factors, Keynes goes to great pains, and largely succeeds, in 
focusing on relationships between observables. The book itself, though 
holding an unassailable place at the head of the cannon of twentieth century 
economics, is as much about introducing a new way of thinking into 
economics, as it is about setting out a well defined theoretical framework. 
Indeed, its influence is because o f this, and illustrates that although rigorous 
logic has a key role to play in economics, any logical framework requires 
application and interpretation. And this in turn requires a less well defined, 
but nevertheless consistent and believable, way o f looking at the world of 
economic activity.
The richness o f the work has led to a plethora o f interpretation, but before 
examining some of these, five features will be set out that are identified by 
Blaug as the principal distinctive features o f Keynes’ theoretical framework. 
These concern the level o f analysis o f the theory, distinctions between stable
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and volatile aggregates, distinctions between saving and investment, interest 
rate determination and the relationship between wages and employment 
(Blaug 1997, 646).
Keynes’ level o f analysis involved a shift from his predecessors in several 
dimensions. None o f the new perspectives was fundamentally new, but each 
challenged important assumptions of the neoclassical model. It was for this 
reason that Keynes called his theory general, because he claimed that the 
neoclassical model made certain assumptions which he did not, and which did 
not correspond with the available evidence of economic activity, particularly 
when applied to an economy as a whole (Keynes 1936, xxxii). In this process, 
as previously mentioned, the primary shift was from what is now termed the 
micro to the macro perspective. Alongside this was the shift to the short-term 
equilibrium at the macro level. Although short-term equilibrium was the 
standard approach at the micro level, the macro level prior to Keynes was 
analysed in terms o f longer duration periods. However, while the micro 
perspective essentially considered all goods in an exchange as equivalent, 
Keynes introduced money into the basic exchange mechanism, with distinct 
characteristics from other goods. The final shift, and in many ways most 
revolutionary, was the recognition that prices were ‘sticky’ and variation of 
quantities could be at least as important as variations in prices.
A key link between investment and consumption was the concept o f the 
multiplier, introduced by Kahn in 1931. This arises from the fact that, when 
someone is paid to carry out activity as part of an investment, they will spend 
a proportion o f their earnings on goods produced by others, and save the 
remainder. The multiplier itself, the proportion o f the rise in total income 
compared to the initial investment, depends on the fraction o f income saved. 
Keynes suggested that as income rises, consumption rises, though by less than 
the full amount (Backhouse 2002, 231). While aggregate consumption and 
savings are stable functions o f income, investment is volatile. So, because of
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the multiplier, the volatility of investment means that overall income, and so 
consumption and savings, will be volatile too (Blaug 1997, 646).
To a large part the predicted instability is a consequence o f the observation 
that the people who make investment decisions are different from the people 
who make savings decisions. In principle, Keynes saw the level o f investment 
depending on the relationship between the expected return o f the investment 
and the rate o f interest. However, expectations are dogged by uncertainty. In 
theory, expectation should be evaluated over the lifetime o f the investment, 
which can be considerable. In practice, because o f the inherent uncertainty 
involved, the state o f confidence at any time will be the critical factor. The 
implication o f this, however, is that apparently minor changes in news can 
have significant changes in investment, because the current state is generally 
assumed to be that which will continue indefinitely. Instability is further 
increased when investment decisions are determined by speculators, because 
their decision criteria is not even the current situation, but the direction in 
which the market is moving in the short term. So any real world change is 
magnified considerably, resulting over time in great instability (Backhouse 
2002,230).
Although the role played by expectations leads to considerable instability, the 
interest rate does play an important role in investment decision-making. 
Keynes recognised that money is not limited in its role in .financing 
transactions; the role primarily assigned to it up until that time. It is also held 
as a store o f value. For example, when financial securities are falling in price 
they have a negative return, so cash is preferable. In general, this leads to the 
demand for money depending on the rate of interest. This is Keynes’ theory 
of liquidity preference. It makes clear that the rate of interest is not simply a 
way of connecting savings to investments (Backhouse 2002,231).
It is the combination of the three elements of the propensity to consume, the 
marginal efficiency o f investment, and liquidity preference that form a theory
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of output and employment. An equilibrium point will exist, and changes to 
the different factors have to be analysed in terms of the resulting change in 
equilibrium. For example, reducing wage rates will not increase employment, 
unless doing so raises the level of effective demand, and Keynes, after 
examining ways this could happen, concluded that this was unlikely. 
However, raising the money supply or reducing the rate o f interest would 
increase effective demand, and consequently increase output, and so 
employment (Backhouse 2002,231).
The description just set out o f Keynes’ general theory gives a conventional 
view of the central logic of Keynes argument. Skidelsky characterises the 
underlying motivation as being to provide a logic o f choice, not under 
scarcity, but under uncertainty* (Skidelsky 1992, 539). Yet the logic is only a 
part o f the picture Keynes paints. Skidelsky makes a distinction between the 
vision, the theory, and the model. The vision of investment in chapter twelve 
is different from the theory o f the investment process in chapter eleven, and 
the vision o f the rate o f interest introduced in chapter thirteen and developed 
in chapter seventeen is different from the formal statement of the theory in 
chapter fifteen (Skidelsky 1992, 540). Yet despite what could been seen as a 
rather confused picture, the impact of the book was unprecedented. Why did 
the book have the impact it did?
5.2.4 Keynes’ Impact
In September 1936, a few moths after the publication o f Keynes’ book, three 
papers were presented at a meeting of the Econometric Society in Oxford. 
Each presented an algebraic interpretation o f Keynes’ theory. O f the three, 
one, John Hicks’ paper, drew a diagram, which very quickly became the 
accepted way of teaching Keynesian theory, and in most cases was the way it 
was applied in practice (Blaug 1997, 668). Twelve years later, Samualson’s 
classic textbook, Economics: A n  Introductory Analysis, opened with a section on 
the determination of national income on Keynesian lines, and went on to
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become the most successful economics textbook of all time (Blaug 1997, 
643).
Hicks’ model, known as the IS-LM model, from the two lines that cross 
scissor-like inside the positive axis, provided a way of representing both 
Keynes new theory and the ‘classical’ theory. The paper, in which he 
published his model the next year, 1937, was in fact titled ‘Mr Keynes and the 
Classics: A suggested reinterpretation.’ The y-axis is labelled ‘rate o f interest’ 
and the x-axis, ‘income.’ Both the IS and LM lines represent sets of 
equilibrium points. The LM curve shows for combinations o f income and 
interest the point at which demand for money, that is liquidity (L), equals an 
exogenously given supply (M). The IS curve shows combinations o f interest 
and income at which saving (S) matches investment (I). The power o f Hicks 
formulation was its flexibility. Although the LM curve always slopes upwards 
and the IS downwards, with the LM curve almost vertical and the IS curve 
almost horizontal the graph represents the classical case, where there is a fixed 
money supply, and demand for money is a result of its use in transactions, 
largely determined by income. In contrast, with the IS curve almost vertical 
and the LM curve almost horizontal the graph represents Keynes’ perspective 
o f the 1930s, where demand for money is mainly determined by liquidity 
preference for holding money as a store of value, and investment and saving 
follow direcdy from income. Within these extremes a whole range of 
relationships can be shown and, at least in principle, can be found empirically, 
and so provide well-understood options for policymakers to take action, with 
supposedly predictable results.
While the impact on the economics profession was clearly apparent, it was 
less so on economic policymaking. Roosevelt’s New Deal had got underway 
with a vengeance immediately following his election victory in 1932, so it 
makes no sense to claim that it was a practical consequence o f Keynes’ 
theory. In fact, on the contrary, the acceptance o f Keynes theory, and its 
implication o f an active role for government in the management o f the
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economy as a whole, could well have benefited from the perceived success of 
Roosevelt’s programme. Skidelsky suggests that following the publication of 
Keynes’ book, and an enthusiastic welcome, particularly at Harvard, the 
recruitment o f young economists from there to Washington did perhaps play 
a role in reinvigorating a languishing programme (Skidelsky 1992, 580).
With the coming of war, in 1939, there was little time for policy based on 
Keynes’ work to take effect in peacetime. It was ideally placed though to 
provide the conceptual framework on which the western allies, at least, fought 
the war on the economic front. Hicks introduced the equation that has 
subsequently formed the basis o f national income accounting: GNP = C + I 
+  G  (national income equals consumption plus investment plus government 
expenditure). Meade and Stone strengthened the framework by introducing a 
form of presentation in double-entry terms. From 1941 the United States 
moved away from the Kuznets and Nathan framework, developed earlier in 
the 1930s, to the Keynesian Meade-Stone one. Subsequently this framework 
became adopted as an international standard (Backhouse 2002,244-5).
The availability o f figures that people were prepared to trust transformed the 
economic conduct of war. Keynes himself introduced the concept o f the 
inflationary gap, to calculate how much could be spent without causing 
inflation, and this was applied to the UK  government’s budget o f 1940. In the 
US, national income figures confirmed that Roosevelt’s Wictory Program’ of 
vast increases in military expenditure in 1942-3 was achievable; and it was 
achieved. The approach set feasible and realised targets that saw military 
procurement rise from 4 to 48 percent o f national income, over the course of 
just four years; a really quite astonishing achievement (Backhouse 2002, 291- 
2)-
It is easy to see why the experience of the New Deal and the war led to a 
belief that government economic planning along Keynesian lines could 
effectively tackle inequities and inefficiencies in any economy. In the 1960s
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the Kennedy administration in the US was explicit in its use o f a Keynesian 
approach to achieving full employment. The escalation o f the Vietnam War, 
through the 60s, was not planned however, and the resulting monetary 
expansion turned into rapidly rising inflation. 1973 saw a reduction in oil 
supplies by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, in an attempt 
to boost their income through a rise in prices. This, and the disruption to 
supplies as a result of Arab Israeli war in the Middle East, led to an acute 
shortage of oil. Oil exporters were suddenly receiving more money than they 
could spend, with the corresponding consequence o f reducing demand in oil 
importing countries. Inflation and unemployment began to rise 
simultaneously, leaving Keynesian approaches helpless, as rising 
unemployment suggested increasing spending, but raising inflation suggested 
reducing spending. The Keynesian consensus had clearly broken down by the 
end o f the 1970s (Backhouse 2002, 295). The only available competitor was 
monetarism, which saw control of the money supply as the only policy 
instrument necessary for, and capable of, managing a successful economy. 
But by the end o f the 1980s that had failed too. The 1990s did not see 
economic theorists providing any clearly visible help to the most serious 
economic problems of that decade, including the transition from communist 
central planning in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and the reverse rather than 
acceleration o f development in Sub-Saharan Africa. While Western Europe 
and North America continue to thrive economically, few o f the people who 
work in the economy, or the politicians who take the major policy decisions, 
have studied economic theory, so there is no reason for it to have any part in 
that success. In the transition and developing countries, where economists are 
more widely employed in influential positions, economic success is elusive. 
This is despite economic growth being a major area for contemporary 
economic enquiry. There is therefore little evidence that the Cambridge 
combination o f Marshallian microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics 
capture in a meaningful way the logic of successful western economies.
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5.2.5 Keynesian Economics and Observability
From the above analysis, it is clear that more than anything else, Keynes’ 
theoretical framework was successful for two reasons. Firstly, that is was open 
to a straightforward algebraic and geometric interpretation, and secondly that 
it suggested an approach to economic policy that was in line with the 
contemporary New Deal and wartime experiences o f economic policymakers, 
many of whom were ‘called up’ to serve for a limited time, before returning to 
their academic posts.
Keynes himself was probably more conscious o f the need for concise 
frameworks that could be subject to testing, than were his promoters and 
successors. His concern with measurable properties was to enable his theory 
to be tested. He did, however, value numerically measurable properties over 
simply observable ones. While it is arguably better for predicted observations 
to be measured on a numerical scale, modem molecular biology shows that it 
is far from a necessity.
The appeal o f Keynes’ theory to the economics profession clearly arose from 
the ease with which it could be taught to students, and its apparent success in 
guiding policy. This illustrates a similar weakness as institutional economics, 
where although the profession is keen to promote economics as a scientific 
discipline, there is a ‘rush to policy.’ Rather than subject theories to empirical 
test, the profession values the statement of ‘obvious’ principles with perhaps 
not so obvious consequences, but ones that nevertheless are promoted as 
beneficial policy recommendations.
In many ways, Keynes’ analysis has stood the test o f time as an explanation of 
many economic phenomena. It is however clearly not the whole o f the story. 
Indeed, while aggregate measures o f the economy are useful indicators, by 
their very nature they are very blunt instruments through which to implement 
economic policy. As is recognised particularly in the ‘new classical 
macroeconomics,’ they say little about the microeconomic level where
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interactions actually take place. So, while providing a useful model o f the 
interrelationship between aggregate measures, it has little to say about how 
micro level activity would lead to different macro outcomes. In other words, 
its ability to make predictions in particular situations is inherently limited.
The analysis o f Keynes’ work also suggests however that, while ease o f 
teaching and apparent policy relevance are important for professional 
acceptance, they are not the whole story. Issues such as the type of 
phenomena that are worthy o f attention, and the specific problems that are 
susceptible to observation and explanation, are in practice as important as the 
scientific logic o f the work itself in determining its reception and ultimate 
contribution. So, as we move in the next chapter to assessing the contribution 
o f the commitment-credit theory, it will be worthwhile to take into account 
work aimed at understanding the nature of scientific progress in general.
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C h a p t e r  S i x
THEORY IN PRACTICE
This final chapter has the task of assessing the theoretical and practical 
contribution of the commitment-credit model and its tests, set out in the first 
four chapters, and compared with previous work, as set out in the previous 
chapter. Chapter one set out the commitment-credit model and argued that 
governance was an important but overlooked issue that fell between 
economics and management. The model made specific predictions, which 
were then tested out in the subsequent three chapters, and confirmed. The 
previous chapter described two other attempts to incorporate governance into 
economic analysis, which have received a considerable amount o f attention, 
although neither o f them has been particularly successful from a scientific 
perspective.
It is my contention that most contemporary economists, particularly those 
who work at the microeconomic level, have lost touch with economic reality 
in their pursuit o f ever more sophisticated mathematical models, with litde 
regard for the important practical problems that good theory could help to 
address. A growing body if literature such as (Mirowski 1989; Weintraub 
2002) provides a detailed intellectual history o f this process. The aim of this 
project, however, has not been to provide an intellectual history, or even a 
direct critique of contemporary work. Instead, it proposes an alternative, or at 
least suggests a possible direction along which a better alternative could in 
time be developed. The limitations of North and Williamson’s work, 
alongside its continuing appeal, suggest that a theoretical framework that 
combines a ready applicability to practical questions, with a concise and 
coherent conceptual core is not such an easy thing to do. Nevertheless, some 
coherent way of assessing the contribution o f the commitment-credit model
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needs to be chosen. The approach taken here is to use well-established 
frameworks from the philosophy of science to compare the commitment- 
credit model and existing alternatives.
6.1 Scientific Method
The initial motivation for this project, set out in the first chapter, was o f the 
need for a theoretical approach that helped address serious practical 
problems, and in particular, one that took into account increasingly common 
observations regarding the important role of governance in economic activity. 
The crucial role o f observation in this motivation, and in the relative weight 
subsequently to be given to it, was said to suggest that this made it a more 
scientific approach.
There may be the tendency on the part of some to browse through economic 
journals and conclude that, because the articles are awash with mathematical 
symbols, it must be a scientific discipline. This would o f course be a serious 
mistake. Since the origins of human history mankind has displayed a need and 
a facility for abstract reasoning. The ancient origins of astrology and alchemy, 
alongside their continuing appeal to some, testify to this. Symbols and 
abstract relationships pervade their study. Metaphysics has a much longer 
history than physics, but it is not abstraction alone that confers scientific 
status. Indeed, the difference between science and metaphysics is not in 
theoretical abstraction but in its tie to reality, and its ability to, not necessarily 
without resistance, jettison cherished beliefs if the evidence demands it. 
Maybe in a bid to escape what they see as the woolly reasoning o f other social 
sciences, economists are in danger of ditching not just the social, but the 
scientific as well.
The claim that the commitment-credit model is more scientific than much of 
contemporary economics may seem strange. Although the correlation 
between mathematics and science held good for the nineteenth and first half 
o f the twentieth centuries, the recent success o f molecular biology, using
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chemistry as its logical foundation, shows that the connection is not a 
necessity. But if mathematical logic is not what qualifies a discipline as 
scientific, what is? This is the question to which we now turn.
6.1.1 Underlying Thesis: Science is Observation before Formalisation
Beyond looking for a way to incorporate governance into economic models, 
the thesis that underlies the specific model presented here is that scientific 
progress relies on active observation, and that perhaps the most significant 
failing o f neoclassical economics is the readiness o f its practitioners to 
propose practical solutions to imagined economic problems, rather than 
concentrate on explaining observations, of both success and failure. 
Economists delight in taking ‘self evident’ propositions and using these to 
work out the inevitable consequences of particular policy choices, for either 
business firms or governments, in terms suggested by the theoretical 
framework.
On the contrary, society only benefits from economic theory when 
economists have developed well understood, and tried and tested, logical 
relationships. It will not be for economists, as scientists, to propose specific 
solutions, in much the same way that chemists do not prescribe drugs, 
physicians do, and pharmacists dispense them; because while chemists can 
predict with increasing certainty how particular molecules will interact, 
identifying which drugs can tackle the observed symptoms and whether the 
side effects will outweigh the benefits is a separate profession, where bedside 
manner is as important as scientific knowledge. Managers and politicians are 
the professions that should apply economic knowledge, because their training 
allows them to recognise relevant symptoms and administer treatment in an 
effective manner. It may be stretching the analogy too far, but maybe lawyers 
and accountants perform the role of pharmacists in business and political 
situations, by ensuring that to the greatest extent possible unintended 
interactions between policies are avoided, as well as avoiding the worst cases 
o f incompetence or negligence in prescribing.
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The birth o f modem science is often traced to Francis Bacon, and his careful 
description o f natural phenomena. It is the subsequent interaction between 
logical explanation and careful observation that produced progress in science, 
and an unprecedented, and still to some awesome, capability o f mankind to 
understand much of its natural environment, and sometimes the ability to 
control it in some ways. Useful scientific principles such as the relationship 
between force and acceleration and the role of DNA in the lifecycle of the 
cell were far from obvious before looking at the world from a certain 
perspective made them obvious, and enormously useful. There is little role for 
passive observation. Physical and biological scientists devote huge amounts of 
time and thought, and increasingly money, to achieve a novel observational 
perspective.
The classic paradigmatic scientific activity is the experiment. Experiments on 
animals are increasingly problematic, as are behavioural experiments on 
people. More widespread social experimentation, and particularly economic 
experiments on real businesses and nation states are clearly very problematic, 
to the extent that this can be cited as the major difference between social and 
natural sciences. But it is in the creation of new observational opportunities 
that science makes progress. Even new theories do not become important 
because they are elegant and sophisticated logical constructions, but because 
they predict otherwise unexpected observations, and sometimes this means 
that they ‘only5 explain existing observations, albeit ones that were previously 
puzzling. In particular, scientists seek to explain both successes and failures, 
and it is a theory’s power to do both that gives it credibility.
Neoclassical economic theory explains neither success nor failure, at least in 
part because on the whole its practitioners seek not to explain but to 
prescribe. The commitment-credit model presented here can explain both, 
and in particular explains the extraordinary phenomena o f economic growth, 
which has released mankind from most o f its previous travails and, in 
providing the resources for scientific progress, has made tremendous strides
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in relieving the tedium and grind of hard physical work, and the ravages o f 
many diseases. Maybe the failure of the neoclassical approach is a result o f 
focusing on science as theorizing, rather than as experiment. The relationship 
between theory and experiment is not straightforward to untangle, but that is 
the next task.
6.1.2 Popper’s Scientific Logic of Falsification
Karl Popper provided what is generally taken to be the definitive analysis o f 
the internal logic o f the scientific method. Others have discussed other 
aspects o f scientific activity, and will be considered to some extent 
subsequently. However, as the first issue at hand is the internal logic o f 
scientific method, Popper’s analysis is presented first. In his view, ‘A theory is 
a tool which we test by applying it, and which we judge as to its fitness by the 
results o f its applications’ (Popper 1959, 108). Popper’s analysis will now be 
set out in some detail, before considering how this applies to the comparison 
between the neoclassical and commitment-credit models.
The starting point for scientific enquiry is the theory or model. How it came 
about is not a scientific question, it is how it stands up to testing that is the 
scientific issue (Popper 1959, 31). To be able to test a theory it is important to 
make the distinction between ‘universal statements’ and ‘singular statements’ 
(Popper 1959, 60). Science as an activity is about the search for ‘universal 
statements,’ which are general statements, though it proceeds by making 
predictions regarding ‘singular statements.’ The two types o f statement are 
distinct and do not overlap. It is never possible to use singular statements to 
verify universal statements, partly because it is always possible to either 
dismiss the specific statement as wrong or add an extra condition to the 
universal statement. In addition, in terms of formal logic it is also impossible 
to move from a statement of existence to one o f universal applicability. 
However, a statement of universality can be shown to be untrue through the 
truth o f a singular statement that the universal statement excludes as a 
possibility (Popper 1959, 41). This applies even when the universal statement
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is that something exists, because one could hypothesise its opposite, by saying 
that the opposite exists nowhere, which cannot be verified but can be falsified 
(Popper 1959, 70).
It is because the only logical relationship between universal statements and 
basic statements is this one o f falsification that this is the focus o f the 
scientific method. It is this that distinguishes science from other speculative 
activities, and this translates to the central scientific activity o f putting theories 
to the test. While universal statements and the relationship between basic and 
universal statements are logical statements that can only be disputed on the 
basis o f logical reasoning, basic statements are an intersubjective concept 
(Popper 1959,104). What constitutes an effective test o f a basic statement can 
never be incontrovertible, because there is always the opportunity to dismiss a 
particular test on the basis that it was not doing what it claimed, or that other 
factors were more important in bringing about the observations in which it 
resulted. For this reason, repeatability is an important characteristic o f a 
scientific test, although even with this the acceptance o f the validity o f a 
particular test is always a collective judgement of the people involved in the 
discipline.
Popper identifies four possible logical ways that the basic statements that are 
consistent with the universal statement of a theory can be subjected to testing, 
and these form the basis on which theories can be compared. They are: logical 
comparison o f basic statements among themselves; determination o f logical 
form to determine whether the theory is empirical scientific or tautological; 
comparison with basic statements consistent with other theories; and 
empirical testing of a statement (Popper 1959, 32-33). The first two are clearly 
internal to the theory itself. The first involves comparing basic statements 
consistent with the theory to see if they are mutually compatible. Clearly, 
where a theory suggests both that one test will confirm a theory, and also that 
the opposite result o f the test would also confirm the theory, the theory is not 
empirically falsifiable, and needs modification. The second test is whether the
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theory has any basic statement the result of which could lead to the 
falsification o f the theory; if it does not it is then just a metaphysical theory 
and not a scientific theory. The second pair of tests allows theories to be 
compared. Given two self-consistent scientific theories one can compare the 
basic statements that could lead to the falsification o f the theory. It may be 
that these basic statements are not compatible, or it may be that the basic 
statements lead to the same tests. Clearly, what is sought is a basic statement 
which can be tested in such a way that its results will lead to the falsification 
o f either one theory or the other. Finally, of course, a theory can be tested 
through empirical application. In general these tests will be most productive if 
they are directly comparing theories, but this may not always be possible.
Because it is testing that is central to the scientific method, it is falsification 
not formalisation that is the distinguishing feature of scientific theories. 
Clearly the theories need to be formulated sufficiendy definitively and clearly 
for the introduction of additional assumptions to be recognisable (Popper 
1959, 71), otherwise it will be difficult to bring about agreement on what 
constitutes a testable basic statement. And it also follows that the more 
opportunities for falsification the better the theory (Popper 1959, 113). So 
given two theories, one o f which implies all the basic statements o f the other 
and others in addition, it is the one with the additional basic statements that 
should be the focus of attention. While these statements remain unfalsified it 
is clearly the better theory. But even if these basic statements prove to be false 
on testing, by making the falsifying results special cases it will still have more 
falsifiable statements, and so be better from a scientific point o f view. Within 
theories that are broadly equivalent in the extent to which they can be 
falsified, it is the higher the degree of universality and the higher the level of 
precision the better (Popper 1959,122).
From the logic set out above, it follows that scientific progress is made 
through the postulation of theories that claim to have a higher standard of 
falsification than existing theories. Even when a particular theory is falsified, it
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is always possible to modify it by adding an extra condition that will lead to a 
basic statement compatible with the outcome o f the test that falsified its 
simpler predecessor. In developing basic statements that will test the theory, it 
follows that the focus should be on falsification, rather than confirmation, of 
the theory. It is this dynamic o f postulating theories and then testing them 
until they are falsified, then reformulating the theories, that distinguishes a 
scientific discipline from scholarly or metaphysical ones.
It therefore follows that to determine the extent to which the commitment- 
credit model is better, as a scientific theory, than neoclassical theory, and in 
particular neoclassical partial equilibrium theory, it is necessary to compare 
them in terms o f their falsifiability. So the next task is to establish the 
falsifiability o f the neoclassical theory. After that the two theories can be 
compared in these terms.
6.1.3 Neoclassical Falsification
Why choose the neoclassical partial equilibrium model, when it is only one 
among a whole raft o f economic models that could be applied in any given 
situation? Primarily because it is the first model that is taught in conventional 
economics classes, so even if it is left behind by the time people emerge as 
qualified economists, it is one of the most important, if not the most 
important, in the underlying conceptualisation they develop o f their subject.
So what is the neoclassical partial equilibrium model? It claims to establish the 
relationship between seven concepts, namely price, demand quantity, supply 
quantity, cost, utility o f consumption, short and long run, and production 
scale. It is perhaps one o f the distinguishing features of this theory that it can 
be expressed in both formal mathematical terms and in more intuitive forms 
requiring less previous education. Any mainstream textbook will provide a 
very similar development of the relationship between these concepts and 
demonstrate that, for example, in the short-run a producer should supply the 
quantity at which the marginal revenue, defined as price at which the next unit
229
of supply can be sold, is equal to the cost of producing one extra unit o f 
supply in the short run. This is subject to the condition that the price at least 
equals the short-run average variable cost at that output level. Some recent 
textbooks are (Fischer, Dombusch et al. 1988; Mansfield 1994; Hyman 1997; 
Colander 1998; McConnell and Bme 1999). This is the theory originally 
developed by Marshall, the context o f which was set out in section 5.2.
This is clearly a concise and precise formulation, it is moreover one where 
the concepts appear to be able to be applied through the measurement o f a 
single quantity. This obviously adds to the pedagogical appeal of the model as 
students can be given quantitative data in a form that fits easily into this 
theoretical framework, and asked to carry out analyses within the terms o f the 
theory that lead to precise quantitative answer, which certainly makes marking 
more straightforward and less subject to the personal judgment o f the marker. 
But this is not what makes a subject a science. As Popper’s analysis clearly 
demonstrates the criterion on which a scientific theory needs to be judged is 
to what extent is it subject to falsification.
Our suspicions are perhaps aroused when the first classes in economics are 
compared with those in, for example, physics or biology. In physics, for 
example, early subjects studied may be Newtonian mechanics or optics. 
Simple experiments are carried out, and numerical calculations are easily made 
to establish the relationship between different measurements, for example 
force and acceleration, or the angle of incidence and the angle o f reflection. It 
may well come over to the students at this stage that theories are constructed 
by generalising from particular measurements and that this is how science 
progresses, but nevertheless the intimate relationship between theory and 
practice is central to the educational process from the very beginning. Biology 
is in many ways a more interesting example than physics. Unlike physics, 
modem biology has a central unifying concept, albeit one not as susceptible to 
quantitative measurement, namely the cell. Again, students use microscopes 
to examine a variety of animal and plant material and satisfy themselves as to
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the veracity of the claimed role o f the cell. Any science teacher worth their salt 
will communicate that it is each student’s responsibility to satisfy themselves 
o f the applicability o f the theories they are presented with. In no way should 
they accept what they are told simply on the say so o f their teacher, or some 
obscure reference to ‘common sense’ or ‘everyday experience’.
Economics is taught differently. While there are a huge variety o f economic 
statistics widely available, and one would imagine it is not that difficult to 
construct, albeit contrived, exercises of stimulated economic activity, or even 
some data collection from sources readily at hand such as local shops, 
economics proceeds from asserting the obviousness and importance o f the 
partial equilibrium framework described above. The central concepts o f the 
partial equilibrium framework appear quantifiable, but are they measurable? 
Because without measurability there can be no falsifiability.
Price is the one easily measured quantity, all the others are problematic, and 
particularly problematic is cost. It is possible to define the other concepts in a 
way that is measurable, although further assumptions have to be brought in to 
operationalise them, so it is not necessarily the core concepts that are being 
subjected to empirical testing. No methods of directly observing demand and 
supply quantity schedules are routinely described. Utility o f consumption can 
conceivably be specified as an order of preferences for an extra unit of 
consumption given an existing consumption pattern, but becomes 
unmanageably complex beyond this. Both short and long run, and production 
scale, relate to measurable quantities of time and output, but in quite what 
way it is impossible to operationalise. Cost is a clearly understandable concept, 
but it proves fiendishly difficult to measure definitively even in the simplest 
situations, as the problems grappled with by early accountants described in 
section 4.1 demonstrate. So, with price as the only observable quantity dealt 
with in the neoclassical partial-equilibrium model, it is impossible to construct 
any falsifiable theory; because that would require the existence o f at least one 
other observable quantity for there to be a relationship between them to test.
231
Given that it is so problematic to falsify the neoclassical partial equilibrium 
model, it is therefore questionable to what extent it can be considered a 
scientific theory. This is not to say that other, widely taught, economic 
theories cannot be considered falsifiable. But given the central role o f this 
model in most economists’ education, and the fact that it remains the core of 
early economics teaching, and no other models have anything like comparable 
claims made as to the pervasiveness of their applicability, it is difficult to 
consider economics, as it currendy stands, a scientific discipline.
It would seem that it should not be that difficult for a model to be better as a 
scientific theory than the neoclassical partial equilibrium-model. However, the 
lack o f models that claim this status, and the enduring appeal o f the partial- 
equilibrium model, suggests that finding an economic model, and a 
microeconomic model in particular, that can be considered in any meaningful 
way scientific, is a considerable challenge. It is this challenge that the 
commitment-credit model claims to have met. The next task is to establish 
the extent to which it can be considered falsifiable.
6.1.4 Commitment-Credit Model Falsifiability
So, what are the key observable conceptualisations in the commitment-credit 
model, and to what extent are they open to falsification? Falsification is a 
combination o f two elements, namely clarity and observability. Without clarity 
it will be very difficult to determine whether or not a statement can be said to 
be consistent with the empirical evidence. This is the weakness o f many 
alternatives to the neoclassical model, including that o f North. They deal in 
several different concepts and relationships, but in any given situation it is 
difficult to determine how any basic statement would not apply. This clearly 
makes falsification difficult, which in turn makes the theory of questionable 
scientific value.
The outstanding characteristic o f the neoclassical model is its clarity. The 
problem set out above, however, concerns the extent to which the concepts it
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deals with can be linked with empirical observations. It should be apparent 
that the commitment-credit model being tested here is clear, although perhaps 
not to the same extent as the neoclassical model. This however is not 
sufficient for a theory to be scientifically useful. It is the observability o f the 
concepts that the theory deals with that is where this theory can be considered 
superior to the neoclassical model.
The remainder o f this subsection sets out how each concept defined in the 
commitment-credit model can be related to empirical observations. The key 
concepts are innovation, consumption available to be forgone as investment, 
a credible contracting environment, a financial market for allocating forgone 
consumption to innovators able to make credible contracts, output growth, 
the growth o f single economic units, growth in the variety o f investment 
vehicles and, within overall output growth, a cycle in the rate. Each o f these 
will be considered in turn.
Innovation, or at least innovative capacity, is taken to be a given, and is 
qualitatively observable in the pervasive human characteristic o f producing 
tools to make productive activity easier. It is also possible to conceive of 
measures of the rate of innovation, although this was not pursued in this 
study. In many ways this is the psychological principle underlying the 
economic model here, and to the extent that human cognitive capacity is 
measured through determining the rate at which abstract problems can be 
solved it is clearly observable. It follows from this that it is the limitation on 
rationality and information availability that is the foundation o f this theory, 
while neoclassical theory starts with the opposite assumptions and treats 
situations where these are violated as special cases.
Maximum potential saving is the difference between maximum consumption 
possible and the minimum in material necessities to sustain life and current 
level o f production. From this definition it is clear that saving potential exists
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in most societies most of the time. In monetary economies this can be 
measured numerically.
A credible contracting environment is something that is difficult to quantify, 
but it is in many ways the central argument of this thesis that it is observable, 
and acts as a predictor of economic performance. While the role of 
innovation and saving in economic activity is widely accepted, the central role 
given in the commitment-credit model to a credible contracting environment 
is not. Much as the role o f the cell in biological organisms is not at first clear, 
and needs the appropriate apparatus and expectation to become observable, 
so it is with the credible contracting environment. Further work may be able 
to identify specific consequences o f particular elements of credible 
contracting environments.
Financial markets are both observable and quantifiable. In particular they 
introduce into the model two concepts widely recognised to be important to 
economic activity, and central to macroeconomics, but absent from 
microeconomic models, namely money and interest rates. While money can 
have a role in simply facilitating exchange, its great asset is its ability to be 
used as a claim on resources invested in future production, to an extent that 
more than compensates for the forgone conception plus additional 
consumption opportunities paid as interest to the saver who forwent 
consumption. In this way it can be conceived o f as the original financial 
derivative. In a monetary economy with extensive division o f labour, both the 
quantity o f saving and rates of interest can be measured numerically.
Output growth is both observable and quantifiable. In a money economy 
output is exchanged for money, so measuring monetary income is essentially 
the same as measuring output, and the growth in this, corrected for the 
general rise in the price level through inflation, is relatively straightforward to 
calculate. One slight caveat is that a competitive environment means that 
improvements in the quality or performance o f the output may not always be
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reflected in prices, and so in increases in income. Historically this does not 
seem in general to have been a significant effect, and to some extent it can be 
corrected for.
The growth o f single economic units is both observable and quantifiable. At 
this stage this is mainly in the form of the characteristic properties o f the 
industrial revolution and the managerial revolution respectively, namely the 
factory system and the large corporation. However, by bringing this 
observation to attention, further work may enable more systematic analysis 
and further refinement to the theory.
The growth in the variety o f investment vehicles is observable, but more 
problematic to quantify. Each individual type o f contract that varies in any 
way can be considered distinct, but that is not so much the sense o f this 
concept, rather it is the sharing o f risk and return between different parties 
and in different ways. Contemporary empirical financial research on this 
trade-off may enable this aspect of the theory to be refined relatively 
straightforwardly.
Cycles are both observable and quantifiable. They essentially follow from 
shorter-term variations in output growth within the longer-term trend. 
Distinguishing between short term and long term absolutely is as problematic 
here as in the neoclassical model. However, because this is an observable 
consequence o f the model, rather than a condition predicting distinct 
outcomes, in practice it is not nearly so problematic. The business cycle is a 
well-established topic o f investigation, so may make further elaboration only a 
case o f analysing available data, although for the product cycle this is less the 
case.
This brief summary has shown that all of the central concepts dealt with in 
the theory can be straightforwardly related to relatively easily observable 
empirical facts. So while the neoclassical model only has one such concept, 
namely price, and cannot have any easily testable statements constructed
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about it, this does not apply to the commitment-credit model. Because all the 
primary concepts are straightforwardly related to specific observables, any 
logical relationships that the theory implies can be subject to test Therefore 
the commitment-credit theory is falsifiable, and so a better scientific theory 
than the neoclassical one.
6.1.5 Distinguishing Historicism and Historical Data
There are also two potential problems with using the historical approach 
taken here, though neither o f them turns out to be serious. It is however 
worthwhile to consider them briefly, before moving on to the more general 
question of the practical distinctiveness o f the scientific method, and the 
consequences o f this for the contribution of the commitment-credit theory. 
The first potential problem is the danger that Popper primarily addresses in 
The Poverty of Historicism. It is attempting to use science to predict the future of 
society. The second potential problem, which Popper also considers, is using 
empirical data from one epoch to explain experience in another. Both will 
now be considered in more detail.
Popper defines historicism as the social science that assumes that historical 
prediction is its principal aim, through discovering the laws and trends that 
underlie historical evolution (Popper 1961, 3). Alongside this goes the belief 
that immediate social relations do not necessarily take the same form in 
different historical epochs, to such an extent that it is impossible to predict 
them. What historicism does however suggest is that there are universally 
valid laws that link together historical epochs. Popper suggests however, that 
this almost certainly overrates differences between epochs. Moreover, most 
problematic with this as a proposition is that the distinction between epochs 
is not something that can be open to testing in specific cases (Popper 1961, 
92).
Unfortunately, another problem that has followed from historidst work is the 
confusion that has developed between historidsm and holism. Because
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historicism assumes that social systems can only be studied as complete 
wholes, it has taken some comfort from developments in holism and areas of 
study such as Gestalt psychology, which investigates how people perceive 
whole objects, rather than their individual elements. Some historicists even 
refer to alternative approaches as atomistic, on the basis that they treat 
individuals with no reference to the society that they inhabit. Yet this is a 
perverse criticism, and can only be rhetorical, because even atomic physics is 
actually primarily concerned with the relationships between individual 
particles (Popper 1961, 76).
Popper further criticises the confusion within historicism between laws and 
trends. Laws are abstract generalisations independent o f any specific situation, 
while trends are observed empirical relationships. Trends refute laws but, as 
between any abstract theory and empirical result, this is the only possible 
connection (Popper 1961, 106). One particularly problematic consequence of 
the historicist position is that it is impossible to predict the effects o f small 
changes, and it is only possible in practice to influence society by accelerating 
or slowing down large-scale social trends. This has particularly serious 
consequences, because large-scale change is always problematic. N ot the least 
reason for this is that, when big mistakes occur, they are very difficult to learn 
from, in part because the impact of different elements is difficult to assess. 
The most serious problem in practice however is that, because o f the many 
people involved, any attempt at dispassionate assessment will almost 
inevitably be impossible because particular conclusions could have significant 
effects on the whole careers of particular people (Popper 1961, 81).
However, while historicism is deeply problematic, Popper does see an 
important role for historical evidence in social science. Because, while he 
disputes scientific justifications for any call for large-scale changes such as 
those advocated by historicism, and historicists dispute the possibility o f any 
enduring generalisation regarding small-scale social phenomena, for Popper it 
is because o f the continuing need for small-scale reforms that social science
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has value. Because, while it is never possible to predict with absolute certainty 
what the outcome of any institutional reform will be, he does not doubt that 
there are general principles that impose restrictions on what is possible, and 
these are open to discovery. And this process o f discovery benefits 
enormously from historical experience. So he characterises his position as 
being anti-historidst, but not anti-historical (Popper 1961, 41). He points out 
that this corresponds to the situation in the physical sciences, where despite 
extremely predse theories, there is still a very limited degree o f predictability 
in any concrete situation in the physical world. Although experiments can be 
contrived, these are very artificial situations (Popper 1961, 129). One 
consequence o f this, not expliddy pointed out by Popper, is that very 
particular historical situations will need to be selected when seeking to test 
spedfic sodal scientific theories, but this is no different to the very particular 
situations created in the laboratory.
Unlike the laws o f historical evolution sought by historidsts, sdentific 
theories logically apply universally, in time and in space, because they are o f an 
abstract nature; it is in their nature that they are never said to apply only to 
one particular time period. Although even physical laws could always be 
stated with the condition that they only apply to the present cosmological 
period, Popper believes that doing this would demonstrate a 
misunderstanding of the logical nature of sdentific theories (Popper 1961, 
94). This does not deny that there may be reasons why theories need to be 
modified to take account of changes between historical epochs, but the 
scientific approach is to test the application of theories to particular epochs 
(Popper 1961, 87). Indeed, the differences in sodal conventions that exist in 
different geographical regions make it dear that there is a limitation in testing 
any social theory in just one region or time period that must be recognised, 
and this does not make the theory less true, it simply means that in different 
conditions one must expect at least the possibility of different consequences 
(Popper 1961, 91).
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From this analysis, Popper draws implications for history and economics. 
While historicists present an interpretation of history, such as ‘all history is the 
history o f class struggle’ they make too strong a claim for their theories. In 
contrast, what he terms ‘classical historians,’ have often erred in the other 
direction and, although they have necessarily adopted points of view, this may 
not always have been realised. The solution Popper advocates is that points of 
view should be expliddy adopted, although these points o f view may or may 
not amount to a theory (Popper 1961, 140). Interestingly, given the analysis 
previously in this chapter, Popper believes that the success o f mathematical 
economics shows that it has ‘gone through its Newtonian revolution’ (Popper 
1961, 54). Perhaps this can be put down to the apparent success o f the 
Keynesian approach to macroeconomics at the time the book was written, 
though it may also be that in practice things are not as simple, or at least as 
logically dear, as Popper would like them to be.
The original targets o f Popper’s argument were Marxist social sdentists. It is 
in many ways ironic that from a contemporary perspective it is in fact 
neodassidsm, and its political twin neoliberalism, that are now the most 
popular historidst approaches to social phenomena. For these free 
marketeers, every spedfic situation is too difficult and unpredictable to 
intervene in. To modem historidst ideology, all that can be done is accelerate 
progress towards state-free all-market nirvana.
From a legal perspective, Atiyah sees the idea of market equilibrium price as 
practically equivalent to the medieval idea of the just price (Atiyah 1979, 63). 
It is a worthy concept in practice, but one that can never be legally, or 
empirically, determined.
In reality, economic phenomena need to be approached sdentifically because 
there is no free-market nirvana. A sdentific approach is needed to economics 
because future consequences of current changes matter, and because
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institutional innovation can bring benefits, but there needs to be some way to 
asses what likely future impacts are, although one can never expect certainty.
In terms of the commitment-credit theory, it is clear that it is not a historicist 
approach. Although the evidence used to test it is presented as a large-scale 
historical development, there is no claim that there was anything inevitable in 
the evolution o f social systems that correspond with the commitment-credit 
model. The model simply suggests that when institutions occur where the 
attributes identified in the theory are important, there will be particular 
consequences, and this is what was observed. As a theory it suggests that 
where the corresponding institutions develop in the future, similar 
consequences are possible, though they are by no means inevitable. As in any 
real world situation, there may be additional more powerful factors at work. 
But does this caveat of ‘other factors’ occurring in practice not call into 
question the existence of any meaningful distinction between science, and any 
other analytical approach? This question will now be addressed.
6.2 Social Science
Although science clearly has an important logical aspect, it is very much a 
social activity. Subsequent work in the philosophy o f science has focused far 
more on this aspect than Popper did, and two widely regarded approaches 
will now be considered to help understand science as a distinctive human 
activity, and the consequences of this for the particular contribution o f the 
commitment-credit theory as science.
While Popper’s formulation of the scientific method identifies the essential 
element that distinguishes science from other areas o f human endeavour, it 
has been recognised for many years that there are other aspects o f scientific 
progress, albeit ones that are common to human endeavour in general. 
Indeed, Popper recognised the crucial role played by professional convention, 
specifically in what is accepted as a repeatable test o f a prediction. Popper 
recognised that there was no prospect of a purely logical connection between
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abstract theory and the truth o f a prediction of a specific relationship between 
observations; there would always be the need for an element of human 
judgement.
6.2.1 Kuhn's Metatheory
The most important explanation o f the more sociological aspects o f scientific 
progress is that o f Thomas Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. His 
analysis will largely provide the structure for the discussion in the second half 
o f this chapter, which focuses on the potential for a broader contribution of 
the commitment-credit theory, and the tests of it, set out in this thesis, within 
the economics profession.
Kuhn’s primary concern is with the relationship between abstract theory and 
professional activity. Although not the only interpretation, this will be taken 
as an alternative perspective to Popper’s definition o f  science, rather than a 
direct criticism of it. Indeed, Kuhn implicitly confirms this interpretation 
because at the end o f his first chapter he asks the question ‘How could history 
o f science fail to be a source o f phenomena to which theories about 
knowledge may legitimately be asked to apply?’ (Kuhn 1996, 9). So he sees 
himself dealing with abstract formulations that can be tested using historical 
evidence, much as this work claims to be doing. And because his theory 
concerns the nature and practice o f scientific theory, it seems appropriate to 
label it a metatheory.
Kuhn therefore, like Popper, has an abstract logical framework for describing 
scientific activity. He applies this to particular historical evidence, although he 
is not explicit about testing hypotheses. This metatheory will be set out in 
some detail, and then applied to the theoretical frameworks described 
previously. So this is an example not of the testing of a theory, but the 
application o f an accepted theory to make an argument regarding the 
relationships between the phenomena it deals with.
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The perspective taken by Kuhn is of science as a social activity. He defines a 
scientific community as one that has answers to questions such as *what are 
the fundamental entities o f which the universe is composed? How do these 
interact with each other and with the senses? What questions may legitimately 
be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in seeking 
solutions?’ (Kuhn 1996, 4). Central to the answer the community gives to 
these questions is what Kuhn terms a ‘paradigm.’ A paradigm has two 
characteristics. First if all, it contains a body of accepted theory, which has 
been applied successfully in such a way that it attracts a group o f people to 
work within the framework to the exclusion o f other approaches; but 
alongside this, it is sufficiently open-ended for there to be unresolved 
problems for the group to tackle (Kuhn 1996, 10). The concept o f paradigm 
naturally suggests three phases of scientific activity, namely pre-science, 
before a single paradigm has become established, normal science for work 
within a paradigm, and revolutionary science, when there is a fundamental 
shift in the paradigm used by a community. Kuhn’s metatheory elaborates 
these distinctions, which are now set out.
Before a paradigm becomes established, each individual publication starts 
from first principles, and justifies the introduction o f each concept. Research 
results tend to be communicated using books that are addressed to anyone 
interested in the subject matter, and non-specialists can follow progress by 
reading the practitioners’ original reports. These phenomena fairly rapidly 
cease to apply to activity within the field once a single paradigm comes to 
dominate the discipline, usually coming out of an existing tradition, but one 
that is initially seen as simply one among a number o f possible perspectives 
on the discipline.
Once a paradigm is established, normal science then occurs. In contrast with 
pre-normal science, work here takes a good deal as already established, usually 
presented in educational textbooks, and advances are reported in specialist 
journals, which are generally difficult for a non-specialist to penetrate. Within
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normal science, Kuhn identifies the fact-gathering activity as particularly 
distinct. This can be seen as largely limited to doing three things. First o f all, it 
aims to increase the accuracy and scope of significant factual observations. 
Secondly, it seeks to determine facts as yet unknown, but predicted by the 
paradigm theory. The third aspect involves the collection o f facts to aid in the 
resolution of ambiguities and problems that have been identified within the 
theoretical paradigm. Kuhn describes the first activity as that to which the 
greatest amount of effort is expended, and for which great ingenuity is 
required to push the boundaries of accuracy and application ever further. The 
second activity, perhaps classically Popperian, is not so widely practiced, often 
because the formulation of new practicable tests is rarely straightforward. The 
third type of activity can appear in retrospect to be challenging the theory, but 
often its initial motivation is just to fill in a gap in knowledge, or establish 
which o f a number of possible perspectives is the best one to apply in a 
particular situation. Theoretical work is similar, except for the relative 
proportion o f effort that is expended. Some clarification o f exiting theory and 
application to new areas is carried out, but is generally regarded as technology 
not science. Most theoretical work focuses on small and often superficially 
indistinguishable changes to existing theory, but in a way that is amenable to 
empirical testing. Theoretical and empirical work most closely relate in the 
third category, where in practice both advance hand-in-hand (Kuhn 1996, 25- 
34). One consequence o f the paradigm is that, within normal science, 
fundamental novelties are often suppressed, because they are necessarily 
perceived as subverting its core commitments. Nevertheless, because those 
commitments are to some extent arbitrary, the nature o f normal research 
ensures that useful novelties cannot always be suppressed for long (Kuhn 
1996, 5). However, in the meantime, a project whose outcome does not fall in 
the expected range is often seen as a reflection not on nature, but on the 
scientist conducting the project (Kuhn 1996, 35).
From time to time, it becomes apparent that there are serious problems with 
the paradigm within which normal science is conducted. Often these arise in
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Kuhn’s third category, where what can start as a curious anomaly comes 
increasingly to be regarded as a serious problem (Kuhn 1996, 67). Although 
this logically indicates a problem with the theory, on the basis that this is the 
aspect open to human manipulation, theories are not in practice declared 
invalid until an alternative candidate is available to take the place o f the 
existing one (Kuhn 1996, 77). Kuhn explains this by identifying the 
interrelation of theory and data as fundamental to the nature o f science, and 
rejecting a theoretical framework without a substitute would mean that 
potential participants could not regard any resulting activity as science. 
Furthermore, the very nature o f science as a continuing tackling of puzzles 
that is the hallmark o f normal science means that any anomaly can always be 
dismissed as simply another puzzle that has not yet been resolved, but with 
time, effort and sufficient brainpower can be solved by using the existing 
paradigm (Kuhn 1996, 79). Nevertheless, as anomalies continue to persist, 
competing articulations are put forward; there is an increased willingness to 
try anything; and explicit discontent begins to be expressed. Debates over 
fundamentals and recourse to philosophy all provide symptoms of an 
underlying problem (Kuhn 1996, 91). Then someone very young or new to 
the field puts a fundamentally new invention forward, and claims to solve the 
problem that the existing paradigm was unable to tackle (Kuhn 1996, 90, 
153). This claim is however rarely sufficient by itself. What can be particularly 
persuasive is for the new paradigm to predict phenomena that were entirely 
unsuspected while the old one prevailed (Kuhn 1996, 154). Sometimes 
aesthetic aspects o f the new theory persuade some, though normally only a 
few, but this group can become the core of an ultimately successful challenge 
(Kuhn 1996, 156). In the end, the move to the new paradigm is an act o f 
faith, because it promises the potential to tackle many large problems that 
confront it, even though the older paradigm only fails in a few and has a 
considerable body of existing uncontroversial material as a result o f its 
previous successes (Kuhn 1996,158).
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At first sight Kuhn’s metatheory appears strikingly different to Popper’s. It 
shows signs o f embodying a paradigm shift. Possibly for historians and 
philosophers o f science it did, because it substantially broadened the issues it 
was legitimate for them to consider. Nevertheless, as a framework for 
assessing the contribution o f the commitment-credit model, and its tests, it is 
in many ways simply a different perspective on the same phenomena. Kuhn 
does assert that the historical study of scientific development has not found 
something resembling what he calls the stereotype o f falsification by direct 
comparison with nature, because one paradigm is only rejected when it can be 
replaced by another (Kuhn 1996, 77). Perhaps the crucial word here is 
‘stereotype’, because this is not a contradiction with the way Popper uses the 
idea o f falsification. The first criteria Popper establishes for a scientific theory 
is falsifiability. This is essentially taken for granted in Kuhn’s framework, 
where theory development and empirical testing go hand in hand. And as 
already noted, Popper also makes the point that the actual practice of 
falsification is a social not a logical criteria, because there are too many factors 
involved for a statement for or against falsification to be logically definitive; it 
is a judgement made by a community of scientists, and so different 
communities, and even the same community at different times, can come to 
different conclusions. Kuhn’s explicit critique of Popper is that Popper makes 
the choice between paradigms seem too easy (Kuhn 1996, 146). But Popper 
does not make a distinction between normal science and revolutionary 
science. Kuhn’s description o f the vast majority o f work in normal science as 
being refining and stretching standard measurements for experimentalists, and 
for theoreticians modifying theories in a small way that will be amenable to 
test through existing techniques, matches with Popper’s conception, as does 
the role o f anomalies leading to significant changes in scientific paradigms. In 
a way, Kuhn’s framework is a refinement o f Popper’s, because while for 
normal science small changes can be absorbed in the paradigm, sometime 
changes regarded as necessary by some in die community cannot be so easily 
incorporated, and a whole-scale rearrangement o f conceptual relationships
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becomes necessary. So while Popper provides the internal logic, Kuhn 
provides an external perspective that explains the sociology.
6.2.2 Neoclassical Economic Theory as Kuhnian Science
Kuhn’s theory provides a detailed model o f scientific progress that has been 
widely applied to different disciplines, and in some cases further refined. The 
purpose here is, however, to apply it only to assessing the contribution o f the 
commitment-credit model, and specifically by comparing its potential 
contribution to the economics profession in relation to the neoclassical, new 
institutional and Keynesian paradigms.
At first sight neoclassical economic theory displays many of the characteristics 
that Kuhn ascribes to normal science, but on closer examination it also fails to 
display others. Economics, and microeconomics in particular, has clearly 
moved beyond Kuhn’s pre-sdentific stage, where assumptions are justified 
each time they are employed, and professional publication is in books rather 
than scholarly journals. It is however questionable whether what it has moved 
on to corresponds to Kuhn’s concept o f normal sdence.
To some extent a number o f threads have to be pulled together to make the 
problem dear. Kuhn highlights several elements in the education o f the 
neophyte sdentist, but two are particularly important. One is the role of 
textbooks, which Kuhn focuses on largely to demonstrate the fact that 
previous revolutions tend to be glossed over. Each revolution requires the 
rewriting o f textbooks, or more likely new textbooks, and these new texts 
present all their material in terms o f the new paradigm. Often they present 
results, theoretical or empirical, from prior to the paradigm shift, but the text 
does not recognise the different context in which they were originally 
understood. This reinforces the message that the current paradigm is the 
‘correct’ way of viewing the world, and it is not open to any reasonable 
challenges (Kuhn 1996,136-137). The second aspect o f sdentific training, and 
the one that to a large extent influenced the choice o f the term paradigm, is
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the role o f exemplary problems and applications that the theory, in order to 
become accepted, has to better explain than any other candidate (Kuhn 1996, 
46-47). Science’s pedagogy entangles discussion of the theory with 
demonstrations and remarks on exemplary applications (Kuhn 1996, 80).
Pulling these strands together prompts the question: what are the exemplary 
applications that are contained in textbooks that present neoclassical price 
theory? The answer is, that there are none. A random sample o f four 
microeconomics texts, all from editions published in the 1990s, will serve as a 
demonstration (Mansfield 1994; Hyman 1997; Colander 1998; McConnell and 
Brue 1999). McConnell and Brue even describe their text in the preface as the 
best selling in the United States (1999, xvii). All present in similar ways the 
price theory framework, use a wide variety o f justifications, and no two 
examples in common, certainly no ‘original tesf o f the theory that, albeit 
retrospectively, explained the success of the theory. Indeed, there is an 
emphasis on the revision of examples to bring them up to date (Colander 
1998, vii; Hyman 1997, vii). To make their exposition particularly interesting 
McConnell and Brue even ‘present interesting applications with attractive 
modem art’ (1999, xviii). While this combination o f art and science is not 
necessarily a problem, what is problematic is Colander’s report o f 
collaborative research he carried out into the opinions o f students at ‘top 
graduate programs,’ where only three percent agreed that a thorough 
knowledge o f the economy was important to achieving success as an 
economist, and sixty eight percent said it was unimportant (1998, v). This is 
particularly troubling when, for example, ‘physical intuition’ is a phrase 
commonly used by physicists in explaining the way they work to produce 
theoretical advances.
Price theory was, as described in subsection 5.2.1, essentially the creation o f 
Marshall, although that attribution is rarely made in textbooks. That is 
however not necessarily different from textbooks in physical and biological 
sciences. However, as pointed out, the success o f the theory was in
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reconciling in a formal way the previously conflicting approaches o f Ricardo 
and Smith. If  Marshall did present any exemplary applications, they have 
disappeared in the numerous generations of successive textbooks. This is in 
marked contrast to Ricardo’s Com Law application, and Adam Smith’s pin 
factory, which is a part o f the broader understanding o f economics, although 
not expliddy taught except in history o f economic thought classes.
So although, superfidally, neoclassical microeconomics may appear to have 
the characteristics o f Khun’s normal sdence, it lacks one key element, namely 
the paradigmatic application. O f course, as demonstrated in subsection 6.1.3, 
it lacks any connection with applications because none o f its key elements 
corresponds to any empirically observable phenomena. This makes it virtually 
impossible for the tension Kuhn effectively takes for granted between 
theoretical formulations and empirical observations to exist. In particular, the 
anomalies between observations and paradigmatic predictions that lead to 
scientific revolutions will be even more infrequent and less apparently 
problematic, because there simply is not that opportunity for incorporating 
predse empirical observations into the paradigm. This perhaps explains the 
enduring role o f the framework in economics education. Nevertheless, the 
inability of the framework to deal with genuine economic problems is 
increasingly widely recognised, as set out in section 1.1.1.
The next subsection uses Kuhn’s framework to answer the questions why the 
new institutional alternative has not recdved wider acceptance, and then why 
Keynes’ theory did in the macroeconomic arena, although the subsequent 
mismatch found between theory and evidence have led to a dramatic loss of 
popularity.
6.2.3 Neoclassical Alternatives as Kuhnian Science
A cursory review of the new institutional work set out in section 5.1 shows 
that, because the majority o f publications are in the form o f books rather than 
professional journal articles, this alternative to the neoclassical framework is at
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a pre-sdentific stage of development. It is noticeable and significant that the 
only work dted that was published as a journal artide is by far the oldest, 
namely Coase’s 1937 paper. Presumably at that time his approach was 
compatible with most other contemporary work, and was seen as mainstream 
work. However, the other works were all books published in the 70s, 80s and 
90s, and by then the fault lines were too pronounced. Each o f the approaches 
will briefly be analysed using the Kuhnian framework, in chronological order.
Coase’s paper can be seen as an attempt within the neodassical framework to 
develop an explanation for the growing prevalence o f large firms apparent by 
that time, which is not what the neodassical framework predicted. O f the two 
dimensions identified by Coase on the basis of which the quality o f a theory 
could be assessed, namely analytical tractability and correspondence with the 
real world, it is unfortunate that the profession went wholly down the former 
road, abandoning the latter.
Williamson recognises that his work lies outside the paradigm of normal 
neoclassical microeconomics, although he does not justify his assumption just 
in his own terms, but as in line with Coase. Much like Coase, he identifies an 
anomaly within the neodassical framework, which asserts the ineffidency of 
non-market transactions, in contrast with the demonstrable competitive 
success o f many large vertically integrated corporations. His solution is to 
abandon the central idea of the neoclassical model, namely o f economic 
activity as exchange, in favour o f economic activity as contracting. And the 
competition that leads to efficient exchange is problematic because, while it 
can deal with bounded rationality and opportunism, it fails to deal with asset 
spedfidty, which requires a dynamic treatment outside the instantaneous 
equilibrium to which the neoclassical framework is limited. Much of the work 
is however directed to policy formulation, not testing even in the form of 
confirmation, never mind the possible falsification o f the theory. This is 
perhaps the reason why, although attracting a good deal o f attention, an 
extensive literature has failed to grow up elaborating and further testing the
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theory, certainly not to the extent that microeconomic textbooks, although 
they increasingly include game theoretic frameworks that are not necessarily 
directly compatible with the neoclassical price theory, also fail to include more 
recent transaction cost perspectives. Although perhaps this is because, while 
game theory is not seen as directly contradicting price theory, transaction cost 
theory is. So Williamson’s paradigm does not seem to be sufficiently attractive 
to replace the existing neoclassical one.
North’s work provides a curious contrast between his earlier work, 
particularly that in conjunction with Thomas, and his later work. The early 
work provides a close integration of detailed economic evidence and 
economic theory. The theory is presented as not significandy different to the 
neoclassical framework, and easily accommodated within it. So it fits neady 
into Kuhn’s category o f normal science, albeit with the discrepancy of 
appearing as a book. His most recent work however, contends that 
transaction costs in addition to the neoclassical framework, with its focus on 
production costs, are not sufficient to explain many economic phenomena. 
He provides a relatively elaborate articulation of the interaction of 
motivational benefits and institutional constrains that he claims does provide 
a significandy improved explanation. Although he does provide a sprinkling 
o f examples, such as national constitutions in North and South America, and 
general developments in financial markets, there is no concerted in-depth 
presentation o f even one significant economic development, such as that 
provided in his earlier work. So this perhaps explains why his work, although 
recognised as important through the award of a Nobel Prize, and while a 
challenge to the neoclassical framework, has failed to replace it.
Keynes’ innovative framework was successful in replacing the neoclassical 
one, at least in dealing with economic phenomena that have subsequendy 
come to be labelled macroeconomics, and was probably the only large-scale 
scientific revolution in twentieth century economics. So, before considering 
the application of Kuhn’s framework to the commitment-credit theory, it will
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be instructive to examine in more detail die extent to which it applies to the 
progress o f the Keynesian revolution.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given its tenuous relationship with empirical 
evidence, the anomaly Keynes’ theory explained was not focused on one 
aspect o f the neoclassical paradigm, but on its complete inability to either 
explain or suggest effective policies to deal with the deep and persistent 
economic problems that affected first of all the British economy in the 
nineteen twenties, and then the global economy in the nineteen thirties. These 
problems were exacerbated because the neoclassical framework largely 
suggested that there were no effective approaches to remedying large-scale 
economic problems available to a government. And, as Kuhn predicts, it is 
only when a viable alternative is proposed that moving away from the existing 
framework becomes conceivable to the vast majority of the profession.
Keynes’ status in the profession, as a Professor at a leading university and the 
editor o f the leading professional publication, the Economic Journal' is not in 
line with Kuhn’s prediction that challenges come from young or new 
members o f the profession. Although it is perhaps significant that Keynes did 
not train initially as an economist, but as a mathematician, and then worked as 
a civil servant, before taking up a university post. He also had considerable 
subsequent experience in government during the First World War, as well as 
continuing contact with business through his personal investment activity. 
What is perhaps significant is that, while as editor he could clearly have 
published his work initially in the Economic Journal, he chose a book as a more 
appropriate format.
As well as providing an alternative explanation o f the contemporary economic 
crisis, and explaining why Roosevelt’s interventionist policy had a significant 
degree o f success, Keynes’ theory also provided a significant scientific 
advance. Keynes went to some trouble to explain that his theory had been 
formulated in such a way to allow it to be tested using the newly available
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national income statistics. Moreover, in doing this he provided additional 
impetus for advancing this empirical work, as well as providing what was 
generally regarded as an improved analytical structure for the data. While 
Hicks’ elaboration provided a way of reconciling Keynes’ theory with the 
neoclassical framework, this corresponds to Kuhn’s prediction that successful 
paradigms usually incorporate much previous work, albeit in a different 
overall framework. So this reconciliation does not diminish the argument for 
a genuine Keynesian scientific revolution, it actually strengthens it.
6.2.4 Commitment-Credit Theory as Kuhnian Science
Before moving towards a conclusion as to the distinctive scientific 
contribution o f this project, it clearly makes sense to analyse it in some detail 
in terms of Kuhn’s sociological theory of science, as has been done for 
existing theories in the preceding sections. It will be assessed against each 
category in turn.
From the perspective o f the pre-sdentific category, there is some 
correspondence, but also significant differences. The work is presented in 
essentially book form, though to some extent that could be simply a function 
o f its role as a PhD thesis. It is also likely that the book could be read by non- 
spedalists and, with the exception o f a handful o f nuances and references, it is 
hopefully not too optimistic to believe it could be appredated. However, the 
prindpal concepts are not justified in their own right, but draw on spedfic, 
well-established concepts.
In terms o f normal sdence, there are some similarities, but more 
discrepandes. Aside from its current presentation as a book, it is difficult to 
envisage a ‘core’ part being published in mainstream journal, without 
removing so much material that it would detract from the overall argument. 
There is little sense in which a professional audience could take as read 
extensive references to the background literature and detailed methodological 
concerns, which normally disappear in the transition from PhD thesis to
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published paper, and which are largely presented in the former to 
demonstrate the professional status of the author, in addition to the small but 
recognisable advance at the core of the work. The primary innovation here is 
in the theory at the beginning, though it is the weight o f significant empirical 
evidence presented subsequently that justifies its value; and there is no claim 
to originality in the empirical evidence, though in fact this provides the bulk 
o f the work. But, with the possible exception o f North and Thomas, this is 
not a conventional form of empirical economic work. So it would be difficult 
to characterise it in Kuhn’s term as a theoretical advance that does not move 
on too much from existing theory, because its application to empirical data, in 
such a distinctive way as is done here, would be very problematic. The form 
of the work, although broadly similar to that of Williamson and North, is very 
different in form from that which currently fills most professional economic 
journals. So the closest correspondence to a form o f normal science is the 
exploration o f an anomaly between the lack o f growth mechanism in 
neoclassical microeconomics, using the very much minority but nonetheless 
existing approaches of theory expressed abstractly in verbal form, drawing 
together financial economics and the property rights aspect o f the new 
institutional framework, together with extensive historical evidence. The 
closest similarity is with the work of North and Thomas o f three decades ago, 
so is hardly contemporary.
So the final stage is to consider the extent to which there is evidence for a 
correspondence between this work and Kuhn’s notion of a scientific 
revolution. The initial indications are that there is a degree o f agreement. 
Work combining empirical and theoretical innovations to explore anomalies 
within existing theory and data is the normal source o f ideas that are able to 
develop to the extent that they lead to revolution. But, as occurred with the 
transaction cost and new institutional economic theories, although they have 
explained empirical phenomena that the neoclassical framework has difficulty 
in admitting, particularly the growth of large corporations and their enduring 
success in competitive markets, this work comes up against the problem that
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the neoclassical framework has no close connections with any empirical data, 
so it is difficult to argue successfully from a discrepancy between theory and 
evidence the need for an alternative paradigm.
However, the anomaly that the commitment-credit theory primarily addressed 
is not one o f explaining success, which can perhaps always be countered by 
saying that alternatives could be even more successful, but is a sustained crisis 
in economic experience on a scale at least comparable to that which preceded 
the Keynesian revolution. This is the increasingly recognised widespread 
failure o f both neoclassical and Keynesian frameworks in explaining and 
suggesting enablers of economic growth, for what is often, somewhat 
euphemistically given the evidence, called the developing world. However, as 
Kuhn’s theory and the evidence o f the Keynesian revolution strongly suggest, 
this need is only acknowledged in hindsight, once a credible alternative 
paradigm has been developed.
One indication predicted by Kuhn of the coming of a revolution is recourse 
to philosophical debates. It is not clear from the evidence presented here that 
this was present to any real extent in economics prior to Keynes. Although it 
is not necessarily a coincidence that, prior to economics, Keynes’ primary 
intellectual interest was the philosophical nature o f probability theory, and 
although his theory when formalised did not include any probabilistic 
elements, chance and uncertainty were significant aspects o f some elements of 
his paradigm. There is some evidence of philosophical questions currendy 
being asked, in work such as (Blaug 1992) and (Mirowski 1989), and the 
recent call by some for a ‘post autistic economics’ (www.paecon.net). but 
these appear relatively peripheral to the discipline as a whole. Nevertheless, 
the problematic nature of a challenge to an existing paradigm, in that it makes 
no sense to attempt to evaluate any contribution in terms o f that paradigm, is 
why philosophy of science is the framework drawn on here to discuss the 
contribution o f the commitment-credit theory.
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6.2.5 Scientific Contribution of the Commitment-Credit Model
Given the analysis just set out, assessing the commitment-credit theory in its 
relationship with alternative economic theories, in terms o f the metatheories 
o f Popper and Kuhn, what can be concluded as to its contribution?
From the Popperian perspective, the evidence presented in chapters two, 
three and four, although nominally focused on attempting to falsify the 
theory, does overwhelmingly show that there is a way o f matching the 
abstract constructs of the model with observable phenomena. Because 
Popper focuses on the logic of scientific activity, he pays no attention to the 
social aspects, except where this is necessary to fill a gap in the logic, and the 
key social aspect is agreement on the correspondence between the abstract 
and observable phenomena. While for physical and biological scientists this 
activity o f matching theory and data is probably the most substantial aspect of 
their training, it is largely absent from contemporary economic education. 
And the claim in the first section of this chapter was that this is the primary 
difference between the neoclassical and commitment-credit model. So, to 
what extent has this objective o f a microeconomic theory that has clear 
empirical application been achieved?
The essential pivot of the argument for the scientific value o f the 
commitment-credit theory is that historical observations confirm the 
prediction o f the theory: that the result of developing an effective form of 
commitment device, which allowed savings to be invested though a financial 
market, did harness the natural human talent for innovation, so that it was 
directed towards economic growth.
Although the ancient and medieval Mediterranean world saw the early stages 
o f developments that would lead to effective economic commitment devices, 
they were unable to provide the confidence necessary to override wider social 
concerns. It was only in England that the legal infrastructure necessary to 
arbitrate and enforce contract disputes rationally slowly emerged. Although in
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many cases taken for granted today, and despite the difficulties in achieving 
this often being belitded, the achievement was real and distinct. However, as 
contractual links increased in quantity and sophistication it became necessary 
for large legal entities to be able to provide evidence of their ability to live up 
to their commitments beyond legally enforceable contracts. Audited accounts 
met this need, and achieved their modem role under the auspices o f financial 
market regulators in the United States in the early twentieth century. It is the 
nature o f these commitment devices that they are written documents 
potentially open to subsequent legal scrutiny, so the character o f their 
historical development remains available to scientific scrutiny.
Even in ancient times commitment to repayment was a necessary condition 
o f lending, but the difficulties in disentangling economic and broader social 
relationships prevented the development of financial markets that directed 
funds to the most economically beneficial uses. Largely as a result o f the legal 
environment, effective impersonal financial markets developed from the end 
o f the seventeenth century in England. Initially this was through discounting 
bills o f exchange, with the national debt providing an effectively risk free 
form o f saving that provided the benchmark against which the risk and return 
on private liabilities could be assessed. Then an increasingly specialised 
infrastructure o f financial markets and intermediaries developed, to the extent 
that a qualitative change in their nature occurred, and reached its modem 
shape in the United States by the early years of the twentieth century. The 
public nature o f these markets has also left its mark on the historical record, 
so making the character and development of credit markets observable.
While the industrial revolution is a widely recognised phenomenon and, 
although not without bringing significant social problems, is generally seen as 
providing massive economic benefits, quite what its nature was and the 
reasons for its success are less widely subject to consensus. And although 
large organisations are pervasive features o f modem life, their origin and 
indeed sometimes their role in society are less clear. The four aspects of
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growth in the commitment-credit model, namely in output, in sub-unit size, in 
credit sophistication, and in cyclical form, provide a relatively clear framework 
in which developments can be assessed. Although not necessarily as 
immediately available to scrutiny, because their observability is not as central 
to their function as it is to commitment devices and credit markets, they have 
all left their mark. Output measures have been a subject o f intense activity for 
economic historians over the years, particularly at the national level before the 
advent o f official statistics, and these statistics provide at least a good first 
estimate where they are available. Financial accounts likewise provide 
measures for firms. Unit size is perhaps the most problematic, in that 
systematic data sources do not exist, although details o f many particular cases 
do. Financial sophistication is observable through an examination o f the 
extant instruments, which because they were written contracts are often still 
available, though again no obvious systematic source or analysis is extant. 
Cycles again are widely recognised and data is available, though not on a 
wholly systematic basis.
It is on the basis o f the observability of its conceptual elements that the 
commitment-credit model can claim from a Popperian point of view to be an 
advance over existing alternatives. Neither neoclassical nor new institutional 
microeconomics offers this combination o f analytical precision and 
observable falsifiability. Keynesian economic theory does, and although it 
deals with saving and investment, and its focus on aggregate statistics has 
been extended to tackle economic growth, it is an unabashed macro 
perspective and to some extent relies on the veracity o f the neoclassical model 
in dealing with micro level phenomena.
From the Kuhnian perspective the contribution o f the commitment-credit 
theory is more difficult to assess definitively. It does stand relatively sustained 
comparison with the initial stages of the Keynesian revolution. In some ways 
it could be seen to carry forward the Keynesian revolution by using a 
Keynesian approach at the micro level, that is, using what Slridelsky describes
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as the vision o f the theory in providing a logic o f choice, not under scarcity, 
but under uncertainty. Although while Keynes dealt with concepts made 
observable through national statistics, the commitment-credit model deals 
with those made observable through the analysis o f historical records. Much 
as in Keynes’ time, where some people in Britain lived in considerable luxury 
while many others lived in abject poverty, the same is widely regarded as true 
today on the global scale. And while choices have to be made by 
governments, by individuals and by firms, the problems to be solved are not 
generally seen as problems of scarcity, but as problems o f uncertainty. The 
need to do something is evident. The problem is that there is little agreement 
on what should, or even can, be done.
Many of the concepts and approaches that make up the commitment-credit 
model also play important roles in the new institutional literature. North and 
Thomas’ book is the most similar part of the literature to the overall approach 
taken here. And Williamson gives contracts an equally pivotal role in his 
model, though they are seen as important in production and not in innovation 
and investment, which are the focus here. His book also commences with a 
relatively concise abstract formulation, although he then goes on to apply this 
to current policy debates, rather than assess its explanatory capability when 
applied to phenomena about which there is a good deal o f consensus. So in 
Kuhnian terms this work could be a contribution to the largely still pre- 
scientific new institutional economics.
It is the nature o f the sociological basis o f Kuhn’s framework that it is 
impossible, for now, to assess the ultimate contribution o f this work in his 
terms. It will not be clear for some time whether this work will be an integral 
part o f a revolution in economic science or simply part o f the froth outside 
the mainstream of the profession. Perhaps the most that can be said 
definitively is that is shows that an alternative is possible.
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However, regardless of a theory’s philosophical status and its ability to explain 
an existing anomaly, Kuhn is clear that an alternative in itself is not sufficient, 
because it must explain phenomena not previously explained. Although this 
may be a useful criterion in the natural sciences, it is not so useful in the social 
sciences, where particular events are always explainable to some extent in 
terms o f their social and historical environment. Perhaps it should be that the 
model naturally explains phenomena in several situations that are otherwise 
only explainable in terms o f their specific situation. Nevertheless, in the end 
the acceptance o f a new paradigm is an act o f faith by a substantial 
community o f scholars, faith that the new approach will be able to deal with 
problems existing theory cannot, and only time can hope to provide the 
answer as to whether the commitment-credit model will achieve that.
So the commitment-credit theory provides an alternative, but as with the 
Keynesian revolution, scientific criteria will almost certainly not be enough to 
attract further attention and elaboration within the economics profession, it 
will also need to have important practical implications. So, finally, the 
question needs to be answered as to how this theory differs from a practical 
perspective. One might even say: it is all very well in theory, but what about in 
practice?
So, the commitment-credit model has some claim to have made a 
contribution to economics as a scientific discipline, but does it have any 
practical implications? While it could be argued from a scientific point o f view 
that conciseness is a big benefit to a scientific theory, are not societies and 
economies so complicated that in practice no simple model can be o f any 
practical value? Can the scientific method broadly construed ever really be 
expected to make any useful contribution to social phenomena; is there 
anything to distinguish its products from those produced from an artistic or 
contemplative perspective? Applying these questions to the commitment- 
credit model: how does it contribute to ongoing debates o f the relationship 
between science and practice, and particularly social science and social
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practice? This is the question that the final subsection seeks to answer. Since 
Popper’s and Kuhn’s writing there have been sustained critiques of the 
existence of science and scientific knowledge as a distinct activity, although 
perhaps the concern was that science has in some situations become viewed 
as a privileged form of knowledge, and perhaps this is problematic. This 
critique in effect questions whether there is any meaningful way that theories, 
including the commitment-credit model, can be practically compared. One 
popular critique o f the concept of a distinct scientific method serves as the 
focus here, that o f Feyerabend.
6.2.6 Critique of Scientific Distinctiveness
Feyerabend in his book Against Method under ‘the principle: anything goes’ 
(Feyerabend 1993, 19) argues that it is impossible to set out any rational 
principles that must always apply to any scientific activity. He gives the 
example o f Galileo, who can be seen in retrospect as having a deep and 
profound effect on subsequent science, but who worked in what seems to be 
a highly unsystematic way. Galileo’s results were also problematic. For 
example, while use of the telescope he invented on terrestrial objects was 
acknowledged as unproblematic, he had considerable difficulty with celestial 
phenomena. For example, at one demonstration to twenty-four professors 
they could not agree that they were able to make any useful astronomical 
observations (Feyerabend 1993, 88). The experimental comparison this was 
supposed to give, by current standards, would not have been able to establish 
a distinction between the Aristotelian and Copemican alternative theories. 
Modem theories of, for example, the Coriolis forces that influence of the 
earth’s atmosphere, optical aberrations, after images, and mutual inhibition of 
retinal elements, now explain this difficulty; but were obviously far away in 
those days (Feyerabend 1993,110).
The implication o f the historical difficulties Galileo experienced is, for 
Feyerabend, that Popper’s theory of science does not predict these difficulties. 
Popper’s theory ‘is either a meaningful idea or it is a collection o f slogans that
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can be adapted to any situation’ (Feyerabend 1993,151). The irony is that this 
applies to Feyerabend’s ‘argument’, although it is difficult to tell to what 
extent this is deliberate. In the book’s preface, where its overall approach is 
set out, Feyerabend says that he uses irony and mentions ‘anything goes’ in 
particular as not so much a principle but ‘the terrified exclamation o f a 
rationalist who takes a look at history’ (1993, vii). Later in the book 
Feyerabend describes the difference between his and Kuhn’s work in that his 
is abstract while Kuhn’s is historical (Feyerabend 1993, 212). A better 
description would seem to be that Kuhn’s is historical and abstract, while his 
is just abstract. Even better, both are abstract and historical, but Kuhn 
proposes an abstract characterisation, while Feyerabend does not.
While Feyerabend seems to be arguing against science, he is in fact arguing 
against philosophy; what Popper would call metaphysics. It does indeed seem 
impossible to find general statements that apply in all situations, unless they 
are so woolly and general that they are effectively devoid o f meaning. But this 
does also beg the question of the value of Popper and Kuhn’s theories, and 
the idea o f science as a distinct activity. But some considerations will make 
clear that, unlike Feyerabend, these do have value beyond that o f a brain- 
teasing puzzle.
Fayerabend’s basic problem is one that seems to be more at home in the 
nineteenth century, though perhaps he would argue that, on the contrary he is 
arguing against a nineteenth century view that was still enduring in the 
twentieth century. Even before the end of the nineteenth century, in 1895, 
Poincare had shown that there was not a fully deterministic solution to the 
‘three body problem’ o f the gravitational interaction between three otherwise 
independent bodies. So a precisely specified abstract system has an 
indeterminate outcome. The quantum revolution in atomic physics, and 
Godel’s proof o f the impossibility of a complete logical system without 
contradiction, in 1931, simply reinforced the idea that from both a physical 
and logical point o f view it was impossible to reconcile science and
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determinism. Why after this anyone would wish to argue for any broadly 
applied and absolutely correct generalisations is difficult to comprehend. The 
complexity and indeterminate nature of the human interactions at the core of 
any social process is no excuse for denying the possibility o f taking a scientific 
approach to understanding them. The issue is perhaps to get beyond the 
simplistic conception of science and scientific theories.
Scientific endeavour itself, it almost goes without saying, is a human social 
activity. Popper recognises this, as has been repeatedly referred to previously, 
through his recognition of the consensual nature of recognising particular 
observations as confirming or falsifying basic statements. Fayerabend’s 
description o f Galileo’s initial difficulty concerning celestial observation with 
his telescope clearly falls into this area. And Kuhn’s whole approach takes the 
social nature o f science as its starting point. While Kuhn introduced the idea 
o f paradigm shift, he clearly did not introduce the idea o f revolution. Indeed, 
in many ways, Kuhn’s characterisation of scientific revolutions as paradigm 
shifts sheds a great deal of light on other social changes, including the legal, 
financial, industrial, accounting, corporate finance and managerial revolutions 
described here in chapters three and four.
Fayerabend’s point is perhaps that science is no different from any other 
human activity. Perhaps more strongly, that it is not a privileged form of 
human endeavour. It is indeed problematic to describe it as privileged, but 
that is not a claim made here. It does seem particularly problematic however 
to say that because no simple generalisation o f the scientific method can be 
articulated then science is not a distinct activity. Kuhn, and perhaps more so 
Popper, articulate theories that do seem to capture the key elements of 
scientific activity, in that they are concerned with the interaction between 
formal knowledge and empirical data, largely for their own sake, and this is 
what distinguishes scientific activity. But as Kuhn recognises, a paradigm such 
as his does as much to create problems as it does to solve them. Popper 
captures the idea that more general theories create more challenges from a
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wider range o f specialisms, and this is in line with what intuitively makes a 
better theory.
So it does need to be said that it is inherendy problematic to try to discuss 
practical consequences o f scientific development. Science can only be 
effective when it proceeds on its own terms. Nevertheless, it is an integral part 
o f the wider world, and it is even more problematic to simply treat it as an 
autonomous activity. So the final question answered here is, what could be 
the distinctive practical contribution of commitment-credit theory as 
presented here?
6.2.7 Practical Contribution of Commitment-Credit Theory
For most of the twentieth century there was an increasingly loud call for the 
separation of economic theory and economic policy, articulated as the need to 
distinguish between positive and normative economics, with the more or less 
explicit corollary that only positive economics can claim to be scientific. It is 
also a striking coincidence that the best-known proponents o f this distinction, 
Lionel Robbins and Milton Friedman, were also amongst the most politically 
conservative economists o f their generation.
Lionel Robbins in his 1933 book The Nature and Significance of Economic Theory 
argued that economics was the scientific study o f choice. It was here that one 
of the most popular and enduring definitions o f economics was set out, as 
making choices under conditions of scarcity. Although he argued that this was 
the positive, and therefore the scientific approach to economics, he argued 
that it could be pursued largely independently o f empirical work (Backhouse 
2002, 239). Blaug cannot bring himself to accept that Robbins really believed 
that theories should be developed simply though deducing the logical 
consequences o f simple postulates derived from introspection, although this 
would not be incompatible with anything in the book (Blaug 1997, 690). 
Nevertheless, this has become how microeconomics in particular is largely
263
conducted, despite the subsequent rise to prominence o f Popper’s and 
Kuhn’s work.
Friedman published his ‘Essay on Positive Economics’ in 1953. It can be 
concluded from this that he is arguing that predictive accuracy should be the 
sole criteria o f a theory’s validity (Blaug 1997, 694). Given Popper’s insight 
that the step from theory to practical observation is the one step not 
susceptible to logical analysis, and can only be dealt with through a 
professional consensus, Friedman’s proposal is problematic. In the essay itself 
Friedman does to some extent recognise this, although his argument is more 
o f a negative one against criticism of the ‘unrealistic’ assumptions of 
neoclassical economics. Unfortunately, he does not offer any prediction of 
neoclassical economics that had been confirmed, and simply asserts his belief 
that it is fruitful and deserves confidence (Friedman 1953,207).
In many ways positive economics is in political terms a deeply conservative 
concept, because it posits that what exists is in some sense superior to 
alternative preferences, and leads to problems such as the importance 
attached to the Pareto equilibrium. Although this concept recognises that not 
all policy interventions are zero sum, because some changes could be made 
that would improve the economic position of one individual while not 
affecting that o f others, it begs the question what is so crucial about no one 
losing out? Although it can be precisely stated, this is not the only criterion on 
which theoretical concepts are chosen. Why should it be considered o f value 
within an economic theory? It was precisely the failure to tackle particular 
vested interests that lay at the heart of Argentina’s economic failure. This is 
not to say that economists should make decisions based simply on their 
theories, but that their role is to set out likely consequences, and not to reject 
policies, much less whole theories, that may breach normative principles such 
as Pareto equilibrium.
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Perhaps most problematic with the positivist approach to economics is the 
‘rush to policy’ problem. Putting aside Friedman’s exhortation to only accept 
theories with demonstrated predictive power, Robbins’ implication that 
economic consequences can be deduced simply through a combination of 
introspection and deduction provides ample justification for rushing to 
implement policies justified by these untested theories, though normally the 
real justification is political.
Enron and, through the IMF, Argentina, were guided by a political ideology 
and not by scientific principles. This is not the place for a detailed 
consideration o f the experience o f Enron and Argentina as a test o f the 
commitment-credit model, although this may be an interesting subsequent 
research project once more data is available, but it is striking that the theory 
puts at the centre o f attention issues such as managerial accountability and 
legal predictability that are now generally regarded as the reasons behind such 
spectacular, and to some extent unexpected, failures, yet form little part of 
contemporary economic research.
Ideology and politics are not in themselves problematic; in many cases they 
are the only way to gain sufficient consensus to deal with controversial social 
problems, or to take advantage of poorly understood new economic 
opportunities. It is when science and politics are confused that problems arise. 
Although it should be clear that science and politics are different things, this 
in no way means that they have nothing to offer each other. Fayerabend can 
be seen to be making a positive contribution by pointing out the absurdity of 
science ‘trumping’ politics because it has some innate truth that politics lacks. 
Politics can draw on scientific work to identify possible solutions to the 
difficult problems with which it deals, and even to help in arguing the case for 
a solution that has been chosen. Science on the other hand, and social science 
in particular, by being engaged with politics, can be guided as to where 
problems exist that it could tackle with a possibility o f contributing to society,
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from which ultimately it needs resources. Politics here includes both *big P’ 
national politics, and ‘small p ’ managerial politics.
The commitment-credit theory is clearly still in its very early stages, and does 
not offer a great deal of precision; nevertheless, it does offer some benefits to 
society. The germ theory o f disease reinforced a growing focus on the 
importance o f hygiene, long before anything was known about the specific 
molecular processes underlying particular diseases, which are only now 
starting to be understood. But Kuhn recognises that a change in paradigm 
often appears to lose detail. This is clearly the case in microeconomics, where 
contemporary economic theory sets high standards o f precision, and generally 
requires the use o f formal mathematical language. This is a feature, which 
Popper at least recognised as having value, which the framework as set out 
clearly fails to meet. This begs the question, to what extent can this 
formulation be formalised? The arbitrage-free capital market logic is heavily 
formalised, so this may provide a platform to build on. Although it is not 
immediately clear to what extent this could be extended to the innovative and 
productive side o f the economy, apart from the capital markets. An important 
part o f the model is the fundamental uncertainty o f innovation that the capital 
markets exist to share out, and so minimise the extent to which individual 
investors are exposed. However, it may turn out that rather than the 
likelihood of a particular product’s success, statistically it is the number of 
innovations brought to market that is significant overall, together with the 
propensity of consumers to try alternative products and services. Consumer 
choice would act as a ratchet, only repeating purchases of goods and services 
that provide a higher benefit/price ratio, leading to growth in the economy. 
Alternatively, it may turn out that a jurisdiction-independent legal-regulatory 
logic needs to be more carefully articulated, and quantitative measurements 
will always be more subsidiary. Clearly, further research could produce 
important advances here.
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It could be said that the consequences o f the problems with Enron were far 
less severe because it existed in an effectively regulated environment, but it is 
also the case that moving to another employer is routine, while moving to 
another country is not, at least given contemporary restrictions on cross- 
border labour mobility. So while commitment-credit theory does provide a 
paradigm that goes a long way towards understanding many of the issues 
regarding the management o f firms, it is not sufficient for explaining the 
additional complications of national economies. It cannot tell managers what 
to do, but it does seek to address what they perceive as problems and provide 
a conceptual framework that helps them to think through the implications of 
alternative decisions.
What the commitment-credit theory does imply is a shift in economic 
theorising, one largely inverting micro and macro concerns. Micro’s current 
focus is largely on equilibrium, while macro’s is growth. Yet growth is now 
generally understood to be a result of micro activity, producing not just more 
but better goods and services, and should be considered at this level. It 
follows that the role o f the macro-economy, and macroeconomic policy, 
should be to ensure that the micro-level transitions, which innovation implies, 
are enabled to happen in a way that involves the least disruption across the 
economy as a whole, and for the individual people who provide its most 
important raw material. This suggests that further work is needed to build on 
this microeconomic theory, to create a macroeconomic theory that seeks to 
understand the additional role for democratic accountability in regulating 
legal, accounting and financial systems, and in managing the money supply 
and public finances.
O f course, proposing what is effectively a new paradigm for understanding 
microeconomics, one that makes far more sense from a managerial point of 
view than the existing neoclassical one, creates far more questions than 
answers. That is the nature o f a scientific paradigm. Perhaps there is some 
comfort that one question is better understood. Einstein is reported to have
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replied to the question as to what is the most powerful force in the universe, 
with the answer ‘compound interest.’ The commitment-credit theory goes a 
long way to explaining why this makes so much sense, because it puts 
investment rather than production and consumption at the heart o f economic 
analysis. Only time will tell whether the economics profession can abandon 
simple exchange as its central paradigm, and in its place institutionalise 
commitment and credit.
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